In the technical sense (algorithmic information theory, Shannon, various others), information is understood syntactically only, so there is no content involved. Content is required for truth or falsity. So the technical notion of information has nothing to say about truth or falsity of the information. Information is either transferred, or it is not.
On the nature of information flow (transfer), I recommend the book by that name by Barwise and Seligman. It is far superior to anything written by or about Shannon, but it is based on pre-Shannon work on networks by electrical engineers in the 1930s. It is a difficult book, but you can find the basics summarised in several of my articles on my web page. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Charles Pyle [mailto:charlesp...@comcast.net] Sent: Thursday, 29 June 2017 4:35 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information' I have always been concerned about the implications of false information for the definition of information. Is false information information? Is false knowledge knowledge? I should think the answer must certainly be "No" for knowledge, because to know is a factive verb, meaning that it presupposes the truth of its object. I believe in common usage of 'information' in the technical sense, as in information theory, false information would be information even if it was false, but information in the ordinary sense of the word would not be information if it is false. If, as I have argued, all signs are of a duplicitous nature, then this would be a moot question, or at least a very different question. On June 29, 2017 at 7:59 AM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote: Jon A, Jeff D, and Gary F, JA Why don't we put this on hold for later discussion? I was about to send the following when your note appeared in my inbox. It should be sufficient for the word 'information', but we can discuss other issues later. JD I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use of "depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and 1896. The change was a broadening of the use of both terms. GF What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the application of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them. That does not mean that their depth, or “signification” as Peirce often called it, changed in any way; I agree. One example I use is the broadening of the word 'number' from integers to rational numbers to irrational numbers to complex numbers to quaternions... That broadens the application of the word, but it does not make the definitions for its earlier uses obsolete. For any particular application, the definition can be narrowed by adding an adjective, such as real, complex, hypercomplex... JA BTW, is it really necessary to point out once again that the job of a lexicographer presenting a survey of significant usages in common or technical is very different from the role of a philosopher expounding his or her own conception? Many of Peirce's definitions for the Century Dictionary or Baldwin's dictionary include short philosophical essays. They are as significant for his Opera Omnia as any other publications. And note his Ethics of Terminology. From EP 2.265: The first rule of good taste in writing is to use words whose meanings will not be misunderstood Implication: For a common word such as 'information', a dictionary that cites dates for the word senses, such as the OED, would be sufficient to determine what Peirce had intended. But when he wrote the definition himself, that's even better: I'm sure he would not use a word in a sense that was inconsistent with his own definition. John ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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