Hi Jon, List,
I don't detect any impatience, which is good because it will take some patience on our part to dig deeper into the puzzles that stem from Peirce's remarkably compact arguments in "The Neglected Argument." Let me start by focusing on the first points you make about the meaning of create. The references you provide do support the claim that the first meaning of "create" is a good fit with what Peirce says about the creation of the three universes of experience, and I find those references helpful. In particular, they help to focus the attention on the idea of what was created from what. There are a number of ways of looking at the issue. How is something created from nothing? How is existing brute matter created from possibility? How is order created from randomness? These are all good questions. Having said that, I would like to direct attention away from the question of how one thing is created from another to the question of what kind of creativity is being ascribed to God as Ens necessarium? The intransitive meaning of “create” is to originate, or to engage in originative action. Partly for personal reasons, I am intrigued by the example he provides for this intransitive use of the term. He looks at Emerson’s Essay “The Farmer”, and offers the following quote: “the glory of the Farmer is that, in the division of labor, it is his part to create.” If we insert the God into this equation we get: “the glory of God as Ens necessarium is that, in the division of labor, it is his part to create.” Or, for those who find the reference to God hard to make out: “the glory of the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium is that, in the division of labor, it is its part to create.” Following this line of thought, what is it to for something to have the capacity to engage in an originative action. Peirce says this about origination: Originality is being such as that being is, regardless of aught else. CP 2.89 Drawing on this idea, we might think of God's creative act as a self-sufficient act of origination. Or, to put it as a question and in terms that others might find are more palatable to their ears: Is the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium self-sufficient in its originative capacity, or is its capacity to create (e.g., something from nothing, brute matter from possibility, order from randomness, etc.) dependent on something else? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 2:25 PM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories Jeff, List: JD: In saying the God created these universes of experience, is he using the transitive or the intransitive sense, and if it is the former, then which does he seem to have in mind? Is there a good reason not to take him as straightforwardly using his first (transitive) definition, especially since he quotes Genesis 1:1 as his initial example? CSP: To bring into being; cause to exist; specifically, to produce without the prior existence of the material used, or of other things like the thing produced; produce out of nothing. (http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=02&page=459&query=create) Peirce is more explicit about his meaning in his definitions of God as Ens necessarium in some of the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected Argument." CSP: "He by Whom the three Universes of Experience are, supposedly, getting, directly or indirectly, created from Nothing--soberly, from less than a blank." (R 841) CSP: "Reality is not determined by signification; but supposing Him Real, then out of Nothing, out of less than a Blank, He is creating the three Universes of Experience." (R 843) CSP: "He who is creating the three Universes of Experience from Nothing; soberly, from less than a blank." (R 843) I think that we are on pretty solid ground here. JD: So, we're trying to explain the variety in our experience, and then we turn to those homogeneities of connectedness that are found in our experience of space and time. "Homogeneities of connectedness" sound like continuities (Thirdness) to me, and thus bring this passage to mind. CSP: But the saving truth is that there is a Thirdness in experience, an element of Reasonableness to which we can train our own reason to conform more and more. If this were not the case, there could be no such thing as logical goodness or badness; and therefore we need not wait until it is proved that there is a reason operative in experience to which our own can approximate. We should at once hope that it is so, since in that hope lies the only possibility of any knowledge. (CP 5.160, EP 2.212; 1903) I do not wish to seem impatient or dismissive--I sincerely appreciate your characteristically thoughtful contributions to this and other discussions--but how does this help me figure out Universes vs. Categories? Regards, Jon On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Hi Jon, Gary R, List, You asked, "Where does this leave us?" I believe it leaves us with three related areas of inquiry--mathematical logic, phenomenology and semiotics--that we can draw on for the sake of gaining better insight in the questions you've been asking about universes, realms and the modal features of our assertions. Each has its own methods, and we should use them selectively to probe for better answers to those questions. The real trick is putting the results of those areas of inquiry together properly in order to address the really hard questions in cosmological metaphysics and in the special science of cosmology. Before turning to such questions of metaphysics and the special science of cosmology, my understanding is that this discussion started with a look at the opening moves in "A Neglected Argument." In what sense might God as ens necessarium really be creator of the three universes of experience? Or, better yet, in what way might the hypotheses involving such a conception of ens necessarium help to explain puzzling features of these global aspects of our ordinary experience? It will help, I think, to look a little closer at what Peirce might mean by "creator." He provided definitions of "create" and "creation" for the Century dictionary. Why don't we look there to see what hints might be found. He says that create has several meanings. He provides 5 senses of the transitive use of the verb, and then one sense of the transitive. In saying the God created these universes of experience, is he using the transitive or the intransitive sense, and if it is the former, then which does he seem to have in mind? Once that is done, it might help to look closely at what is calling out for explanation within each of these three universes and also between the three. Peirce is pretty good at describing what he has observed, so let's see what is to be found--quite publicly--in our experience as well. The feature that stands out to me are descriptions of this sort "Let the Muser, for example, after well appreciating, in its breadth and depth, the unspeakable variety of each Universe, turn to those phenomena that are of the nature of homogeneities of connectedness in each; and what a pectacle will unroll itself! As a mere hint of them I may point out that every small part of space, however remote, is bounded by just such neighbouring parts as every other, without a single exception throughout immensity. So, we're trying to explain the variety in our experience, and then we turn to those homogeneities of connectedness that are found in our experience of space and time. The homogeneities of connectedness are similar, in some respects, to the those found in the quality of the sound of a trombone moving through the tones, or those found in the change of the colors found in the setting of the sun in evening. Why does these colors, sounds have such homogeneities of connectedness, and why are they similar to those found in space in time? The notion of a homogeneity of connectedness has a rich history in both math and philosophy. Given the fact that he talked of bringing unity to the manifold of impressions in the start of "A New List of the Categories", it might be worth starting there. The reference is clearly to Kant's discussion in the first Critique of what is necessary for brining the manifold of sense into a synthetic unity. The condition of homogeneity is key for understanding how it is possible for such synthesis. How might we understand Peirce's take on this condition for cognizing the manifold--either early on in the discussion of the New List or much later in the Neglected Argument? This, I think, is not an easy question to answer. As a starting point, I think it might help to focus on what Peirce says about the "play" of the imagination. This is a clear reference to Kant's and Schiller's discussion of such play on the part of a Muser who is engaged in aesthetic contemplation. This transition from phenomenological analysis to aesthetic contemplation holds, I think, an especially interesting move on Peirce's part--especially when it comes to understanding how an aesthetic condition for seeking homogeneities of connectedness in our experience might find its source. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354> ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 9:17 AM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories Jeff, List: Thanks, that was helpful but still leaves me with questions. JD: Let us compare three different sorts of discussions of universes, realms and categories: It remains unclear to me what distinctions (if any) we should draw in defining these three terms, even within each of the three types of inquiry that you listed. JD: Peirce talks about three universes of experience as part of his phenomenological inquiries. In the early pages of "A Neglected Argument," the discussion of these universes is largely phenomenological in character. I agree up to a point, especially since Peirce calls them Universes of Experience. However, he also defines each Universe on the basis of that in which the Being of its members consists, which suggests a metaphysical aspect to them; and of course, the overall subject of the article is the Reality of God, which is obviously a metaphysical topic. What makes this especially tricky is that phenomenology/phaneroscopy precedes logic/semeiotic in the architectonic of the sciences, but metaphysics follows it. I take this to mean that semeiotic can depend on phaneroscopy, but is not supposed to depend on metaphysics. Where does this leave us? Regards, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 10:53 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Hi Jon S, Gary R, List, Let me try to simply matters considerably. It will involve a number of oversimplifications, but I'm hoping it might help to address some questions you are finding vexing. Let us compare three different sorts of discussions of universes, realms and categories: 1. The simple systems of formal algebraic and graphical logics--being developed as a part of mathematics 2. The phenomenological inquiries. 3. The semiotic inquiries. Peirce talks about three universes of experience as part of his phenomenological inquiries. In the early pages of "A Neglected Argument," the discussion of these universes is largely phenomenological in character. In the development of the formal systems of algebraic logic and existential graphs, Peirce builds various conceptions that model different universes of discourse and categories. In these different formal systems, the universes and modal notions are treated differently. For instance, the universes of discourse are handled differently in the alpha, beta, and the various systems of the gamma graphs. In the development of the semiotic theory, he uses the formal systems of logical for the purpose of refining the classifications and explanations of the sign relations and patterns of inference. At this point, he needs a philosophical interpretation of the mathematical models--including interpretations of what a sheet of assertion means in the context of the alpha graphs, the beta graphs, and the various versions of the gamma graphs. It might be helpful to think of the phenomenological inquiries concerning the three universes of experience as remarks concerning the more "global" features of our observations--where those observations are informing the classifications and philosophical explanations that being generated in the semiotic theory. Each of these three lines of inquiry--formal logic as a part of mathematics, phenomenological, and semiotic--are informing the others, but in different ways. For instance, in the context of the formal logic, Peirce sees no need to pick between the different ways of conceiving of the universes of discourse and the modal features of the assertions. The alpha system of graphs can make do with a much simpler version of a universe of discourse than is needed for the various systems of the gamma graphs. It isn't the case that one version is right or wrong. They are just different formal systems--like the different systems of numbers (e.g., rationals, reals, surreals) or different systems involving continuity (e.g., topology of one two or three dimensions, projective geometry, metrical geometries). Clearly, some of these different formal systems are more "basic" than the others in some senses, but we should remember that, in the final analysis, they are just different formal systems starting with different sets of initial definitions, postulates and axioms. We seek to build formal system that manifest virtues such as balance and symmetry, but even the systems that lack these virtues may be of some special interest for particular problems. Of course, when we move from these three forms of inquiry to metaphysics, we then need to press the question: what it the best explanation of the nature of what exists as objects and what is real as general? At this point, we can then make use of the prior work that has been done in the math, phenomenology and logic to address the questions of cosmological metaphysics that are so interesting--but hard to answer well. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354> ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 8:18 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories List: Following up on the post below--as I mentioned in the thread on Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology), I now notice that Peirce added the caveat that whether it is correct to assign Subjects to Universes and Predicates to Categories "is a question for careful study" (CP 4.545). He then proceeded to present a long and complicated analysis of propositions to explain why he found it unsatisfactory to view Universes as "receptacles of the Subjects alone" (CP 4.548). At least, I think he did ... CSP: Let us, at least, provide for such a [destined] mode of being in our system of diagrammatization, since it may turn out to be needed and, as I think, surely will. CSP: I will proceed to explain why, although I am not prepared to deny that every proposition can be represented, and that I must say, for the most part very conveniently, under your view that the Universes are receptacles of the Subjects alone, I, nevertheless, cannot deem that mode of analyzing propositions to be satisfactory. (CP 4.547-548) The second sentence here is key, but it is tough to decipher. I assume that "explain why" refers to the preceding assertion that a third mode of being will be needed. The rest is very muddled. What is the relevance of whether "every proposition can be represented"? What, specifically, did Peirce find "very convenient"? Most importantly, what "mode of analyzing propositions" could he not deem to be satisfactory? Am I right to take this as referring to "your view that the Universes are receptacles of the Subjects alone"? I think so, because Peirce went on to suggest, as an alternative, "the principle that each Universe consists, not of Subjects, but the one of True assertions, the other of False, but each to the effect that there is something of a given description." The rest of CP 4.548 is an analysis of two specific propositions using both methods, showing that the alternative is more correct. But this means that there are only two Universes, not three; and they consist of True and False assertions, not Ideas, Things/Facts, and Habits/Laws/Continua. Given the context, I gather that these may refer to the Sheet of Assertion and that which is fenced off from it by a cut. So apparently this passage is apparently not about the "Universes of Experience" at all! Peirce then came back to Categories in CP 4.549. CSP: I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories, but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you have explained as predicates of predicates. That wonderful operation of hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create entia rationis that are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning predicates from being signs that we think or think through, into being subjects thought of. As I also mentioned in the other thread, hypostatic abstraction enables us to convert predicates into subjects. Does this mean that even if we assign subjects to Universes and predicates to Categories, it turns out to be a distinction without a difference? CSP We thus think of the thought-sign itself, making it the object of another thought-sign. Thereupon, we can repeat the operation of hypostatic abstraction, and from these second intentions derive third intentions. Does this series proceed endlessly? I think not. What then are the characters of its different members? My thoughts on this subject are not yet harvested. I will only say that the subject concerns Logic, but that the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny). On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in the different Modes of Being. Meantime, it will be proper that in our system of diagrammatization we should provide for the division, whenever needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality into Realms for the different Predicaments. Now we have "Modes of Being" or "modes of reality" that are identified as "three Universes" and correspond to "Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny)." We also have "Realms for the different Predicaments," which are what we used to call "Categories," but these divisions "must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being"; instead, "the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in the different Modes of Being." Peirce leaves it at that ... and thus I am still confused about Universes and Categories. Regards, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jeff, List: JD: Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between subjects that belong to different universes of discourse. The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in Peirce's theoretical framework that Jappy hypothesizes. How do we reconcile your summary here with the "Prolegomena" passage from 1906, which indicates that Subjects belong to Universes and Predicates belong to Categories? Which 1903 term corresponds to "Universes of Experience" in 1908--"categories of being" or "universes of discourse"? JD: I think that Peirce sometimes dropped the distinction between the realms of the logical categories and the realms of the universes in his later writings when he was examining matters of philosophical necessity and was operating as this very high level of the discussion. My impression--which may be incorrect--is that Peirce stopped talking about Categories altogether in his later writings, and only talked about Universes. Jappy specifically claims that "after 1906 Peirce never again employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs," but I am not entirely sure that this is also true in other areas. JD: My ability to engage in these discussions has been limited due to my daughter’s health issues. Prayers are ascending for your daughter, as well as for you and the rest of your family. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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