> On Mar 28, 2017, at 6:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > CG: Don’t we here have to distinguish between the mark and the sign? > > I know what you mean, but I am not sure that "mark" is the right word here, > especially since Peirce used that term in some later writings as a synonym > for "qualisign." I just had in mind the "thing" (also not the best word for > it) that acts as a sign. >
Yeah, the terminology can get tricky. Especially since it’s signs all the way down. > CG: Two signs can’t be the same sign unless they also have the same > interpretant and object, can they? > > I seem to recall that T. L. Short took this position in Peirce's Theory of > Signs, but consistent with that book's reputation overall, I do not know > whether it truly reflects Peirce's view or just his own. Besides, given that > semeiosis is continuous, is it even legitimate to "count" signs as distinct > individuals at all? I don’t think it’s just Short’s. I’m not sure how else to conceive of equating signs. In some sense we must be able to do so. > CG: Does the icon have its character really or merely as interpreted? That’s > the very question that divides nominalism from realism. > > Yes, and I think that the icon really has its character regardless; but the > question is whether merely having that character makes it an icon, apart from > anyone or anything interpreting it as such. Again, is it sufficient for > something to have only an Immediate Interpretant--"its peculiar > interpretability"--in order to "qualify" as a sign, or is that "status" only > achieved once it has a Dynamic Interpretant? Hopefully my later post clarified that a bit. I confess I’m reaching for proper language because most terms are ambiguous about the distinction I’m trying to raise. Realism vs. nominalism is probably the best way to think of it I’ve decided.
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