I have thought of CSP as having much in common with the Common Sense philosophers. Their systematic scepticism in particular, and their emphasis on practical issues. The idea of atoms as we know not what exactly but small and localized and having properties that can interact with other properties seems rather Peircean to me. Open to further investigation.
I don’t know enough about what Peirce said about Boscovich. Pierce saw Boscovich as a precursor to argument by analogy, or hypothesis in note 1 of “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”, but there is nothing referring to atoms. However he did have much more to say, which I will come to below. Basically, Peirce was against atomistic combinations being explanatory, especially in biology Atamspacker has a paper in which he mentions Peirce, but only with reference to abduction and semiotics, and also a paper referring to Boscovic (also about hypothesis) by Rὂssler, Otto E. (1991), ‘Boscovich covariance’, in Beyond Belief, ed. by J.L. Casti and A. Karlqvist (Boca Raton: CRC Press), pp. 65–87, which is an important paper. I can’t get access to the papers here at home, but Boscovician covariance championed by Rosseler more or less first my account, as I understand him. There is actually quite a bit of literature on the subject, but not lot in English. The covariance principle is a precursor to Einstein’s, and I think it tends to emphasize the extended field nature of Boscovician atoms rather than there point character. I see no problem with interpreting him as a field theorist rather than as an atomic theorist. See also http://www.commens.org/encyclopedia/article/esposito-joseph-synechism-keystone-peirce%E2%80%99s-metaphysics, where Perice’s synechism is compared to Boscovic’s physics. Here is an excerpt: Atomism “Synechism is incompatible with atomism at least in the sense in which atoms are regarded as irreducible and without parts. Another incompatibility would be that two atoms absolutely could not occupy the same space. They would be rigid bodies, to the extent that they were bodies, whose boundaries would mark a complete discontinuity with their surroundings. Peirce preferred to think of atoms the way his contemporaries regarded chemical compounds, as a system of components with an internal energy configuration: “Unless we are to give up the theory of energy, finite positional attractions and repulsions between molecules must be admitted. Absolute impenetrability would amount to an infinite repulsion at a certain distance. No analogy of known phenomena exists to excuse such a wanton violation of the principle of continuity as such a hypothesis is. In short, we are logically bound to adopt the Boscovichian idea that an atom is simply a distribution of component potential energy throughout space (this distribution being absolutely rigid) combined with inertia.” (CP 6.242) (Boscovich, 1758) Going on: “A Boscovichian atom is a point of energy exerting a repulsive energy at approaching bodies, which is then turned into neutral and attractive force as the horizon of repulsive energy is breached. Ruggiero Giuseppe Boscovich, (1711-1787) was a Jesuit astronomer and mathematician and a precursor of the German Nature-Philosophers. He attempted to embed the laws of Newtonian physics into a simpler and more universal set of laws. Peirce appreciated the non-material and dynamic atomic model, but regarded the interaction of forces as more complex, as reflected in the differential equations that describe them: “But the equations of motion are differential equations of the second order, involving, therefore, two arbitrary constants for each moving atom or corpuscle, and there is no uniformity connected with these constants.” (CP 6.101; 7.518) Forces are functions of space and time, and not of space alone, Peirce contended. Therefore, spatial configuration of two interacting bodies at any given time cannot be the basis for understanding subsequent configurations of those bodies. In the spirit of Boscovich, and of course Schelling and Hegel, Peirce wanted to reinterpret Newton’s laws using dynamic and relativistic terms: … .one object being in one particular place in no way requires another object to be in any particular place. From this again it necessarily follows that each object occupies a single point of space, so that matter must consist of Boscovichian atomicules, whatever their multitude may be. On the same principle it furthermore follows that any law among the reactions must involve some other continuum than merely Space alone. Why Time should be that other continuum I shall hope to make clear when we come to consider Time. In the third place, since Space has the mode of being of a law, not that of a reacting existent, it follows that it cannot be the law that, in the absence of reaction, a particle shall adhere to its place; for that would be attributing to it an attraction for that place. Whence it follows that in so far as a particle is not acted upon by another, that which it retains is a relation between space and time. Now it is not logically accurate to say that the law of motion prescribes that a particle, so far as it is not acted upon by forces, continues to move in a straight line, describing equal intervals in equal times. On the contrary the true statement is that straight lines are that family of lines which particles, so far as they are unacted upon, describe, and that equal spaces are such spaces as such a particle describes in equal times. (CP 6.82) “Atoms also violate the doctrine of continuity insofar as they are thought to be indestructible material beings. If they do not come into being and do not decay then they are not subject to transitional states. If they are instantaneously created or annihilated then their emergence or disappearance is discontinuous in space and time. (Belief in the annihilation of matter Peirce considered a gratuitous hypothesis. CP 5.587) A more coherent model is that of a system of forces. The being of elementary particles—atoms, singularities, atomicules, atomicities—was to interact: “We observe no life in chemical atoms. They appear to have no organs by which they could act. Nor can any action proper gain actuality, that is, a place in the world of actions, for any subject. Yet the individual atom exists, not at all in obedience to any physical law which would be violated if it never had existed, nor by virtue of any qualities whatsoever, but simply by virtue of its arbitrarily interfering with other atoms, whether in the way of attraction or repulsion. We can hardly help saying that it blindly forces a place for itself in the universe, or willfully crowds its way in.” (CP 1.459) “As a result of his synechistic perspective Peirce at times sounds more like a twentieth-century physicist than a nineteenth-century one. Developments in elementary particle physics in this century have shown that the atom of John Dalton and Niels Bohr was a profound simplicity.” I might add, that it is also a return to Boscovich. With respect to biology, Peirce is b=very sceptical that understanding the combinations of atoms is sufficient: “The molecule-to-molecule mechanism may be described in terms of lesser or greater bonding capacity; for example, molecules may attach to a cellular membrane consisting of molecular-matrixes and disrupt the covalent bonds that stabilize the membrane molecule thereby changing its linking capacity within the cell and making it a target cell. Hormones and other signaling molecules circulate throughout the body to highly specific targets in order to activate through various transduction pathways other messengers that turn on or inhibit cascades of enzymes. However, such descriptions do not reach a level of relational generality that explains what is being described, and we are left to marvel at what we do not understand even while the picture may be clearly before us. What is the required level of generality—the subatomic, the cellular, the intercellular, that of functioning organs, the organism, the ecological? Peirce suggests that there may be a relatively few general algorithms that are capable of explaining the dizzying complexity of mushy biological systems. He would contend that the capacity to represent would be a part of this synechistic algorithm. Representation is a process of creating a virtual reality, a Hegelian ‘reflection’, the emergence of a Thou to an I. It is part of every physical process, according to Peirce: Whatever is real is the law of something less real. Stuart Mill defined matter as a permanent possibility of sensation. What is a permanent possibility but a law? Atom acts on atom, causing stress in the intervening matter. Thus force is the general fact of the states of atoms on the line. This is true of force in its widest sense, dyadism. That which corresponds to a general class of dyads is a representation of it, and the dyad is nothing but a conflux of representations. A general class of representations collected into one object is an organized thing, and the representation is that which many such things have in common. And so forth. (CP 1.487) “Atomism collapses because it does not include a way of integrating itself into a theory, for example, of how biological sub-systems may ‘signal’ other sub-systems and generally of how representations could co-exist with atoms. So Peirce rejected atomism as an explanatory principle. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com] Sent: Thursday, 09 March 2017 7:00 AM To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Cc: Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com>; John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>; Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.ku.dk>; Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>; Jeffrey Goldstein <goldst...@adelphi.edu>; Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>; Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen <ahti-veikko.pietari...@helsinki.fi>; John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points. John: CSP’s interpretation of Boscovich’ian atoms was unique to CSP, at least that is my reading. I could find the CSP text if it is a substantial issue. It was in a short note on the classification of the elements. Note the dates of the two men. Do you have a significant reason for introducing “Common Sense” philosophy into CSP’s view of “atoms”? Cheers Jerry On Mar 8, 2017, at 9:41 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote: Interesting discussion, but one that bothers me a bit due to my reading of Boscovic as an undergrad and my familiarity with the Scottish “Common Sense” philosophers. My understanding of Boscovician atoms is that they are centres od force fields that very in sign and intensity, being effective over varying distances. The overall effect is a sinusoidal liker wave centred on the atom. In this sense Boscovician atoms are not points, but have an extended scope, which varies with distance. The point aspect stems from this filed being zero at the centre, all the effects stemming from more distant fields centred on the atom. The Scottish Common Sense Philosophers, Like Thomas Young (usually classed as an empiricist) took the view that we should treat a phenomena as it appears, irrespective of its real nature, until we know more. In the Boscovician case this would mean treating atoms as very small, but with the Boscovician field properties, without reference to their smaller nature or their real structure. Young, the wave theorist, was a follower of this school, and so was, to some extent Maxwell. So I think it is historically misleading to compare Boscovician atomism with continuous views – I see no contradiction – much as the problem might be interest in itself. I am more than a little reluctant to set up metaphysical problems that aren’t supported by the science itself, and I think it requires careful and unbiased historical study to ensure this is enforced. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com] Sent: Wednesday, 08 March 2017 6:51 PM To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Cc: Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com<mailto:baud...@gmail.com>>; Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.ku.dk<mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk>>; Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>>; Jeffrey Goldstein <goldst...@adelphi.edu<mailto:goldst...@adelphi.edu>>; Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>; Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen <ahti-veikko.pietari...@helsinki.fi<mailto:ahti-veikko.pietari...@helsinki.fi>>; John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points. List, John: I’m rather pressed for time so only brief responses to your highly provocative post. Clearly, your philosophy of mathematics is pretty main stream relative to mine. But this is neither the time nor the place to develop these critical differences. My post was aimed directly at the problem of the logical composition of Boscovich points. This is inferred from CSP’s graphs and writings. I would ask that you describe your views on how to compose Boscovich points into the chemical table of elements. Please keep in mind that each chemical element represents logically a set of functors in the Carnapian sense. see: p. 14, The Logical Syntax of Language. > On Mar 7, 2017, at 8:56 AM, John F Sowa > <s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote: > > Jerry, > > We already have a universal foundation for logic. It's called > "Peirce's semiotic”. Semiotics is not, in my view, a foundation for logic which is grounded on antecedent and consequences. Neither antecedents nor conclusions are intrinsic to the experience of signs yet both are necessary for logic. Logic is grounded in artificial symbols. Applications of logic to the natural world requires symbolic competencies appropriate to the application(s). > > JLRC >> the mathematics of the continuous can not be the same as the >> mathematics of the discrete. Nor can the mathematics of the >> discrete become the mathematics of the continuous. > > They are all subsets of what mathematicians say in natural languages. I reject this view of ‘subsets’ because of the mathematical physics of electricity. Many mathematics reject set theory as a foundations for mathematics, including such notables as S. Mac Lane (I discussed this personally with him some decades ago.) My belief is that numbers are the linguistic foundations of mathematics and the physics of atomic numbers are the logical origin of (macroscopic) matter and of the natural sciences. (Philosophical cosmology is a different discourse.) > > For that matter, chess, go, and bridge are just as mathematical as > any other branch of mathematics. They have different language games, > but nobody worries about unifying them with algebra or topology. > Board games are super-duper simple relative to the mathematics of either chemistry and even more so wrt life itself. > I believe that Richard Montague was half right: > > RM, Universal Grammar (1970). >> There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between >> natural languages and the artificial languages of logicians; indeed, >> I consider it possible to comprehend the syntax and semantics of >> both kinds of languages within a single natural and mathematically >> precise theory. The logic of chemistry necessarily requires illations within sentences that logically connect both copula and predicates associated with electricity. This logical necessity is remote from the logic of the putative “universal grammars.” (I presume that a balanced chemical equation is analogous to the concept of the term “sentence” in either normal language or mathematics.) > > But Peirce would say that NL semantics is a more general version > of semiotic. Every version of formal logic is a disciplined subset > of NL (ie, one of Wittgenstein's language games). > JLRC >> For a review of recent advances in logic, see >> http://www.jyb-logic.org/Universallogic13-bsl-sept.pdf, >> 13 QUESTIONS ABOUT UNIVERSAL LOGIC. > > Thanks for the reference. On page 134, Béziau makes the following > point, and Peirce would agree: >> Universal logic is not a logic but a general theory of different >> logics. Analyze this quote. Is he saying anything more beyond a contradiction of terms? >> This general theory is no more a logic itself than is >> meteorology a cloud. What the hell is this supposed to mean? Merely an ill-chosen metaphor? > > JYB, p. 137 >> we argue against any reduction of logic to algebra, since logical >> structures are differing from algebraic ones and cannot be reduced >> to them. Universal logic is not universal algebra. > > Peirce would agree. > > JYB, 138 >> Universal logic takes the notion of structure as a starting >> point; but what is a structure? > > Peirce's answer: a diagram. Mathematics is necessary reasoning, > and all necessary reasoning involves (1) constructing a diagram > (the creative part) and (2) examining the diagram (observation > supplemented with some routine computation). > > What is a diagram? Answer: an icon that has some structural > similarity (homomorphism) to the subject matter. Chemical isomers are not mathematical homomorphisms because of the intrinsic nature of chemical identities. Thus, this reasoning is not relevant to the composition of Boscovichian points. The reasoning behind chemical equations is not “necessary” in this sense of generality, but is always contingent on both the (iconic?) perplex numbers and the functors. See, for example, Roberts, p. 22, 3.421. > JYB, 145 >> Some wanted to go further and out of the formal framework, namely >> those working in informal logic or the theory of argumentation. >> The trouble is that one runs the risk of being tied up again in >> natural language. > > Universal logic (diagrammatic reasoning) is *independent of* any > language or notation. The differences between the many variants > are the result of drawing different kinds of diagrams for sets, > continua, quantum mechanics, etc. (Note Feynman diagrams.) If this is the case, then find a mode of explanation that is relevant to Boscovichian points and compositions of matter. To me, these sentences are a very slippery use of language. Logic remains tied to its ancient roots, antecedents and consequences. Diagrammatic reasoning is just a picture. See the excellent book by Greaves on the Philosophy of Diagrams. > > I develop these points further in the following lecture on Peirce's > natural logic: http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/natlogP.pdf > > See also "Five questions on epistemic logic" and the references > cited there: http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf I read these very nice papers. But, I do not find your arguments very useful for either chemistry or biology which demand that the concept of identity is antecedent to all consequences for the logic of the grammar and the “algebra” of the sentences. My general view is that if such broad assertions were valid pragmatically, then we would have a mathematics of life itself. So, how do you relate your work (and your logical assertions) to the dynamic of life grounded in the genetics and contextual relations to health and disease? These are the issues of interest to me. I believe that both the logic of Tarski (meta-languages) and mereology (part-whole illations over chemical identities) are necessary and have published papers to that effect. Thus, by and large, we are talking past one another. It is my view that 21 st Century scientific logic is dependent on symbolic competencies. Cheers Jerry > > John > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe > PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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