I have always been concerned about the implications of false information for the definition of information. Is false information information? Is false knowledge knowledge? I should think the answer must certainly be "No" for knowledge, because to know is a factive verb, meaning that it presupposes the truth of its object. I believe in common usage of 'information' in the technical sense, as in information theory, false information would be information even if it was false, but information in the ordinary sense of the word would not be information if it is false.
If, as I have argued, all signs are of a duplicitous nature, then this would be a moot question, or at least a very different question. > > On June 29, 2017 at 7:59 AM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > > Jon A, Jeff D, and Gary F, > > JA > > > > > > Why don't we put this on hold for later discussion? > > > > > > I was about to send the following when your note appeared in > my inbox. It should be sufficient for the word 'information', > but we can discuss other issues later. > > JD > > > > > > I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his > > use of > > "depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and > > 1896. > > The change was a broadening of the use of both terms. > > > > > > GF > > > > > > What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the application > > of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them. > > That does not mean that their depth, or “signification” as Peirce > > often called it, changed in any way; > > > > > > I agree. One example I use is the broadening of the word 'number' > from integers to rational numbers to irrational numbers to complex > numbers to quaternions... That broadens the application of the word, > but it does not make the definitions for its earlier uses obsolete. > > For any particular application, the definition can be narrowed > by adding an adjective, such as real, complex, hypercomplex... > > JA > > > > > > BTW, is it really necessary to point out once again that the job > > of a lexicographer presenting a survey of significant usages in > > common or technical is very different from the role of a philosopher > > expounding his or her own conception? > > > > > > Many of Peirce's definitions for the Century Dictionary or Baldwin's > dictionary include short philosophical essays. They are as significant > for his Opera Omnia as any other publications. > > And note his Ethics of Terminology. From EP 2.265: > > > > > > The first rule of good taste in writing is to use words whose > > meanings will not be misunderstood > > > > > > Implication: For a common word such as 'information', a dictionary > that cites dates for the word senses, such as the OED, would be > sufficient to determine what Peirce had intended. But when he wrote > the definition himself, that's even better: I'm sure he would not > use a word in a sense that was inconsistent with his own definition. > > John > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >
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