Clark, Jeff, List: In chapter 8 of *Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism*, Paul Forster argues--convincingly, I think--that the different "theories of truth" are competitors only within a nominalist epistemology and metaphysics. By contrast, Peirce's realism recognizes that "correspondence, coherence, consensus, and instrumental reliability are all essential and constitutive elements of truth--none is any more fundamental than the others. Moreover, each of these elements of truth is a necessary condition for realizing the others. Each one--properly understood and fully explicated in accordance with the pragmatic maxim--implies the others" (p. 175).
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 5:42 PM, CLARK GOBLE <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mar 9, 2017, at 3:17 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> > wrote: > > With respect to the 13 items on the list. None is, taken by itself, a > theory of truth. Rather, they are statements made by a commentator on > passages in the published works and manuscripts, many of which > are from different contexts--and many of which seem to have been written by > Peirce with different purposes in mind. > > Exactly what I was going to point out. None of that really gets at a > theory of truth. I agree completely. > > As John (Sowa) noted there are a lot of different issues at play here. >
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