John S., Clark, List: JFS: Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram ... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way you interpret the specification: Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?
This is a very compact and insightful way of explaining nominalism vs. realism. Would you mind elaborating, perhaps including some specific examples? JFS: I'm using the word 'diagram' in a very broad sense that includes all kinds of images or icons in any sensory modality ... And every kind of sign begins with an image (icon), and every sign constructed from other signs is a diagram. Therefore, all reasoning begins with perception of external images and continues with internal images (diagrams). Higher cognition consists of constructing and examining diagrams. Peirce carefully distinguished between images and diagrams as two *different *types of icons (or "hypoicons"). "Those which partake of simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are *images*; those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are *diagrams*" (CP 2.277; c. 1902). Are you using the terms "image" and "diagram" in a different way? In particular, did Peirce himself ever affirm that *every *sign begins with an "external" image, and that *every *sign constructed from other signs is an "internal" diagram? JFS: Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything we can imagine, and mathematics can analyze anything we can imagine. CG: I think Peirce rejects the idea of the unknowable with his rejection of Kant’s thing-in-itself. Yet he also ties this to the ideal community of inquirers rather than any particular person. Put simply while the universe is knowable and therefore imaginable it doesn’t follow that it is imaginable for any finite group of people. Does it help to amend the initial statement to form a subjunctive conditional? "Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything we *would *be able to imagine, if the right conditions *were *to occur." If so, is this formulation still unobjectionable to a nominalist? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
