List, Folks who were around a dozen years ago will remember all the fun and fuss we had when some rather absurd things about Peirce's theory of truth or the lack thereof popped up in various Wikipedious articles. Some of us eventually hashed out a fairly useful account of a Pragmatic Theory of Truth, at least IMHO.
Busy watching Goblet of Fire 🔥 for about the dozenth time now, where I am finding Rita Skeeter's theory of Alternative Truth especially poignant in view of current events, but I will dig up some old scraps of text later. Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > On Mar 9, 2017, at 5:17 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jerry C., Jon S, List, > > > With respect to the 13 items on the list. None is, taken by itself, a theory > of truth. Rather, they are statements made by a commentator on passages in > the published works and manuscripts, many of which are from different > contexts--and many of which seem to have been written by Peirce with > different purposes in mind. If we start with something more modest than a > theory, such as a definition of truth (verbal, logical or pragmatic), we can > see that Peirce was offering definitions of different senses of the > conception, and that the different senses were not wholly separate. Rather, > they are attempts to capture the meaning of conceptions pertaining to truth > where it functions as an ordinary end, and where it functions as a larger > ideal and where is taken as a relation between signs and objects, etc. Some > of these conceptions will be needed for the purpose of developing speculative > grammar, and others for the purpose of a critical logic and yet others for > the purpose of a methodeutic. Taken together, many if not most of the > statements Peirce has made about truth may turn out to be part of a larger > integrated semiotic theory. Others may turn out to be accounts of rival > conceptions of truth, or of ordinary notions, etc. As such, I suspect that > the 13 items can be sorted and organized, and some will turn out to be simply > false (e.g., 11). > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > > From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > Sent: Thursday, March 9, 2017 1:06 PM > To: Jerry LR Chandler > Cc: Peirce List > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich > points. > > Jerry C., List: > > Almeder's 1985 Transactions article, "Peirce's Thirteen Theories of Truth," > does not spell out the list very clearly, but here is what I gather from the > text. > Correspondence - "true propositions are simply the product of the destined > final opinion of the scientific community." > Correspondence - truth is "an ideal limit of scientific progress, a limit > asymptotically approached (but never in fact reached) by successive advances > in scientific progress." > Correspondence - "some propositions are true because they are what the > scientific community would endorse in the final opinion if the scientific > community were to continue inquiry forever." > Coherence - "truth is simply what one gets when one's beliefs are verified or > fully authorized by standards of rationality proper to the scientific > community." > Consensus - "similar to that ... adopted by Habermas and certain continental > hermeneuticists." > Pragmatic - "the truth of a proposition is a function of whether it ... will > be asserted in the final opinion of the community," which is "destined as a > real product." > Pragmatic - "the truth of a proposition is a function of whether it would be > ... asserted in the final opinion of the community," which is "approached as > an ideal limit." > Pragmatic - "the truth of a proposition is a function of whether it ,,, would > continue to be endorsed were some final scientific opinion to emerge." > Amalgam - "as if Peirce adopted some remarkably subtle theory that > consistently blends elements that are present every known theory of truth." > Combination - "the meaning of 'true' is specified in terms of correspondence > while the conditions for applying the predicate are coherentist." > Muddle - "Peirce's views on truth are basically incoherent or reflect > mutually inconsistent characterisations of the nature of truth." > Received View - "whether Peirce defined truth in terms of correspondence or > coherence, he viewed truth as the product of the opinion that the scientific > community would ultimately reach were it to continue indefinitely long and > progressively in its research." > Plausible View - "Peirce defined truth (with a capital T) as correspondence > and reckoned it the destined product the final opinion, and ... also defined > truth in terms of what are fully authorized in asserting under the current > standards of rationality and under the scientific method at any given moment." > Almeder thinks that only #10, #11, and #13 "make any sense at all," and comes > out in favor of #13. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > >> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 11:18 AM, Jerry LR Chandler >> <[email protected]> wrote: >> List: >> >> In her book, Charles Peirces’s Pragmatic Pluralism, Rosenthal states: >> … the literature on Peirce contains “no fewer than thirteen distinct >> interpretations of Peirce’s views on the nature of truth”, attributing the >> account to Robert Almeder. >> >> She apparently intends contrast CSP’s concept with the notions of >> correspondence and coherence. >> >> (My source of this information is Google Books.) >> >> Can anyone provide the putative listing of Almeter with the original text >> citations? >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry
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