Eric, List: With respect to probability, I am reminded (for obvious reasons) of this passage.
CSP: According to what has been said, the idea of probability essentially belongs to a kind of inference which is repeated indefinitely. An individual inference must be either true or false, and can show no effect of probability; and, therefore, in reference to a single case considered in itself, probability can have no meaning. Yet if a man had to choose between drawing a card from a pack containing twenty-five red cards and a black one, or from a pack containing twenty-five black cards and a red one, and if the drawing of a red card were destined to transport him to eternal felicity, and that of a black one to consign him to everlasting woe, it would be folly to deny that he ought to prefer the pack containing the larger proportion of red cards, although, from the nature of the risk, it could not be repeated. It is not easy to reconcile this with our analysis of the conception of chance. But suppose he should choose the red pack, and should draw the wrong card, what consolation would he have? He might say that he had acted in accordance with reason, but that would only show that his reason was absolutely worthless. And if he should choose the right card, how could he regard it as anything but a happy accident? He could not say that if he had drawn from the other pack, he might have drawn the wrong one, because an hypothetical proposition such as, "if A, then B," means nothing with reference to a single case. Truth consists in the existence of a real fact corresponding to the true proposition. Corresponding to the proposition, "if A, then B," there may be the fact that whenever such an event as A happens such an event as B happens. But in the case supposed, which has no parallel as far as this man is concerned, there would be no real fact whose existence could give any truth to the statement that, if he had drawn from the other pack, he might have drawn a black card. Indeed, since the validity of an inference consists in the truth of the hypothetical proposition that if the premisses be true the conclusion will also be true, and since the only real fact which can correspond to such a proposition is that whenever the antecedent is true the consequent is so also, it follows that there can be no sense in reasoning in an isolated case, at all. (CP 2.652; 1878/1893) It seems to me that the nominalist who insists that only that which is actual is real effectively turns *all *of our experience into a series of "isolated cases" in this sense. As for your second set of remarks, Peirce was adamant that his version of pragmatism, which he came to call pragmaticism in order to distinguish it from that of others (especially William James), required "a logical realism of the most pronounced type" (CP 6.163; 1892). CSP: Another doctrine which is involved in Pragmaticism as an essential consequence of it ... is the scholastic doctrine of realism. This is usually defined as the opinion that there are real objects that are general, among the number being the modes of determination of existent singulars, if, indeed, these be not the only such objects. But the belief in this can hardly escape being accompanied by the acknowledgment that there are, besides, real *vagues*, and especially real possibilities. For possibility being the denial of a necessity, which is a kind of generality, is vague like any other contradiction of a general. Indeed, it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon. (CP 5.453; 1905) However, this is not at all to say that *every *general is real. CSP: As to reality, one finds it defined in various ways; but if that principle of terminological ethics that was proposed be accepted, the equivocal language will soon disappear. For *realis *and *realitas *are not ancient words. They were invented to be terms of philosophy in the thirteenth century, and the meaning they were intended to express is perfectly clear. That is *real *which has such and such characters, whether anybody thinks it to have those characters or not. At any rate, that is the sense in which the pragmaticist uses the word. Now, just as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing certain habits of conduct, the nature of which (as to illustrate the meaning, peaceable habits and not quarrelsome habits) does not depend upon any accidental circumstances, and *in that sense* may be said to be *destined*; so, thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be the same in the end, however the perversity of thought of whole generations may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation. If this be so, as every man of us virtually assumes that it is, in regard to each matter the truth of which he seriously discusses, then, according to the adopted definition of "real," the state of things which will be believed in that ultimate opinion is real. But, for the most part, such opinions will be general. Consequently, *some *general objects are real. (Of course, nobody ever thought that *all *generals were real; but the scholastics used to assume that generals were real when they had hardly any, or quite no, experiential evidence to support their assumption; and their fault lay just there, and not in holding that generals could be real.) (CP 5.430; 1905) I have personally found Paul Forster's book, *Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism*, helpful for sorting out these kinds of issues; but some others on the List have a less favorable opinion of it. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 2:05 PM, Eric Charles < eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, many thanks! Adding to the discussion: > > Does that mean that if I told a nominalist that if I repeatedly shuffled a >> deck of cards, and then looked at the top card, there was a 1/4 *chance* >> of drawing a heart, they would say I was talking gibberish? >> > > JAS: Probably not; but once you have finished shuffling the cards, there > is technically no *objective *chance involved at all; at that point, the > top card is in one of the four suits, but you simply do not know which > until you look at it. Arguably, there is no objective chance even *before > *you shuffle the cards, because the act of shuffling does not make the > arrangement of the cards *genuinely *random. It is an *epistemic *limitation > that makes it uncertain, rather than an *ontological *limitation. > > EC: Well... that seems like a different sort of issue. That is a straight > forward issue of whether we exist in a deterministic world, and that can't > be nominalist-realist distinction, can it? > > If we allow probability of any type, then before I begin shuffling there > *is* a probability that I will turn over a heart at the end, but once I > am done shuffling, any reference to probability is for some quite different > purpose. That is, it would still make lots of sense to be talking about > probability at the end, if I was teaching someone how to calculate pot-odds > in poker, in which case "probability of flipping a heart" is caveated by > "in future situations like the current ones in crucial ways." But it would > not make sense for me to talk about the probability at the end in reference > to the actual top-card at that moment. > > Or, to phrase it differently, if we believe that *anything* > entails chance, we might as well believe that the future order of a deck of > cards, which is about to be repeatedly shuffled with a reasonable amount of > random-imperfection, is an example of a non-determined outcome. I can't see > how being a nominalist or a realist would affect that judgment. > > The issue of how explain the probability is a different issue. You could > phrase it as a frequentist talking about sufficiently similar situations > (which I take to be a nominalist interpretation). You could phrase it in > terms of possible worlds (ala Carnap). You could phrase it as a genuine > probabilists who feels the future is not determined (as I think Peirce > would). However, unless those phrasings can be distinguished in terms of > potential-outcomes under certain arranged conditions... the metaphysics > behind them is just window dressing; it is valuable, if at all, only in > terms of the relative ability to transmit true information to the current > audience, and not in terms of any inherent similarity to > that-upon-which-we-will-ultimately-agree. > > ----- > > >> I suspect that the nominalist would not be flustered by such claims, >> though they might caveat them in minor ways. >> >> If I am correct about that, then it is unclear to me what *actual* >> happening we could observe, under the circumstances of some to-be-arranged >> experiment, to distinguish which approach is correct. >> > > JAS: I agree that nominalists will not likely be troubled by these kinds > of questions. However, they also will not be able to provide explanations > for their common-sense answers, other than something like, "Because that is > just the way that those individual objects (and ones sufficiently similar > to them) happen to behave." Again, Peirce's primary objection to this > aspect of nominalism is that it tends to block the way of inquiry; if one > does not believe that there are *real *qualities and *real *habits/laws > apart from their actualizations, then why go looking for them? The > formulation of a "law of nature" as a conditional necessity that governs an > inexhaustible continuum of potential cases--e.g., "if I *were *to scratch *any > *diamond with a knife, then it *would *remain unmarked"--is unwarranted > under nominalism, except as an inexplicable brute fact. > > EC: I'm still struggling to understand what that looks like in practice. > If I ask a nominalist why all the fried, salted, pork belly I have had is > (generally) delicious, you say that they couldn't answer "because bacon is > delicious" or "because bacon has a salt-fat-protein ration that humans have > evolved to find reinforcing" or "because the devil wants you to eat more > unclean food", they could only answer "Because that is just the way that > those individual objects happen to be" or "Because those objects which you > happen to mistakenly lump under the term 'bacon', produce a variety > of states which you mistakenly label 'delicious'." I can't imagine meeting > a person who limited themselves in a such a manner outside painfully > awkward academic conversations. > > I don't mean to seem obtuse or obstructionist, but this still seems like > exactly the type of conflict that Pragmatism should be able to render moot, > rather than have a side on. I note that while no one above has made quite > so bold a statement, a few people seem to have chimed in to say that they > think the distinction is of little importance. > > The best examples above evidencing a consequence of which side you fall on > in the nominalist-realist debates are highly social examples, in which I > suspect (as indicated in my reply to John) taking a side on the > nominalist-realist debates is merely a smokescreen for forwarding > pre-existing biases, with no logical connection to the intellectual > distinction. Let us say, for example, that I believe "race" is a construct > that is not "real" in any sense beyond a bunch of people happening to agree > to treat people differently based on a hodge-podge of poorly correlated > variables. I take it that makes me a "nominalist" with respect to race, and > it is a good example, because I really do believe that. It does not follow > from my thinking that racial labels are "just labels" that I think such > labels have no affect, nor does it follow that I don't think other labels > reflect real differences. It is primarily a statement that I am confident > that the end-time-agreement will not include those particular labels, i.e., > that when people come to think clearly about the issues and the dust > settles from the investigations, the endeavor will be understood as > vacuous. Meanwhile, I am a realist about all sorts of other things, > including being an aggressive psychological realist (which I have tried not > to bring out in response to some of the replies above, because I think it > would be a distraction here). > > In that context, once you have Peirce's definition of "real", the only > coherent thing the philosophical nominalist could be arguing is that there > will be no end-time-agreement about what types of things are worth labeling > or what any labels should be. Is that what is going on here? > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Supervisory Survey Statistician > U.S. Marine Corps > <echar...@american.edu> > > On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 1:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Eric, List: >> >> Responses inserted below. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 10:14 AM, Eric Charles < >> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Jon, >>> As I understand you, a nominalist would say that "possibilities" are not >>> part of "real" and that "habit/law" is not part of "real". >>> >> >> JAS: My understanding is that a nominalist would say that >> "possibilities" and "habits/laws" are real *only *to the extent that >> they are instantiated in *actual *things and events. Peirce would >> acknowledge that they *exist *only to that extent, but that they are >> *real* in themselves such that we can meaningfully refer to them as >> "may-bes" and "would-bes," respectively. Remember, "real" here means >> "being what it is regardless of how any person or finite group of people >> thinks about it" and "the object of the final opinion, the consensus of an >> infinite community after indefinite inquiry." >> >> >>> Does that mean that if I told a nominalist that if I repeatedly shuffled >>> a deck of cards, and then looked at the top card, there was a 1/4 >>> *chance* of drawing a heart, they would say I was talking gibberish? >>> >> >> JAS: Probably not; but once you have finished shuffling the cards, there >> is technically no *objective *chance involved at all; at that point, the >> top card is in one of the four suits, but you simply do not know which >> until you look at it. Arguably, there is no objective chance even *before >> *you shuffle the cards, because the act of shuffling does not make the >> arrangement of the cards *genuinely *random. It is an *epistemic *limitation >> that makes it uncertain, rather than an *ontological *limitation. >> >> >>> What if I told them it is likely organisms will exist in 2 million years >>> with traits that do not exist today? >>> >>> What if I told them that, as a general rule, things that are heavier >>> than the surrounding air sink towards the center of the earth when >>> released? >>> >>> Or that, as a matter of habit, I put my right sock on before my left? >>> >>> I suspect that the nominalist would not be flustered by such claims, >>> though they might caveat them in minor ways. >>> >>> If I am correct about that, then it is unclear to me what *actual* >>> happening we could observe, under the circumstances of some to-be-arranged >>> experiment, to distinguish which approach is correct. >>> >>> P.S. I anticipate you might accuse me of begging the question in that >>> last part (by use of the italicized word), but I am inquiring nonetheless, >>> as it seems a fair question for a pragmatist to ask. >>> >> >> JAS: I agree that nominalists will not likely be troubled by these kinds >> of questions. However, they also will not be able to provide explanations >> for their common-sense answers, other than something like, "Because that is >> just the way that those individual objects (and ones sufficiently similar >> to them) happen to behave." Again, Peirce's primary objection to this >> aspect of nominalism is that it tends to block the way of inquiry; if one >> does not believe that there are *real *qualities and *real *habits/laws >> apart from their actualizations, then why go looking for them? The >> formulation of a "law of nature" as a conditional necessity that governs an >> inexhaustible continuum of potential cases--e.g., "if I *were *to >> scratch *any *diamond with a knife, then it *would *remain unmarked"--is >> unwarranted under nominalism, except as an inexplicable brute fact. >> >
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