John, List: JFS: The third row (predicate, proposition, argument) is the *formal* triad. A predicate is a symbol of some relation. A proposition is a symbol that asserts the relation.
But the third row does not apply only to symbols. What do we call an icon or index that Peirce further classified as a rheme or dicent sign? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 1:14 PM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, Stephen, Jon A.S., Jon A., list > > ET > >> I don't find that it's the terms that slow down the use of Peirce in >> analysis; I find that it's the concept of a triadic semiosis with that >> vital mediation, and the concept of the three modal categories. Both >> seem very hard for people to grasp - and so, semiotics is reduced to the >> simplistic binarism of Saussurian semiology >> > > I agree that the concept of triadic semiosis is the critical issue. > But expressing it in words that students have never heard, seen, or > used, is a barrier to learning and adoption. > > SCR > >> Which makes it more imperative than ever that a way be found to make >> the triadic mode more understandable and to say why it is infinitely >> superior to binary thinking. >> > > I've found that the best starting point is the dyadic type-token > distinction. That's widely known and accepted in linguistics and > computer science -- even by people who have never heard of Peirce. > > And those people are always surprised when you tell them that > token and type are the second and third terms of a triad. > For the first term, Peirce used the words 'tone' and 'mark'. > > Of those two, tone is hard for people to generalize. A pure tone > is rare, even in music. But mark is the obvious choice for images, > and students can quickly generalize it to any sensation. > > You can start with Peirce's example of tokens of the type 'the'. > CSP mentioned the many tokens on a printed page. The next step is > to point out that vocal tokens of 'the' are also marks that can be > interpreted as tokens of that same type. > > JAS > >> I have no problem with mark/token/type, but "predicate" and >> "proposition" usually designate symbols. >> > > That point leads to the question why the "triple trichotomy" has > three rows. The first row (mark token type) is the *material* > triad: A mark is an uninterpreted sign of some observable > material. A token is an interpretation of that material. And > a type is a habit or law that determines the interpretation. > > The second row (icon index symbol) is the *relational* triad: > An icon is a token of some observable pattern among its parts. > An index is a sign of a causal relation among the parts. And a > symbol is a sign of some habit or law that determines the cause. > > The third row (predicate, proposition, argument) is the *formal* > triad. A predicate is a symbol of some relation. A proposition > is a symbol that asserts the relation. And an argument is a > symbol (one or more propositions) that justifies the assertion. > > JA > >> As far as "predicate" and "proposition" go, usage varies promiscuously. >> > > Logicians are consistent in the way they use those words. And their > usage corresponds to the way that Peirce used the terms 'rhema' and > 'dicent sign'. Nominalists like Quine may prefer the word 'sentence' > to 'proposition', but a sentence is definitely a dicent sign. > > A predicate or rhema has one or more slots or pegs (in CSP's diagrams) > or variables (in the linear notations by CSP and his successors). > Since the referents of the slots or variables are not specified, > the predicate cannot make an assertion. It has no truth value. > > A proposition or dicent sign has all the slots or variables replaced > by signs that designate referents. In a context in which a proposition > is asserted, it has a truth value. In a 3-valued logic, 'unknown' is > a possible truth value. Peirce also discussed issues of vagueness, > which raise further questions. But they don't affect the distinction > between predicates and propositions. > > John
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