Clark, List: Right, I had in mind Peirce's definition of reality/truth at the third degree of clarity. Is this any better? "Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything that an *infinite *community of investigators *would *be able to imagine, if it *were *to carry out an *indefinite* inquiry."
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 12:17 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > On Mar 27, 2017, at 11:14 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Does it help to amend the initial statement to form a subjunctive > conditional? "Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything > we *would *be able to imagine, if the right conditions *were *to occur." > If so, is this formulation still unobjectionable to a nominalist? > > I’m not sure I’d agree with that reformulation simply because I think > Peirce distinguishes between knowability and what individuals know. I guess > you might wrap that up under “right conditions” but my complaint is more > that the notion of continuity seems very wrapped up in Peirce’s project of > knowability here. Things can in principle be knowable but simultaneously be > unknowable for finite knowers. >
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