Jerry, You always seem to bring this up at the most inconvenient moments. Last time I was in the throes of a fever 🤒 and could make only a cryptic remark about the Sisyphean mountain of inquiry that Peirce mapped. And now I'm stuck at ⭐️🦌🦌 waiting for a text ⚡️⚡️⚡️ Later that night ⚡️⚡️⚡️ The other day on Facebook I had occasion to describe the problematic we encounter here as “Metaphysics Out Of Order”, meaning that it is premature to tackle metaphysics before we've established well-provisioned base camps ⛺️⛺️⛺️ at all the lower elevations on the mountain. We are nowhere near having that basis yet laid down.
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-syllabus.jpg Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > On Feb 10, 2017, at 5:38 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > > On “'Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all possible?' > > > > It seems almost ridiculous, while every other science is continually > advancing, that in this, which pretends to be Wisdom incarnate, for whose > oracle everyone inquires, we should constantly move round the same spot, > without gaining a single step.” > > ~Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics > > > > “If the experts should but cannot advise in the Athenian assembly about > harbors and walls, it would seem that the instructional persuasion they have > is not and cannot be persuasive before a crowd, and the rhetorician should > have the knowledge of how to adapt the knowledge of others into a form that > wins the trust of assemblies. > > > > Why, however, cannot the experts themselves do the necessary adaptation?” > > > > ~Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy > > >> On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: >> Thread: >> JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00094.html >> JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00098.html >> JFS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00100.html >> >> JA: >>> As far as "predicate" and "proposition" go, usage varies promiscuously. >>> Some people use them to mean syntactic elements, in the S & I domains. >>> Some people use them to mean objective elements, in the Object domain. >>> In a sign relational setting we need to admit both types of elements >>> and we need to be clear about their distinctive roles in the triadic >>> sign relation at hand. >>> >>> It can help to use a tactic that is common in computer science, simply >>> tack the epithet "expression" or "name" on the end of the formal object >>> name you have in mind in order to denote the associated semiotic entity, >>> e.g., function / function expression, predicate / predicate expression, >>> proposition / propositional expression, and so on. In many contexts one >>> can then use the terms equivocally in the usual way, adding the epithet >>> only when necessary to focus on the syntax. >> >>> On 2/10/2017 2:14 PM, John F Sowa wrote: >>> JA: As far as "predicate" and "proposition" go, usage varies promiscuously. >> JFS: Logicians are consistent in the way they use those words. >> >> Well, no, they aren't. Most logicians and other perfectly >> sensible folks are hardly even consistent in the way they >> use those words within a single context, much less across >> the whole wide literature and history of logic. And yet >> there are sensible ways of resolving the resulting Babel. >> That is a big part of what the sign relational framework >> is for. >> >> By the way, it isn't what one calls the syntactic structures -- >> expressions, graphs, propositions, rhemes, sentences, whatever -- >> that makes one a nominalist, it is the claim that the syntactic >> entities are sufficient. >> >> If syntactic entities are not sufficient then there must be >> other sorts of objective entities that the syntactic entities >> denote. In many cases of practical interest we can recover the >> isomorphic structure of the object domain as equivalence classes >> of the syntactic entities. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> >> -- >> >> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ >> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey >> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey >> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA >> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but >> to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of >> the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >
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