Clark, List: CG: Don’t we here have to distinguish between the mark and the sign?
I know what you mean, but I am not sure that "mark" is the right word here, especially since Peirce used that term in some later writings as a synonym for "qualisign." I just had in mind the "thing" (also not the best word for it) that acts as a sign. CG: Two signs can’t be the same sign unless they also have the same interpretant and object, can they? I seem to recall that T. L. Short took this position in *Peirce's Theory of Signs*, but consistent with that book's reputation overall, I do not know whether it truly reflects Peirce's view or just his own. Besides, given that semeiosis is continuous, is it even legitimate to "count" signs as distinct individuals at all? CG: Does the icon have its character really or merely as interpreted? That’s the very question that divides nominalism from realism. Yes, and I think that the icon really *has *its character regardless; but the question is whether *merely *having that character *makes *it an icon, apart from anyone or anything *interpreting *it as such. Again, is it sufficient for something to have only an Immediate Interpretant--"its peculiar interpretability"--in order to "qualify" as a sign, or is that "status" only achieved once it has a Dynamic Interpretant? CG: I think the idea (and this goes to his cosmology as well) is that we’re talking about habits not choices of interpretations. Thus the icon functions as an icon because of a habit with the habit tied to resemblance along some character. But the resemblance for that habit to function in an iconic form has to be real. It’s not just a free judgment of a human mind but a real regularity. I agree with all of this, and I have long wondered exactly where "habits of interpretation" fit within semeiotic. The object determines the sign to determine the interpretant, but in some sense any Dynamic Interpretant is also (at least partially) determined by the habits of interpretation of the one doing the interpreting. To me, this helps explain why the very same sign can produce different Dynamic Interpretants within the range of possibilities that constitutes its Immediate Interpretant. My working theory right now is that Final Interpretants are habits of feeling, action, or thought--i.e., habits of interpretation tending to determine Dynamic Interpretants that are emotional, energetic, or logical, respectively. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mar 28, 2017, at 3:56 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > My initial response is that we do need to distinguish between the sign > itself and the character by virtue of which it represents its object. > After all, it seems plausible that the same sign can serve as an icon, > *and *as an index, *and *as a symbol--all at the same time, and perhaps > even to the same interpretant--by virtue of the *different *characters > that it possesses. > > Don’t we here have to distinguish between the mark and the sign? Two signs > can’t be the same sign unless they also have the same interpretant and > object, can they? Now it’s true that any sign can typically be broken up > into constituent signs which may be symbols, icons or indexes. Likewise the > same mark can function in a sign that’s an icon or symbol. Indeed that’s > fairly common. > > The real question is the the question of realism here I think. Does the > icon have its character really or merely as interpreted? That’s the very > question that divides nominalism from realism. While I tend to agree that > it’s not a substantial difference functionally most of the time, it is I > think key for understanding Peirce here. > > On the other hand, can something truly be a sign--rather than just a > *potential *sign--if it is never *actually *interpreted as such? In > other words, it has an Immediate Interpretant, a range of *possible > *interpretations, > but no Dynamic Interpretant. This is a sincere question; I am likewise > curious as to what you and others think. > > This gets at the language problem. What do we mean by “interpreted as > such” versus having an interpretant. Again this may be where I’m just plain > wrong. So I hope others chime in. > > My sense is that Peirce’s concern is with volition. It’s the old joke of > someone saying don’t think of blue. You immediately think of blue in some > sense. What I think Peirce is after in his semiotics is a determinative > function where signs aren’t fully volitional. Thus the emphasis on the > object determining. In most philosophy you have judgments as > interpretations made volitionally in some sense. > > CP 2.435 “The Short Logic” is useful here. > > A judgment is an act of consciousness in which we recognize a belief, and > a belief is an intelligent habit from which we shall act when occasion > presents itself. Of what nature is that recognition? It may come very near > action. The muscles may twitch and we may restrain ourselves only > by considering that the proper occasion has not arisen. But, in general, > we virtually resolve upon a certain occasion to act as if certain imagined > circumstances were perceived. This act which amounts to such a resolve, is > a peculiar act of the will whereby we cause an image, or icon, to be > associated, in a peculiarly strenuous way, with an object represented to us > by an index. This act itself is represented in the proposition by a symbol, > and the consciousness of it fulfills the function of a symbol in the > judgment. Suppose, for example, I detect a person with whom I have to deal > in an act of dishonesty. I have in my mind something like a "composite > photograph" of all the persons that I have known and read of that have had > that character, and at the instant I make the discovery concerning that > person, who is distinguished from others for me by certain indications, > upon that index at that moment down goes the stamp of RASCAL, to remain > indefinitely. > > > I think the idea (and this goes to his cosmology as well) is that we’re > talking about habits not choices of interpretations. Thus the icon > functions as an icon because of a habit with the habit tied to resemblance > along some character. But the resemblance for that habit to function in an > iconic form has to be real. It’s not just a free judgment of a human mind > but a real regularity. > > This definitely is a subtle point and language runs us aground when we > talk about interpret. Since of course for a sign to be a sign it has to > have an interpretant and an interpretant typically implies an > interpretation. >
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