Edwina, John S., List: JFS: Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such.
I agree, and I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/regularity as a Sign *itself*, if in fact it is legitimate to treat reality as consisting *entirely *of Signs. ET: I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e., among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific instantiation. I agree, which is why I suggested that the Dynamic Object of a law of nature is the *continuum *of its *potential *instantiations (3ns), not the (discrete) *collection *of its *actual *instantiations (2ns). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > John, list: > > I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e., among > a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific instantiation. > > That is, a law would refer to the continuity of the species of chickens, > which have an ability to reproduce their type via eggs-to-chickens. It > would refer to the continuity of the type of flower - which has the ability > to reproduce that type year after year in particular form after form. > > A rule of conceptual behaviour is not a law and refers only to that > particular individual and does not continue on after that individual. > > Edwina > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Fri 07/04/17 9:02 AM , John F Sowa [email protected] sent: > > On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is > > a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. > > > > Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not our > > linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs > > are they? > > Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes > reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. > That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But > it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such. > > For example, Immanuel Kant's habits were so regular that his > neighbors said that they could set their clocks by the time > he went out for his daily walk. That is an example of law-like > behavior. But it doesn't imply that there was a specific law > embodied in Kant's nature. That's just the way he behaved. > > > Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general > > laws of nature are real, > > If a law we state makes reliable predictions, there must be > something real that makes it true. But that something may be > as elusive as whatever caused Kant's predictable behavior. > Calling it a law is a convenient metaphor for something that > we don't understand in detail. > > For examples, think of the laws discovered by Galileo, Kepler, > Newton, and Einstein. Then think of the thousands or millions > of books, articles, and commentaries about those laws. Then > imagine what scientists might discover in the next millennium. > > An interesting joke: "Gravity is a fraud. The earth sucks." > > For predicting the way we walk in our daily lives, that joke is > as useful a metaphor as any of those scientific commentaries. > > John > >
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