Gary F, Jeff, List, Please excuse my ignorance.
What is NDTR ? Thanks in advance. Sung On Fri, Dec 18, 2015 at 3:46 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff, list, > > > > It does get tricky when we consider the percept as a sign — as the > excerpts you quote in your first two paragraphs (below) demonstrate; and I > think it gets equally tricky when we consider the qualisign as a percept. > But my more specific responses here will be inserted below, starting with > your third paragraph … > > > > Gary f. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 14-Dec-15 09:12 > > List, > > > > GF: There is no vagueness in a percept; it’s a singular. So I don’t see > how the concept of qualisign can serve the purpose you suggest here. I > think the qualisign is simply a necessary result of Peirce’s introduction > of the trichotomy of signs based on the sign’s mode of being in itself. It > has to be First in that trichotomy. > > > > Peirce does say that percepts are, in some respects, vague. Here is one > place in "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmatism: "But not to interrupt > our train of thought, let us go on to note that while the Immediate Object > of a Percept is excessively vague, yet natural thought makes up for that > lack (as it almost amounts to), as follows. A late Dynamical Interpretant > of the whole complex of Percepts is the Seme of a Perceptual Universe that > is represented in instinctive thought as determining the original Immediate > Object of every Percept.†2 Of course, I must be understood as talking not > psychology, but the logic of mental operations. Subsequent Interpretants > furnish new Semes of Universes resulting from various adjunctions to the > Perceptual Universe. They are, however, all of them, Interpretants of > Percepts. CP 4.539 I.e., A complex of percepts yields a picture of a > perceptual universe. Without reflection, that universe is taken to be the > cause of such objects as are represented in a percept. Though each percept > is vague, as it is recognized that its object is the result of the action > of the universe on the perceiver, it is so far clear." CP 4.539 Fn 2 p 425 > > > > Here is a place where he says that percepts have a singular character: > "the reader questions, perhaps, the assertion that conclusions of > reasoning are always of the nature of expectations. "What!" he will > exclaim, "can we not reason about the authorship of the Junius Letters or > the identity of the Man in the Iron Mask?" In a sense we can, of course. > Still, the conclusion will not be at all like remembering the historical > event. In order to appreciate the difference, begin by going back to the > percept to which the memory relates. This percept is a single event > happening hic et nunc. It cannot be generalized without losing its > essential character. For it is an actual passage at arms between the > non-ego and the ego. A blow is passed, so to say. Generalize the fact that > you get hit in the eye, and all that distinguishes the actual fact, the > shock, the pain, the inflammation, is gone. It is anti-general. The memory > preserves this character, only slightly modified. The actual shock, etc., > are no longer there, the quality of the event has associated itself in the > mind with similar past experiences. It is a little generalized in the > perceptual fact. Still, it is referred to a special and unique occasion, > and the flavor of anti-generality is the predominant one." CP 2.146 > > > > For the sake of understanding the division in NDTR between signs based on > the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e., qualisign, sinsign, > legislgn), I do think it would help to spell out the manner in which each > of these types of signs is determined by its object. > > > > GF: Peirce does not say that his first trichotomy in NDTR is based on the > mode in which they are apprehended; rather he says it is “according as the > sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general > law.” I’ve been accustomed to referring to this parameter as the “mode of > being” of the sign in itself. > > Later, in his 1908 letter to Welby, Peirce’s first trichotomy of signs is > “According to the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign itself.” Until now, I’ve > been thinking that this was equivalent to the Sign’s “mode of being,” and > that his first trichotomy in the Welby letter is equivalent to the first > trichotomy in NDTR. Now I think there may be a difference significant > enough to explain why the names of the first-trichotomy sign types in 1908 > are not *qualisign, sinsign*, and *legisign *as they are in NDTR. If we > are looking at two different trichotomies here (rather than one trichotomy > differently named), then Peirce’s 1908 list of “The Ten Main Trichotomies > of Signs” completely dispenses with the first trichotomy in NDTR, so that > it does not include a division according to the mode of being of the sign > in itself. I think this too is plausible, but before giving my reasons, I’d > better quote the whole discussion of the first trichotomy in the 1908 > letter so we can compare it with the qualisign/sinsign/legisign trichotomy. > Here it is (EP2:483): > > > > > > I. A Sign is necessarily in itself present to the Mind of its Interpreter. > Now there are three entirely different ways in which Objects are present to > minds: > > First, in themselves as they are in themselves. Namely, Feelings are so > present. At the first instant of waking from profound sleep when thought, > or even distinct perception, is not yet awake, if one has gone to bed more > asleep than awake in a large, strange room with one dim candle. At the > instant of waking the *tout ensemble* is felt as a unit. The feeling of > the skylark's song in the morning, of one's first hearing of the English > nightingale. > > Secondly, the sense of something opposing one's Effort, something > preventing one from opening a door slightly ajar; which is known in its > individuality by the actual shock, the Surprising element, in any > Experience which makes it *sui generis.* > > Thirdly, that which is stored away in one's Memory; Familiar, and as such, > General. > > > > Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible Presentation, > are divisible (σ) into > > A. *Potisigns,* or Objects which are signs so far as they are merely > possible, but felt to be positively possible; as, for example, the seventh > ray that passes through the three intersections of opposite sides of > Pascal's hexagram. > > B. *Actisigns,* or Objects which are Signs as Experienced *hic et nunc;* > such as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single > paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a book. There may be > repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another place. > But that other occurrence is not *this* word. The book may be printed in > an edition of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy. > > C. *Famisigns,* familiar signs, which must be General, as General signs > must be familiar or composed of Familiar signs. (I speak of signs which are > “general,” not in the sense of *signifying* Generals, but as being > *themselves* general; just as Charlemagne is general, in that it occurs > many times with one and the same denotation.) > > > > I think I might as well have marked this division δ instead of σ, [i.e. > ‘clear’ instead of ‘partly clear’] except that perhaps the question may > arise whether I ought not to have recognized a division according as the > sign is a *natural sign,* which has no party to the dialogue as its > author, or whether it be an *uttered sign,* and in the latter case, is > the very sign that is getting uttered or another. But it seems to me that > this division turns upon the question of whether or not the sign uttered is > a sign of a sign as its Object. For must not every sign, in order to become > a sign, get uttered? > > > > > > I think the family resemblance, as it were, between this trichotomy and > the one in NDTR is clear, but there is also a subtle difference; and I > included that last paragraph of the Peirce excerpt because his question > there seems to me quite relevant to what we’re discussing here. (If the > percept is a sign, is it a natural sign or an uttered sign?) Turning to the > qualisign, we might also ask: *When is a sign not a sign?* > > > > Oddly enough, Peirce gives a direct answer to this question in MS 7 (c. > 1903): “The reference of a sign to the quality which is its *ground*, > reason, or *meaning* appears most prominently in a kind of sign of which > any replica is fitted to be a sign by virtue of possessing in itself > certain qualities which it would equally possess if the interpretant and > the object did not exist at all. Of course, in such case, the sign could > not be a sign; but as far as the sign itself went, it would be all that > [it] would be with the object and interpretant.” This seems to agree pretty > closely with what Peirce says about the qualisign in NDTR: “A *Qualisign* > is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign until it is > embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a > sign.” On the other hand, it also seems to agree with what Peirce had > written earlier in MS 7: “A quality, in itself, has no being at all, it is > true. It must be embodied in something that exists. But the quality is as > it is positively and in itself. That is not true of a sign, which exists > only by bringing an interpretant to refer to an object. A quality, then, is > not a sign.” So is a Qualisign a sign or not a sign? > > > > In a way, this is like asking whether the quality of a feeling is the same > as the feeling of a quality; or whether the mode of apprehension of > something is the same as its mode of being. “For must not every sign, in > order to become a sign, get uttered?” And must not every sign, in order to > become a sign, get apprehended? To that last question I would say Yes, it > must; and therein lies my guess at why Peirce in 1908 does not mention a > trichotomy of signs according to their “mode of being”, but *instead* > begins with a trichotomy according to their “mode of apprehension.” > > > > This is of course no more than a guess, and I’m not sure whether it offers > answers to the questions you’ve raised in the remainder of your post. But > it’s just about all I have to say at the moment, so I’ll leave the rest to > you … > > > > JD: For example, in the Minute Logic, which was written in 1902 (one year > before NDTR), Peirce says the following about the relation between the > percept and the perceptual jugment: "The most ordinary fact of perception, > such as "it is light," involves precisive abstraction, or prescission. But > hypostatic abstraction, the abstraction which transforms "it is light" into > "there is light here," which is the sense which I shall commonly attach to > the word abstraction (since prescission will do for precisive abstraction) > is a very special mode of thought. It consists in taking a feature of a > percept or percepts (after it has already been prescinded from the other > elements of the percept), so as to take propositional form in a judgment > (indeed, it may operate upon any judgment whatsoever), and in conceiving > this fact to consist in the relation between the subject of that judgment > and another subject, which has a mode of being that merely consists in the > truth of propositions of which the corresponding concrete term is the > predicate. Thus, we transform the proposition, "honey is sweet," into > "honey possesses sweetness." CP 4.235 > > > > Is Peirce suggesting in this passage that a visual impression of light or > a taste impression of sweetness can function as a sign (e.g., a qualisign) > because the feeling is abstracted--both prescissively and > hypostatically--from the percept? Another possibility is that the > impressions of light and taste can function as qualisigns insofar as they > are precissively abstracted from the object, and then something like a > diagram (what he will later call a percipuum) comes in as the interpretant > of the qualisign. The remarks he makes about the conventional symbols > expressed as part of a perceptual judgment (e.g., "it is light" "honey is > sweet") are the data that we can analyze for the sake of sharpening our > account of how signs that are mere feelings (i.e., qualisigns) might > function in an uncontrolled inference to a perceptual judgment. > > > > --Jeff > > > > Jeffrey Downard > > Associate Professor > > Department of Philosophy > > Northern Arizona University > > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
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