Gary F - Thanks for the quotation. I have only part of the EP2 - and
those pages weren't included. I do prefer the CP collection.
No- I am not assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign isn't
real. I am sure that it can be/IS real. That's not my point. - which
was to question first, the nature of these natural laws, which are
symbolic but not in the human sense of symbolic. And second, to
question that our primary experience of these natural laws is
metaphorical.
I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is
indexical, in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of these
laws. Intellectually analyzing them and developing symbolic
constructs - is a secondary step. As Peirce said - "every scientific
explanation of a natural phenomenon". I'm talking about prior to the
scientific explanation which, since it suggests Reason functioning
within the natural world - can be 'anthropomorphic' [if we define
Reason as particularly human]. But I consider our analysis of these
laws irrelevant. My focus is on the natural laws themselves, in
themselves, and how they operate.
Edwina
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On Fri 07/04/17 10:53 AM , [email protected] sent:
Edwina, you appear to be assuming that the object of a metaphorical
sign cannot be real. I don’t subscribe to that assumption.
For Peirce’s explanation of this point, see the passage I cited
from Peirce’s Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4. Since you don’t seem
to use EP2, and this passage was apparently omitted from CP, I’ll
copy it here:
[[ I hear you say: “This smacks too much of an anthropomorphic
conception.” I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural
phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which
the human reason is analogous; and that it really is so all the
successes of science in its applications to human convenience are
witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the length and breadth of
the modern world. In the light of the successes of science to my mind
there is a degree of baseness in denying our birthright as children of
God and in shamefacedly slinking away from anthropomorphic conceptions
of the universe.
Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy
of the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast
representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have,
organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of
Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play
in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe,—that
Universe being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I
can make out of this huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are
the premisses for us and these perceptual judgments have icons as
their predicates, in which icons Qualities are immediately presented.
But what is first for us is not first in nature. The premisses of
Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements of
facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the
necessitarian supposes to have been all in existence from the
foundation of the world, but which the Tychist supposes are
continually receiving new accretions. Those premisses of nature,
however, though they are not the perceptual facts that are premisses
to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being premisses. We can only
imagine what they are by comparing them with the premisses for us. As
premisses they must involve Qualities. ]]
Gary F.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53
To: [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement:
"These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as
constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think
John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of
these symbols is anthropomorphic"
As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula
or symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO
metaphorical because WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My
view is that our experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant
is how these laws form individual instantiations of matter - and I
don't see this as metaphorical but as real.
Edwina
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On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM , [email protected] [2] sent:
Jon A.S., John S.,
I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion
below.
Gary F.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected] [3]]
Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52
John S., List:
JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a
metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe.
Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature themselves, not our
linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs
are they? Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that
general laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe
consists of Signs all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is
perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs."
[GF: ] This quote is very often taken out of the context which
specifies what Peirce is referring to as “this universe”:
“It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that
a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning;
but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the
entire universe,— not merely the universe of existents, but all
that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part,
the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as ‘the
truth,’— that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is
not composed exclusively of signs” (EP2:394).
Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the
laws of nature would have to be the “leading principles” which
are “working out its conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193).
These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as
constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think
John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of
these symbols is anthropomorphic (EP2:193). We ascribe these forms to
the greater Universe just as we do with “facts”: “What we call
a ‘fact’ is something having the structure of a proposition, but
supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of
every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other
signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an
interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth,
and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very
Universe” (EP2:304).
To me, this implies the most straightforward answer to your
question, although it may not use the language you are looking for.
Gary f.
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