Gary R., List: My impression--I would not call it anything stronger--that Peirce wrote about Universes rather than Categories late in his life precedes my acquaintance with Jappy's paper, which happened just this week. That only serves as another data point; his specific claim in a footnote is that "after 1906 Peirce never again employed his categories *as criteria in the classification of signs*" (emphasis added).
It is not feasible to prove the negative, of course--we would have to review every single thing that Peirce wrote after 1906, and the Peirce Edition Project will not get to those documents for many years. By contrast, all it would take to refute the assertion is finding something that Peirce wrote after 1906 that *does *classify signs by employing Categories, rather than Universes. The same is true for my broader hypothesis that Peirce did not discuss Categories at all in his later writings--and your counterexample of "Pragmatism," actually written in 1907, pushes the transition date back at least that far. CSP: Consequently, to the three forms of predicates there must correspond three conceptions of different categories of characters: namely, of a character which attaches to its subject regardless of anything else such as that of being hard, massive, or persistent; of a character which belongs to a thing relatively to a second regardless of any third, such as an act of making an effort against a resistance; and of a character which belongs to a thing as determining a relation between two others, such as that of being transparent or opaque or of coloring what is seen through it. Moreover, turning from the three kinds of predicates to their subjects, since by the "mode of being" of anything can be meant only the kinds of characters which it has, or is susceptible of taking, corresponding to the three kinds of characters, there must be three categories of things: first, those which are such as they are regardless of anything else, like the living consciousness of a given kind of feeling, say of red; secondly, those which are such as they are by virtue of their relation to other things, regardless of any third things, which is the case with the existence of all bodies, whose reality consists in their acting on each other, in pairs; thirdly, those which are such as they are by virtue of bringing two others into relation, as signs of all sorts are such only so far as they bring their significance to bear upon the objects to which they are applied. (EP 2.427-428; 1907) Peirce gave no indication here--the year *after *writing "Prolegomena," and the year *before* writing "A Neglected Argument"--of applying the term "categories" only to predicates, or of abandoning it for "universes" when referring to subjects. In fact, what he said next seems to clinch the case *against *my impression. CSP: I have followed out this trichotomy into many other ramifications, and have uniformly found it to be a most useful polestar in my explorations into the different branches of philosophy. There is no fallacy in it; for it asserts nothing, but only offers suggestions. It has preserved me, in innumerable cases, from one-side opinions. It has had me search in directions that it has indicated for points of view that I should otherwise have overlooked. I do not claim that it is a novelty;--or rather, to express myself more frankly, I do not confess that it is a novelty. For it is my conviction that any philosophical idea that in this age of the world is altogether novel is subject to a *prima facie* presumption of falsity. (EP 2.428; 1907) Thus I am now inclined to reject my own hypothesis, and I thank you for bringing this to my attention. As for Jappy's assertion, I can only point to this statement a few paragraphs later that has at least *some *bearing on the classification of signs. CSP: It is easy to see that there are three kinds of interpretants of signs. Our categories suggest this ... (EP 2.430; 1907) Peirce went on to describe the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants, but it remains a matter of considerable debate whether these correspond to the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants or the trichotomies of each as feeling/action/thought. So now we can move on to the next question--given that Peirce still affirmed his three Categories, why did he *sometimes *instead refer to three Universes in his later writings? I did not consciously intend anything by "in favor of" that differs significantly from my use here of "rather than" or "instead," other than the presumption that such use of terminology must have been deliberate on Peirce's part. It seems to signal that he saw a genuine difference between the two, and decided that "Universes" was more appropriate for what he was discussing in certain contexts than "Categories." That distinction is what I am still trying to figure out. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 12:05 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, Jeff D, List, > > Jon wrote: "There seems to be some evidence that Peirce may have stopped > talking about Categories in favor of Universes late in his life; I want to > know whether that is really the case, and if so, what significance we > should attribute to this." > > Jon, you earlier mentioned one piece of 'evidence', as I recall, in > support of the notion "that Peirce may have stopped talking about > Categories in favor of Universes late in his life" connected with some of > Jappy's recent comments (or was it exactly those comments)? Would you point > to that specific piece of evidence (or pieces of evidence) again? Is there > additional evidence which you might point to? > > What does your expression "in favor of" imply imply (if anything)? > Assuming there is such (much?) evidence, what significance do *you* > attribute to this strange, imo, ceasation of nearly a lifetime of analyzing > Categories "in favor of" talk of Universes? For example, it seems to me > that it is possible that the Categories are so fully developed in Peirce's > theory and thinking that they "go without saying," in a manner of speaking. > > What date would you point to when Peirce begins this putative switch from > Categories to Universes? How many times--and in what places--does he > discuss Universes after having 'ceased' discussing Categories? That is, > what is the frequency of his discussions of Universes after that time? Is > it often or oaccional? Aren't there yet categorial discussions at least as > late as the 1908 "Pragmatism" essay? > > You "supposed" that your claim that there is "evidence that Peirce may > have stopped talking about Categories in favor of Universes" may have been, > as you wrote, "one of my 'aims and motivations,' but it is not really the > primary one at the moment, since God as Creator is uncontroversial for me > personally." Is such a belief better supported in some way by a cessation > of discussions of Categories in favor of Universes? (Well, you say it's > "uncontroversial," so I guess it doesn't matter one way or the other?) If > so how or how not? > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >
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