Jon, list: Thank you for that.
I dare you all to think about this conversation NOT in context of CP 5.189. one two three... C A B... icon index symbol... Firstness Secondness Thirdness... esthetics ethics logic spiritedness desire reason... name definition essence... Father Son Spirit... abduction deduction induction... Best, Jerry R On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff, List: > > At first, I was not sure how helpful CP 6.395&397 could be, since they are > from an article published in 1878, 20 years before RLT and 30 years before > "A Neglected Argument." Leaving aside that concern, I read through the > subsequent text and came to wonder if the "general characteristic of the > universe" that Peirce said in CP 6.397 "would be of such singular > assistance to us in all our future reasoning that it would deserve a place > almost at the head of the principles of logic" is what he described a few > paragraphs later. > > CSP: ... while a certain amount of order exists in the world, it would > seem that the world is not so orderly as it might be, and, for instance, > not so much so as a world of pure chance would be. But we can never get to > the bottom of this question until we take account of a highly-important > logical principle which I now proceed to enounce. This principle is that > any plurality or lot of objects whatever have some character in common (no > matter how insignificant) which is peculiar to them and not shared by > anything else. The word "character" here is taken in such a sense as to > include negative characters ... (CP 6.401-402; 1878) > > > He then proceeded to show that "any two things, *A* and *B*, have in > common" the character of "un-*A*-*B*-lessness," and concluded, "It is > obvious that what has thus been shown true of two things is *mutatis > mutandis*, true of any number of things." It seems to me that having > something in common is a form of similarity; i.e., it entails a *relation* > between > them. Since any two (or more) objects have some character in common, it is > also the case that any two (or more) objects have a relation between > them--including two random spots on a page--and thus are intelligible, and > thus manifest what Peirce (much later) called super-order. > > This is my current hypothesis about Peirce's position on "What sort of a > conception we ought to have of the universe, how to think of the > *ensemble* of things," especially when we translate it into the notion of > continuity. What you noticed in italics on page 259 of RLT is telling, I > think. > > CSP: We can hardly but suppose that those sense-qualities that we now > experience ... are but the relics of an ancient ruined continuum of > qualities, like a few columns standing here and there in testimony that > here some old-world forum with its basilica and temples had once made a > magnificent *ensemble*. (RLT:258-259) > > > The ensemble corresponds to the original, most general continuum of *potential > *qualities, out of which are determined the individual sense-qualities > that *actually *occur--like the discrete columns that remain from the > ancient (continuous) forum. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 8:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > > wrote: > >> Jeff, List: >> >> I will try to take a closer look at this later. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 3:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jon S, Gary R, List, >>> >>> Given our interest in providing a clearer meaning for the conceptions of >>> order and Super-order, I think that these passages might be helpful. >>> >>> Any proposition whatever concerning the order of Nature must touch more >>> or less upon religion. In our day, belief, even in these matters, depends >>> more and more upon the observation of facts. If a remarkable and universal >>> orderliness be found in the universe, there must be some cause for this >>> regularity, and science has to consider what hypotheses might account for >>> the phenomenon. One way of accounting for it, certainly, would be to >>> suppose that the world is ordered by a superior power. But if there is >>> nothing in the universal subjection of phenomena to laws, nor in the >>> character of those laws themselves (as being benevolent, beautiful, >>> economical, etc.), which goes to prove the existence of a governor of the >>> universe, it is hardly to be anticipated that any other sort of evidence >>> will be found to weigh very much with minds emancipated from the tyranny of >>> tradition. (CP 6.395) >>> >>> And then, two paragraphs later: >>> >>> If we could find out any general characteristic of the universe, any >>> mannerism in the ways of Nature, any law everywhere applicable and >>> universally valid, such a discovery would be of such singular assistance to >>> us in all our future reasoning that it would deserve a place almost at the >>> head of the principles of logic. On the other hand, if it can be shown that >>> there is nothing of the sort to find out, but that every discoverable >>> regularity is of limited range, this again will be of logical importance. >>> What sort of a conception we ought to have of the universe, how to think of >>> the ensemble of things, is a fundamental problem in the theory of >>> reasoning. (CP 6.397) >>> >>> So, how should we "think of the ensemble of things"? Peirce provides the >>> definition for "ensemble" in the Century Dictionary. In the second >>> definition of the term, he characterizes the mathematical use of the >>> conception. In that definition, he makes a distinction between an ensemble >>> of the first genus, the second genus, and a tout ensemble. It is clear, I >>> think, that he is talking about a tout ensemble at 6.397. What is more, I >>> believe that he is talking about a tout ensemble in RLT, when he puts the >>> word in italics on page 259. How should we think of order and Super-order >>> as they are applied to each of these three sorts of ensembles? >>> >>> He explicitly uses "tout ensemble" in the following passage: >>> >>> The division of modes of Being needs, for our purposes, to be carried a >>> little further. A feeling so long as it remains a mere feeling is >>> absolutely simple. For if it had parts, those parts would be something >>> different from the whole, in the presence of which the being of the whole >>> would consist. Consequently, the being of the feeling would consist of >>> something beside itself, and in a relation. Thus it would violate the >>> definition of feeling as that mode of consciousness whose being lies >>> wholly in itself and not in any relation to anything else. In short, a >>> pure feeling can be nothing but the total unanalyzed impression of the >>> tout ensemble of consciousness. Such a mode of being may be called simple >>> monadic Being. CP 6.345 >>> >>> Given the fact that Peirce draws this meaning of "tout ensemble" from >>> mathematics, I'm wondering if some examples from topology, projective >>> geometry or metrical geometry might help to clarify the differences between >>> a tout ensemble and ensembles of the first and second genus. Peirce offers >>> the example of Desargues' theory of Involution and its use in the 6 point >>> theorem on page 245. How does the conception of an ensemble apply in this >>> case where we are looking at the intersection of these rays as they are >>> projected from their origins at Q and R? >>> >>> The upshot of this example is made clearer when he says that Cayley >>> showed that the whole of geometrical metric is but a special problem in >>> geometrical optic. The point Peirce is making is that the development of >>> the conception of a projective absolute as a locus in space was central for >>> thinking about the character of projective space as a whole--i.e., as a >>> tout ensemble. Taken as a whole, the topological character of the space is >>> something that we study by a process of decomposition. That is, we cut it >>> up and see how the parts are connected. In this way, we come to see what >>> Listing numbers are for the Chorisis, Cyclosis, Periphraxis and Immensity >>> of such a space. The Periphraxis and Immensity, I take it, are especially >>> important in understanding the character of the tout ensemble of a >>> projective space. He says that the Periphraxis of perspective space is 1, >>> and that the Immensity of any figure in our space is 0, except for the >>> entirety of space itself, for which the Immensity is 1. >>> >>> These kinds of exercises in mathematics are essential, I believe, for >>> understanding the points he is illustrating using the diagram involving >>> blackboard on pages 261-3. How might we draw them out? >>> >>> --Jeff >>> >>> Jeffrey Downard >>> Associate Professor >>> Department of Philosophy >>> Northern Arizona University >>> (o) 928 523-8354 >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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