Edwina, List: ET: I don't agree that the 'blackboard' exists, and as a homogeneity - it is not the same as Thirdness, which is habit.
Of course the blackboard does not *exist*, since its reality--or rather, the reality of what it represents in Peirce's diagram--precedes the emergence of *any* actuality. Thirdness is not confined to habit alone; homogeneity is an aspect of *continuity*, which is also Thirdness. So is *generality*. ET: The blackboard, is BEFORE the three categories. Peirce even says it is 'utter vagueness' - and that's nothing to do with the three categories. If the three categories together constitute *all* of reality, as Peirce held, then how could *anything *be before them? Vagueness is another word for *indeterminacy*, which is characteristic of both Firstness and Thirdness; only that which falls under Secondness is *determinate*, and thus subject to both the law of contradiction (not vague) and the law of excluded middle (not general). ET: i certainly don't accept 'other-generated' for then, we have to go to 'what generated this other power'? Only if we presuppose that there is no *Ens necessarium*, Being whose reality is eternal and uncreated. I suppose we could say that the choice is between a self-generating universe and a self-sufficient Creator; again, it is then a matter of which one each of us finds more plausible. Regards, Jon On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 2:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon, list > > 1) I disagree that pure energy is 'something'. I consider it as aspatial > and atemporal to be nothing. > > 2) I don't agree that the 'blackboard' *exists*, and as a homogeneity - > it is not the same as Thirdness, which is habit. The blackboard has no > habits. > > 3) I don't think the pure chance is inexplicable. Peirce considers it > [1.410] a fundamental component [along with 2ndness and 3rdness] of the > universe. > > 4) I agree - with Peirce and Aristotle - that randomness and spontaneity > are not the same. Again, Firstness, which is spontaneity is a fundamental > principle of the universe. > > 5) The blackboard, is BEFORE the three categories. Peirce even says it is > 'utter vagueness' - and that's nothing to do with the three categories. > > 6) I don't think that self-generated means 'inexplicable'. It means what > it says: self-generated. The 'utter vagueness' suddenly 'compressed' in > spontaneity into a 'particle'..as outlined in 1.412. > > i certainly don't accept 'other-generated' for then, we have to go to > 'what generated this other power'? > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; Gary Richmond > <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Tuesday, October 18, 2016 1:35 PM > *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology > > Edwina, List: > > ET: Pure undifferentiated energy so to speak. > > > That sounds like *something*, rather than *nothing*. > > ET: Peirce assumes all three categories as 'fundamental elements' - > acting upon each other from the beginning. > > > Except that the clean blackboard is there *before* any chalk mark appears > on it. > > ET: That blackboard has no categorical mode in its makeup. No Firstness, > no Secondness, No Thirdness. > > > According to Peirce, it represents a *continuum*, which is a paradigmatic > example of *Thirdness*. > > ET: When I draw a line - well - where in the world did I and my action > come from????Outer space? > > > You know (and disagree with) my answer to that question. How does a chalk > line come about, if no one is there to draw it? I assume that your answer > is pure chance, which makes it inexplicable, and thus unacceptable to > Peirce. > > CSP: To undertake to account for anything by saying baldly that it is due > to chance would, indeed, be futile. But this I do not do. I make use of > chance chiefly to make room for a principle of generalization, or tendency > to form habits, which I hold has produced all regularities ... I attribute > it altogether to chance, it is true, but to chance in the form of a > spontaneity which is to some degree regular. (CP 6.63; 1892) > > > For Peirce, chance in this context is not *randomness*, it is > *spontaneity*--a characteristic that we routinely attribute to *persons*, > not merely *events*, as something that "is to some degree regular." > > ET: The white chalk line is a Firstness. Not the blackboard. > > > We agree on this. If the blackboard is not Firstness, and--despite > representing a continuum--is not Thirdness, then what else could it be? > Surely not Secondness, since in the beginning there is nothing else with > which it could react. There are only these three categories, so we have no > other options. > > ET: The universe then self-generated and self-organized using the basic > fundamental three categories. > > > Self-*organized* is one thing, since we can observe that kind of behavior > in the universe now. Self-*generated* is another thing altogether; > again, it effectively renders the origin of the universe inexplicable. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 11:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon, list: I guess we'll just continue to disagree but I don't think the >> outline is really that clear in Peirce's writings. I consider from his >> work, that the universe began with 'nothing', in the sense that there was >> no determination, no agenda, ..never mind no actualization. Pure >> undifferentiated energy so to speak. >> >> 1) Peirce's origin seems to be 'in the utter vagueness of completely >> undetermined and dimensionless potentiality" 6.193. Now a good question - >> is this akin to Firstness? My answer to this is: No. >> My problem with this is that I don't consider the categories as realities >> -in-themselves but only as modes of organization of matter/mind. That is - >> they don't, in my readings, seem to even function until AFTER the >> appearance of matter/mind. So- I don't see this as Firstness. >> >> 2) Peirce writes; 'the evolution of forms begins or, at any rate, has for >> an early stage of it, a vague potentiality; and that either is or is >> followed by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great >> for the individual dimensions to be distinct. It must be by a contraction >> of the vagueness of that potentiality of everything in general but of >> nothing in particular, that the world of forms comes about" 6.196. >> >> I read the above 'continuum of forms' as an outline of the operation of >> Thirdness in a mode of Secondness. Does this mean that this original 'utter >> vagueness' is Thirdness-as-Secondness? I don't see this either, since my >> view of Thirdness is that it is a *post hoc* process, acting as >> habit-formations. And as such, it is not 'utter vagueness'. >> >> 3) So- I don't see that any of the categories have a 'pre-existence' so >> to speak. He does suggest, in 6.197 that our current sense-qualities >> [Firstness] are 'but the relics of an ancient ruined continuum of >> qualities'...and that this 'cosmos of sense-qualities...had in an >> antecedent state of development a vaguer being, before the relations of its >> dimensions became definite and contracted" 6.197. >> >> So- my reading of this is that 'the relations of its dimensions' refers >> to the three categories, which are quite specific in their nature and >> function. These appeared AFTER that 'vaguer being' .....The 'general >> indefinite potentiality' 6.199 doesn't seem to describe either Firstness or >> Thirdness. >> >> And Peirce is specific that the emergence of existence didn't come about >> by 'their own inherent firstness. 'They spring up in reaction upon one >> another, and thus into a kind of existence" 6199. >> >> Peirce assumes all three categories as 'fundamental elements' - acting >> upon each other from the beginning. But - again, the pre-categorical world >> doesn't seem to me to be either Firstness or, as you claim, Thirdness. >> >> 4) That blackboard has no categorical mode in its makeup. No Firstness, >> no Secondness, No Thirdness. When I draw a line - well - where in the world >> did I and my action come from????Outer space? The white chalk line is a >> Firstness. Not the blackboard. >> >> Again- my reading of the emergence of the universe is that the three >> categories are *post hoc* fundamental elements. And what was 'there' >> before was obviously 'not there' [there was no time or >> space]...just...vagueness. The universe then self-generated and >> self-organized using the basic fundamental three categories. >> >> That's as far as i can go! >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L >> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 18, 2016 12:16 PM >> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> ET: So- I argue that indeed, everything could come from nothing, via the >> actions of self-organization, as outlined by Peirce in the earlier >> sections... 1.412. >> >> >> Indeed, Nathan Houser's introduction to Volume 1 of *The Essential >> Peirce* (http://www.peirce.iupui.edu/edition.html#introduction) provides >> a similar summary of Peirce's cosmology, as follows. >> >> NH: In the beginning there was *nothing*. But this primordial nothing >> was not the nothingness of a void or empty space, it was a >> *no-thing-ness*, the nothingness characteristic of the absence of any >> determination. Peirce described this state as "completely undetermined and >> dimensionless potentiality," which may be characterized by freedom, chance, >> and spontaneity (CP 6.193, 200). >> >> NH: The first step in the evolution of the world is the transition from >> undetermined and dimensionless potentiality to *determined *potentiality. >> The agency in this transition is chance or pure spontaneity. This new state >> is a Platonic world, a world of pure firsts, a world of qualities that are >> mere eternal possibilities. We have moved, Peirce says, from a state of >> absolute nothingness to a state of *chaos*. >> >> NH: Up to this point in the evolution of the world, all we have is real >> possibility, firstness; nothing is actual yet--there is no secondness. >> Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is self-actualizing, >> and the second great step in the evolution of the world is that in which >> the world of actuality emerges from the Platonic world of qualities. The >> world of secondness is a world of events, or facts, whose being consists in >> the mutual interaction of actualized qualities. But this world does not yet >> involve thirdness, or law. >> >> NH: The transition to a world of thirdness, the third great step in >> cosmic evolution, is the result of a habit-taking tendency inherent in the >> world of events ... A habit-taking tendency is a generalizing tendency, and >> the emergence of all uniformities, from time and space to physical matter >> and even the laws of nature, can be explained as the result of the >> universe's tendency to take habits. >> >> >> Again, this account hinges on the plausibility of attributing "agency" to >> "chance or pure spontaneity," and "self-actualizing" power to "chaos." It >> requires that "the three universes [of experience] must actually be >> absolutely necessary results of a state of utter nothingness" (CP 6.490), >> which I find to be absurd. Houser's use of the word "Somehow" is telling, >> in my opinion; these presuppositions are supposed to contribute to an >> *explanation* of the origin of everything from nothing, and yet they are >> themselves *inexplicable*! As I have said before, Peirce would never >> countenance this, because it effectively blocks the way of inquiry. >> >> CSP: Now, my argument is that, according to the principles of logic, we >> never have a right to conclude that anything is absolutely inexplicable or >> unaccountable. For such a conclusion goes beyond what can be directly >> observed, and we have no right to conclude what goes beyond what we >> observe, except so far as it explains or accounts for what we observe. But >> it is no explanation or account of a fact to pronounce it inexplicable or >> unaccountable, or to pronounce any other fact so. (CP 6.613; 1893) >> >> CSP: The third philosophical stratagem for cutting off inquiry consists >> in maintaining that this, that, or the other element of science is basic, >> ultimate, independent of aught else, and utterly inexplicable--not so much >> from any defect in our knowing as because there is nothing beneath it to >> know. The only type of reasoning by which such a conclusion could possibly >> be reached is *retroduction*. Now nothing justifies a retroductive >> inference except its affording an explanation of the facts. It is, >> however, no explanation at all of a fact to pronounce it *inexplicable*. >> That, therefore, is a conclusion which no reasoning can ever justify or >> excuse. (CP 1.139, EP 2.49; 1898) >> >> CSP: ... the postulate from which all this would follow must not state >> any matter of fact, since such fact would thereby be left unexplained. (CP >> 6.490) >> >> >> Although Houser cites CP 6.193 and 6.200, he does not incorporate the >> blackboard discussion that comes just a few paragraphs later, which Peirce >> explicitly intended to clarify his "wildly confused" preceding comments (CP >> 6.203). The "original vague potentiality" is not *nothing*; it is, >> rather, "a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions," which >> "the clean blackboard" represents diagrammatically with only two >> dimensions. The appearance of the first chalk mark then represents "the >> transition from undetermined and dimensionless potentiality to >> *determined* potentiality." There is not even "a Platonic world," let >> alone "a world of events, or facts," until multiple chalk marks acquire the >> habit of persistence, as well as additional habits that merge them into >> "reacting systems" and aggregates thereof. It is only when "a >> discontinuous mark" appears on the resulting whiteboard (as I am calling >> it) that "this Universe of Actual Existence" comes about (NEM 4.345). >> >> I think that my alternative account is much more consistent with Peirce's >> stated desire "to secure to [T]hirdness its really commanding function" (CP >> 6.202). Although "Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, >> are other elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not >> have anything upon which to operate," nevertheless Thirdness is in some >> sense primordial--continuity (Thirdness) is prior to spontaneity >> (Firstness), and habituality (Thirdness) is prior to actuality >> (Secondness). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 4:48 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon - the difference between us is not merely theism/atheism - where the >>> former accepts an a priori agency - but, where the latter [might] include >>> not an a priori agency but instead, argues for self-organization. >>> >>> So- I argue that indeed, everything could come from nothing, via the >>> actions of self-organization, as outlined by Peirce in the earlier >>> sections... 1.412. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L >>> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>> *Sent:* Monday, October 17, 2016 5:16 PM >>> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> ET: And that can be acceptable even if one defines these atemporal >>> aspatial Platonic world[s] as nothing for in a very real sense, they WERE >>> 'nothing' - being aspatial and atemporal. >>> >>> >>> Only if you *presuppose *that only that which is spatial and temporal >>> can be "something." Peirce does not impose that requirement; in his >>> terminology, the Platonic worlds are *real*, even though they do not >>> *exist*. >>> >>> ET: I don't see why continuity and generality require a 'super-order >>> and super-habit'. >>> >>> >>> According to Peirce in CP 6.490, it is because otherwise, "the three >>> universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter >>> nothingness"; that is, "A state in which there should be absolutely no >>> super-order whatsoever." But in such a state, absolutely nothing is >>> absolutely necessary; in fact, there cannot be *any *Being whatsoever, >>> since "all Being involves some kind of super-order ... Any such >>> super-order would be a super-habit. Any general state of things whatsoever >>> would be a super-order and a super-habit." >>> >>> ET: I think this is a basic disagreement among those of us who are >>> theists vs non-theists! >>> >>> >>> Probably so. It seems to come down to whether one finds it plausible >>> that *everything *could have come from *nothing*. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 3:48 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Gary R, list >>>> That's a nice outline. >>>> >>>> With reference to the Platonic world[s] ...plural...of which only ONE >>>> has been existential - I'm OK with that. And that can be acceptable even if >>>> one defines these atemporal aspatial Platonic world[s] as *nothing* >>>> for in a very real sense, they WERE 'nothing' - being aspatial and >>>> atemporal. >>>> >>>> With regard to Jon's point: Continuity is generality, and generality of >>>> *any >>>> *kind is impossible in the absence of super-order and super-habit; >>>> i.e., the Reality of God. [see ** below]... >>>> >>>> I don't see this; I don't see why continuity and generality require a >>>> 'super-order and super-habit'. I think they merely require >>>> self-organization of order and habit and Peirce outlines this in 1.410. >>>> That is, order and habit emerge WITHIN the particularization of matter. >>>> They don't pre-exist. I think this is a basic disagreement among those of >>>> us who are theists vs non-theists! >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>
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