Jeff: Your comments about mathematics and phenomenology are well-taken. I am reminded of this remark by Peirce, which Guardiano omitted when quoting what immediately followed.
CSP: What is reality? Perhaps there isn't any such thing at all. As I have repeatedly insisted, it is but a retroduction, a working hypothesis which we try, our one desperate forlorn hope of knowing anything. Again it may be, and it would seem very bold to hope for anything, that the hypothesis of reality though it answers pretty well, does not perfectly correspond to what is. But if there is any reality, then, so far as there is any reality ... (NEM 4:343, RLT 161; 1898) On the other hand, this thread is an offshoot from one about Metaphysics and Nothing, which itself was an offshoot from one about Peirce's Cosmology; so it seems to me that mathematics and phenomenology are pertinent only to the extent that they inform our discussion of such topics. Hence if my questions about the "absolute" are not "on point," then it is unclear to me what the point actually is. JD: What is the advantage of taking different perspectives--where we are highlighting what is predominately of the character of firstness, secondness or thirdness--when we seek to "comprehend the Reality of Phenomena?" Guardiano argues that the Categories have a fundamental role in grounding *any *inquiry, and also sees his approach as "illuminating the rational or logical coherence" of Peirce's cosmogony. However, I am less interested in the fact that he assigns each analysis to the "perspective" of one Category than in the resulting descriptions, which concisely summarize the three most common interpretations in terms of categorial sequence--1ns>2ns>3ns vs. 1ns>3ns>2ns vs. 3ns>1ns>2ns. In Gary R.'s vectorial terminology, this is order vs. process vs. representation. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Nov 8, 2016 at 5:38 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Hello, > > Is Peirce a three category realist? Let me point out a few things that I > take to be obvious. For the purposes of inquiry in both pure mathematics > and phenomenology, Peirce was a no-category realist. For methodological > reasons, Peirce holds that we should not import those kinds of > metaphysical assertions about what is and isn't real into the way we go > about answering questions in pure mathematics and in phenomenology. On > this point, I am in agreement with Peirce. > > When we get to the normative sciences, things get more complicated. What > kinds of assertions can be warranted within the context of inquiry in the > pure sciences of aesthetics, ethics and semiotics about the general > features of what is and isn't really found in nature? > > The answer, I think, is rather complicated. In short, he is working to > progressively to richer conceptions concerning what is real--as those are > needed to justify claims about what kind of ideal is most attractive for > its own sake, what kind of conduct is right, and what forms of inference are > valid and modes of inquiry are best suited for different kinds of > questions. While his position develops over time, most of the assertions > about what is real that are made in the normative sciences are warranted > as something akin to regulative principles that guide inquiry. > > In the context of metaphysics, is Peirce a three category realist? The > answer, of course, is yes. Max Fisch is making a point that he takes to be > obvious. Having said that, the questions of where each of the categories > might really be found in nature and what shapes the categories might take > when treated as metaphysical conceptions is something that has no easy > answer--not even as a summary of the conclusions that he draws. Within the > context of metaphysics, which of the assertions concerning the nature of > what is are still "really" being made as something akin to a regulative > principle and which general claims about what is real are being warranted > on the bases of observational evidence that are sufficient to say that we > can reasonably believe or know that it is literally true? In many cases, > Peirce is arriving at his conclusions by showing that they are the best > hypotheses--all things considered. In some cases, certain hypotheses can be > rejected, but in most, what we are able to do is to delineate a space of > plausible hypotheses--and then we can dicker over which are best within > that space of possible explanations. > > Peirce's view, I think, is nicely summarized in the following passage: > > 121. Philosophy has three grand divisions. The first is Phenomenology, > which simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon and discerns its > ubiquitous elements, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, together > perhaps with other series of categories. The second grand division is > Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of > the relation of Phenomena to *Ends, *that is, perhaps, to Truth, > Right, and Beauty. The third grand division is Metaphysics, which endeavors > to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena. Now Reality is an affair of > Thirdness as Thirdness, that is, in its mediation between Secondness and > Firstness. Most, if not all of you, are, I doubt not, Nominalists; and I > beg you will not take offence at a truth which is just as plain and > undeniable to me as is the truth that children do not understand human > life. To be a nominalist consists in the undeveloped state in one's mind of > the apprehension of Thirdness as Thirdness. The remedy for it consists > in allowing ideas of human life to play a greater part in one's > philosophy. Metaphysics is the science of Reality. Reality consists in > regularity. Real regularity is active law. Active law is efficient > reasonableness, > or in other words is truly reasonable reasonableness. Reasonable > reasonableness > is Thirdness as Thirdness. > > What is the advantage of taking different perspectives--where we are > highlighting what is predominately of the character of firstness, > secondness or thirdness--when we seek to "comprehend the Reality of > Phenomena?" > > --Jeff > > PS Jon S, I hope this response makes it clear that I don't think > the questions you've raised about the Peirce's developing conception of the > "absolute" are on point. > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 >
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