Gary F., List: Thanks, that is very helpful, although I find it interesting that Peirce made no mention of indices in that passage. Elsewhere he stated, "A *diagram *is a representamen which is predominantly an icon of relations and is aided to be so by conventions. Indices are also more or less used" (CP 4.418; 1903). So diagrams are *mainly *icons that embody the significant relations among the parts of their objects, but they *also *involve both symbols (i.e., conventions) and indices in order to do so. From that standpoint, the mere icon (image?) "grows" into a diagram with the addition of symbols and indices, and then "grows" even more by being supplemented or otherwise transformed in accordance with the rules of the representational system in which it is a "lawful construction" (JFS).
Regards, Jon S. On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 9:21 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon Alan, you asked: > > [[ What I was really asking about is the notion that "every kind of sign > begins with an image (icon), and every sign constructed from other signs is > a diagram." Does this come from Peirce, or is it your own insight? ]] > > I wonder if it might come indirectly (with the addition of John’s own > insight) from CP 2.302, c.1895: > > > > [[[ Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, > particularly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of > icons and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are of mixed > nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a man makes a new > symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols > that a new symbol can grow. *Omne symbolum de symbolo.* A symbol, once in > being, spreads among the peoples. In use and in experience, its meaning > grows. Such words as *force, law, wealth, marriage*, bear for us very > different meanings from those they bore to our barbarous ancestors. The > symbol may, with Emerson's sphynx, say to man, > > Of thine eye I am eyebeam. ]]] > > > > This antedates Peirce’s detailed classification of sign types other than > the icon/index/symbol trichotomy, but I think there’s a strong connection > between what he refers to as “symbols” here and what John refers to as > “diagrams.” Both words are being used very broadly, and both grow (or ‘are > constructed’) from icons. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 27-Mar-17 16:16 > > > > John S., List: > > JFS: ... icons as the starting point ... diagrams as lawful constructions > from icons ... > > I am still getting hung up on this way of putting it. As I understand it, > diagrams *are* icons, at least predominantly; but rather than its > object's *qualities*, a diagram embodies the significant *relations *among > its parts. > > JFS: All perception and imagination is by individuals. But by > collaboration, we can share our imaginations, build on them, refine them, > correct them. > > This is where the concreteness of diagrams comes in handy; they can be > transferred from one person's imagination to another's by means of words, > equations, drawings, and other physical manifestations. > > JFS: I don't think that he used the term 'internal' and 'external'. > > What I was really asking about is the notion that "every kind of sign > begins with an image (icon), and every sign constructed from other signs is > a diagram." Does this come from Peirce, or is it your own insight? In > "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" (1868), he flatly *denied *that > we have *any *images in perception or imagination, although in that work > he was referring to "absolutely determinate representations." I am also > not sure that it is correct to characterize *every *sign constructed from > other signs as a diagram in Peirce's technical sense. > > Damasio: The distinctive feature of brains such as the one we own is > their uncanny ability to create maps... But when brains make maps, they > are also creating images, the main currency of our minds. Ultimately > consciousness allows us to experience maps as images, to manipulate those > images, and to apply reasoning to them. > > Given Peirce's early denial that we think in images, and his later careful > distinction of images from diagrams, I doubt that he would have endorsed > these comments as written, at least without knowing their original > context. A map or other mental model is an icon, but it is a diagram *rather > than* an image. I suppose that if all Damasio means by "image" here is > what Peirce meant by "icon," then perhaps they were on the same page after > all. > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 2:23 PM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > > Clark, Jon A.S., and Claudio, > > I'm trying to relate Peirce's logic, mathematics, semiotic, > theory of truth, and logic of pragmatism to his insights > into perception, cognition, and purposeful action. > > CSP's essential insights: triadic semiotic; icons as the > starting point; symbols growing from icons; laws for relating > and defining anything; diagrams as lawful constructions from > icons; logic of pragmatism for constructing, refining, and > testing diagrams; phaneroscopy for examining imagery from any > source, external (all sensory modalities) or internal (mental > models or a kind of virtual reality); and language for social > interaction and collaboration on all of the above. > > Clark > > There’s a bit to unpack there - most particularly who the “we” is... > the ideal community of inquirers rather than any particular person... > while the universe is knowable and therefore imaginable it doesn’t > follow that it is imaginable for any finite group of people. > > > Re 'we': I meant anybody and everybody, individually or in any > kind of collaboration. The human methods of perception, cognition, > and action as individuals are the basis for communication and > collaboration with any groups of individuals in any place or time. > > Re imaginable: All perception and imagination is by individuals. > But by collaboration, we can share our imaginations, build on them, > refine them, correct them. > > Clark > > As you note this is also separate from the nominalist debate > since a nominalist can agree with this. > > > Yes. As Peirce himself said, he began as a nominalist, but his > continued studies and analyses led him to a kind of extreme realism. > I prefer CSP's later interpretations. > > Claudio > > Do you mean the LAWS OF NATURE, or just what we think that laws > of nature are? > > > Either or both. Our methods of reasoning are independent of the > nominalist-realist debate. But the methods of making predictions > and testing them can give us some confidence than we are at least > approximating them -- at least for those areas we have tested. > > Claudio > > everybody has to check twice... before 'believing'... > > > Yes. When we communicate and collaborate with others, we need > to recognize that they are just as fallible as we are. Even > worse, they may have confused, misguided, or hostile motives. > > Claudio > > I would NEVER say that truth is irrelevant!!! > > > I wasn't accusing you. But there are people who use terms > like 'post truth' or 'alternate facts'. They even claim > "Whatever you repeat often enough becomes the truth." > That way of thinking and talking is extremely dangerous. > > Jon > > Peirce carefully distinguished between images and diagrams as two > different types of icons (or "hypoicons"). "Those which partake > of simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; those which > represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts > of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams" > (CP 2.277; c. 1902). > > > That's exactly what I intended. Thanks for digging up the quotation. > > Jon > > did Peirce himself ever affirm that every sign begins with an > "external" image, and that every sign constructed from other > signs is an "internal" diagram? > > > I don't think that he used the term 'internal' and 'external'. > But I wanted to relate what Peirce said to the modern work in > neuroscience. Note the following point by Antonio Damasio: > > The distinctive feature of brains such as the one we own is their > uncanny ability to create maps... But when brains make maps, > they are also creating images, the main currency of our minds. > Ultimately consciousness allows us to experience maps as images, > to manipulate those images, and to apply reasoning to them. > > > I quoted that passage in slide 56 of http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf > In those slides, I was trying to relate and extend Peirce's version of > existential graphs to a more general kind of diagrammatic reasoning. > > In slide 55, I quoted the psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird who > claimed that Peirce's EGs "anticipate the theory of mental models > in many respects, including their iconic and symbolic components, > their eschewal of variables, and their fundamental operations of > insertion and deletion." > > JFS > > Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything we can > imagine, and mathematics can analyze anything we can imagine. > > > Jon > > Does it help to amend the initial statement to form a subjunctive > conditional? "Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to > everything we would be able to imagine, if the right conditions were > to occur." If so, is this formulation still unobjectionable to a > nominalist? > > > Carnap introduced possible worlds to support modal logic. > He might accept the term 'knowable'. > > But Quine objected to the term 'possible world'. I suspect > that he would also object to the term 'knowable universe'. > > John > >
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