Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement:
"These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as
constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think
John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of
these symbols is anthropomorphic"
As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula
or symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO
metaphorical because WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My
view is that our experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant
is how these laws form individual instantiations of matter - and I
don't see this as metaphorical but as real.
Edwina
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On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Jon A.S., John S.,
I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion
below.
Gary F.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52
John S., List:
JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a
metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe.
Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature themselves, not our
linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs
are they? Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that
general laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe
consists of Signs all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is
perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs."
[GF: ] This quote is very often taken out of the context which
specifies what Peirce is referring to as “this universe”:
“It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that
a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning;
but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the
entire universe,— not merely the universe of existents, but all
that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part,
the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as ‘the
truth,’— that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is
not composed exclusively of signs” (EP2:394).
Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the
laws of nature would have to be the “leading principles” which
are “working out its conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193).
These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as
constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think
John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of
these symbols is anthropomorphic (EP2:193). We ascribe these forms to
the greater Universe just as we do with “facts”: “What we call
a ‘fact’ is something having the structure of a proposition, but
supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of
every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other
signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an
interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth,
and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very
Universe” (EP2:304).
To me, this implies the most straightforward answer to your
question, although it may not use the language you are looking for.
Gary f.
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]
On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:35 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
Jon and Edwina,
Jon
What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we
/describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other
/representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature
/itself/,
the real general that governs actual occurrences.
Edwina
But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference
to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a
'shared reality' could be developed.
That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is
strange.
Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has
gone on a holiday". It takes a phrase "general laws" from a
language
game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from
Peirce's
language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game
of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real"
for
which we have no words for describing. In short, it's a metaphor.
To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples:
Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth: If you drop something
in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional
to t squared: x = ½ gt²
Kepler's law of planetary orbits: Planets in the solar system
travel
in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse.
Newton's law of gravity: A generalization that explains the laws
of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena.
Einstein's general relativity: A generalization that explains
all the above plus many more phenomena.
Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its
domain of applicability. The more general laws, which cover
a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to
reality -- but each one is still a law of science.
In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor
for aspects of nature that we can only describe. The ultimate
laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future
might be very accurate. But when stated, they would be signs
expressed in the same ways as other laws of science.
John
Links:
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[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'s...@bestweb.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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