> On Jan 30, 2017, at 9:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > But I don't think that Peirce argued that the laws/symmetries are real, > 'independent of the objects' for wouldn't that be similar to 'logically > prior'??. My view is that the laws are real, as general operational forces > but they have no power/reality except as 'articulated' within the objects. > [This may be what you meant anyway].
Well with logical it depends upon the type of analysis one is doing. That’s largely independent of the ontological priority and deals more with priority in terms of the terms in ones arguments in logical analysis. The issue of object independence is tricky of course. You’re completely right that for Peirce whether they are truly independent of the objects is tricky - especially if one invokes his cosmological views. That’s true for many realisms about properties like color for some thinkers. Say Armstrong in the 20th century where his universals really aren’t independent of the objects that exemplify them. Probably a better and more careful way to make the distinction is to talk about reduction. The properties aren’t independent of the objects that hold them but can’t be reduced to the objects that hold them. Even that way of thinking some might object to (again Armstrong Universals are a good example).
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