Edwina, Gary F., List: GF: Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the laws of nature would have to be the “leading principles” which are “working out its conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193). These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions.
This makes sense to me, although I still need some assistance sorting out in my own mind what it means to be a non-conventional Symbol. I anticipate that Stjernfelt's book will be helpful in this regard, although my impression is that it does not address laws of nature--at least, not directly. CSP: I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous; and that it really is so all the successes of science in its applications to human convenience are witnesses. I wonder if what I am seeking in the other thread--the physico-chemical/biological equivalent of thought in the 3ns-mode Interpretants of human semeiosis--is precisely this "something in nature to which the human reason is analogous." ET: I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is indexical, in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of these laws. Intellectually analyzing them and developing symbolic constructs - is a secondary step. I agree--we *experience *the instantiations of natural laws (2ns), and *reason *to the laws themselves as *generalizations *of that experience (3ns). ET: My focus is on the natural laws themselves, in themselves, and how they operate. This is what I am still trying to figure out--the semeiotic details of what is going on in nature before and apart from *human *representation of it as natural laws. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 11:03 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > Gary F - Thanks for the quotation. I have only part of the EP2 - and those > pages weren't included. I do prefer the CP collection. > > No- I am not assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign isn't real. I > am sure that it can be/IS real. That's not my point. - which was to > question first, the nature of these natural laws, which are symbolic but > not in the human sense of symbolic. And second, to question that our > primary experience of these natural laws is metaphorical. > > I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is indexical, > in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of these laws. > Intellectually analyzing them and developing symbolic constructs - is a > secondary step. As Peirce said - "every scientific explanation of a natural > phenomenon". I'm talking about prior to the scientific explanation which, > since it suggests Reason functioning within the natural world - can be > 'anthropomorphic' [if we define Reason as particularly human]. But I > consider our analysis of these laws irrelevant. My focus is on the natural > laws themselves, in themselves, and how they operate. > > Edwina > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Fri 07/04/17 10:53 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: > > Edwina, you appear to be assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign > cannot be real. I don’t subscribe to that assumption. > > > > For Peirce’s explanation of this point, see the passage I cited from > Peirce’s Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4. Since you don’t seem to use EP2, and > this passage was apparently omitted from CP, I’ll copy it here: > > > > [[ I hear you say: “This smacks too much of an anthropomorphic > conception.” I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural > phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the > human reason is analogous; and that it really is so all the successes of > science in its applications to human convenience are witnesses. They > proclaim that truth over the length and breadth of the modern world. In the > light of the successes of science to my mind there is a degree of baseness > in denying our birthright as children of God and in shamefacedly slinking > away from anthropomorphic conceptions of the universe. > > Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of > the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a > great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living > realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its > Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these > reactions and these qualities play in an argument that, they of course, > play in the universe,—that Universe being precisely an argument. In the > little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our > perceptual judgments are the premisses for us and these perceptual > judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons Qualities are > immediately presented. But what is first for us is not first in nature. The > premisses of Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements > of facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the necessitarian > supposes to have been all in existence from the foundation of the world, > but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new accretions. > Those premisses of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual > facts that are premisses to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being > premisses. We can only imagine what they are by comparing them with the > premisses for us. As premisses they must involve Qualities. ]] > > > > Gary F. > > > > From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] > Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53 > To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca > Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs > > Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement: > > "These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents > of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think John is right to > call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of these symbols is > anthropomorphic" > > As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or > symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO metaphorical because > WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My view is that our > experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant is how these laws form > individual instantiations of matter - and I don't see this as metaphorical > but as real. > > Edwina > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: > > Jon A.S., John S., > > > > I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below. > > > > Gary F. > > > > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52 > > John S., List: > > > > JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor > for aspects of nature that we can only describe. > > > > Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature themselves, not our > linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs are > they? Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general > laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe consists of Signs > all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is > not composed exclusively of signs." > > [GF: ] This quote is very often taken out of the context which specifies > what Peirce is referring to as “this universe”: > > “It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign > should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the > explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,— > not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, > embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are > all accustomed to refer to as ‘the truth,’— that all this universe is > perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs” (EP2:394). > > > > Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the laws of > nature would have to be the “leading principles” which are “working out its > conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193). These are clearly symbols, > though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form > of propositions. I think John is right to call them metaphorical, as our > primary experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic (EP2:193). We > ascribe these forms to the greater Universe just as we do with “facts”: > “What we call a ‘fact’ is something having the structure of a proposition, > but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of > every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other signs, to > approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would > be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may > use this language) would be the very Universe” (EP2:304). > > > > To me, this implies the most straightforward answer to your question, > although it may not use the language you are looking for. > > > > Gary f. > >
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