Edwina, List: I am not pointing out our differences to *you*, I am pointing them out to *others *reading along, especially any newcomers like Eric who are presumably not familiar with our past discussions.
Regarding #1, I do not know what you mean by "primoridal determinism." I was simply alluding to CP 6.24-25, where Peirce declared explicitly for objective idealism rather than dualism, neutralism, or materialism. Regarding #2, once again you insist on assigning a pejorative label to my view. It is *not *Platonic, it is Aristotelian (and Peircean), since I clearly and consistently affirm that 3ns does not *exist *apart from 2ns (and 1ns). Reality, being whatever it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it, is not limited to existence, reacting with the other like things in the environment. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 1:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > JAS: Yes, I disagree, strongly, with point #1, which seems to me to be > primordial determinism and I've no idea why you need to, again, point out > our differences to me. > > As for point #2, of course the reality of laws can't be reduced to their > existences; that would be akin to reducing Thirdness to Secondness - and I > certainly don't accept that. BUT, in contrast to your view, I don't agree > that Thirdness can exist 'per se'; they 'exist' only within an individual > articulation. Again, Peirce was an Aristotelian, not a Platonist - and your > view is Platonic.\ > That's all I'll say on this; I won't get into a debate. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Monday, January 30, 2017 12:16 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism > > Edwina, List: > > What you quoted from Clark was his description of "a very nominalist > conception of thermodynamics." By contrast, I think that Peirce quite > clearly held (1) that the mental (psychical law) is primordial relative to > the material (physical laws), and (2) that the *reality *of laws (as well > as qualities) cannot be reduced to the *existence *of their actual > occurrences; they *do *have "some ontological mode of their own," which > is 3ns (or 1ns) rather than 2ns. I know that you disagree on both counts, > and no one (including me) wants us to engage in yet another "exegetical > battle," so I am simply mentioning my alternative view in the context of > this particular discussion. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 10:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Clark, you wrote: >> >> "So you don’t need the idea of laws logically prior to the objects to >> make sense of them. Just properties inherent to the objects. (There’d still >> be an ontological question about some of these properties like overlap and >> interactions of course — but in theory you could argue they inhere to the >> objects rather than are independent of them) >> >> Peirce’s solution really is to argue that symmetries are themselves real >> independent of the objects." >> >> I agree that the laws are not really 'logically prior' to the objects >> for that would suggest that these laws have some ontological mode of their >> own even if it is not material but mental. >> >> But I don't think that Peirce argued that the laws/symmetries are real, >> 'independent of the objects' for wouldn't that be similar to 'logically >> prior'??. My view is that the laws are real, as general operational forces >> but they have no power/reality except as 'articulated' within the objects. >> [This may be what you meant anyway]. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU> >> *Sent:* Monday, January 30, 2017 11:23 AM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism >> >> On Jan 29, 2017, at 12:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> I would not call it a "force," but I agree that the traditional debate is >> about whether there is something *real *(hence "realism") that all >> rabbits have in common to make them rabbits vs. "rabbits" merely being a >> *name *(hence "nominalism") that we apply to many different individuals >> simply because we happen to perceive them as having certain similarities. >> Even this way of putting it arguably concedes too much to nominalism, >> because it implies that the universal or general is a *thing *that is >> somehow *identically *instantiated in multiple *other *things. >> >> A good place where this debate appears is thermodynamics. It’s fairly >> well known that defining a system with spatially extended objects with >> various symmetries allows one to define the laws of thermodynamics. Now >> this is a very nominalist conception of thermodynamics yet importantly it >> is one where the laws arise out of the symmetries of matter. So you don’t >> need the idea of laws logically prior to the objects to make sense of them. >> Just properties inherent to the objects. (There’d still be an ontological >> question about some of these properties like overlap and interactions of >> course — but in theory you could argue they inhere to the objects rather >> than are independent of them) >> >> Peirce’s solution really is to argue that symmetries are themselves real >> independent of the objects. >> >> Now this won’t work for foundational physics due to the crazy nature of >> quantum mechanics. It’s much harder (IMO) to formulate a quantum mechanics >> in terms of nominalism. People still try to do it of course, but it’s >> usually via a ontological slight of hand where the foundational laws place >> isn’t dealt with. You can see that slight of hand in say New Atheist >> arguments about why there is something rather than nothing. The >> foundational laws of physics are always part of this ‘before’ yet not seen >> as ‘something.’ Effectively they need a real lawlike prescriptive feature >> of the universe prior to there being an universe. Really this has the role >> God does for deists and the distinction between a deist and an atheist >> blurs at best. Of course this was common even in early modernism where >> extreme nominalists still put God into the picture. >> >> Effectively a big reason why realism was a thing before was theology >> (whether pagan for the neoplatonists or in the medieval era and renaissance >> God for the Christians, Jews and Muslims and even for deists) So nominalism >> was a slow development partially done as science became independent from >> religion. After Newton it became possible to really conceive of all of >> reality in terms of deterministic atom and a few laws so nominalism took >> off and became the mainstream intellectual view. >> >>
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