Kirsti,
"Repurposing" is a common term in the North American vernacular these days, and it simply means using something old for a new purpose. Often applied to tools and other artifacts, not usually to words. If you're referring to my comment on the CP 2.407 footnote as "bold," I disagree; I think Jeff's comment on it was bolder. And no, I was certainly not stating "that the main purpose of CSP was to uphold old, established views." His purpose as a logician was to investigate the nature of inference as deeply and minutely as possible. But he also said that "It rather annoys me to be told that there is anything novel in my three categories" (CP 8.254), that the doctrine of pragmatism was "all the better for not being novel" (CP 8.261), and many similar remarks. Many late Peirce quotes on breadth and depth are included in my paper on his concept of information, which you can search for them if you like: http://www.gnusystems.ca/Rehabit.htm. Gary f. -----Original Message----- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 28-Jun-17 19:40 A bold interpretation. I wonder whether to quote is enough to give grounds for it. It almost sounds as if stating that the main purpose of CSP was to uphold old, established views. Which is surely not meant to be the message? I do not quite understand what "repurposing" means, especially in a philosophical context. I hope to get more information on this. Did Peirce ever use this word? Kisti <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] kirjoitti 29.6.2017 02:10: > Jeff, > > What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the _application_ > of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them. > That does not mean that their depth, or "signification" as Peirce > often called it, changed in any way; rather it signals an increase of > information conveyed by those propositions. So I think it's misleading > to say that Peirce's "meaning" of those terms changed from 1867 to > 1893 (or later), or that his _concepts_ of breadth and depth changed > in any way. > > Indeed, whenever he brings up the subject in his 1903-4 writings (such > as "New Elements"), he is careful to say that the concepts are very > old indeed, and he does _not_ say that he is repurposing these > well-established logical terms to say something different from what > logicians have said for centuries. Indeed his own ethics of > terminology would discourage that sort of repurposing. His originality > was in defining "information" as a third "quantity" which could be > formalized as the logical product of the other two. > > In short, these are very basic concepts in logic/semiotic, and what > Peirce did by broadening their _application_ within logic was to > demonstrate just how basic they are. I could supply a dozen or so > quotes from Peirce to back this up, and will do that if you wish, but > there's probably no need for that. > > Gary f. > > FROM: Jeffrey Brian Downard [ <mailto:[email protected]> mailto:[email protected]] > SENT: 28-Jun-17 18:15 > TO: Peirce-L < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> > SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information' > > Hello Gary R, John S, Gary F, Jon A, List, > > I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use > of "depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and > 1896. The change was a broadening of the use of both terms. > > I restricted myself to _TERMS, _because at the time this chapter was > first written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of > breadth and depth was equally applicable to _PROPOSITIONS _and to > _ARGUMENTS. _The breadth of a proposition is the aggregate of possible > states of things in which it is true; the breadth of an argument is > the aggregate of possible cases to which it applies. The depth of a > proposition is the total of fact which it asserts of the state of > things to which it is applied; the depth of an argument is the > importance of the conclusions which it draws. In fact, every > proposition and every argument can be regarded as a term.--1893. (CP > 2.407 Fn P1 p 249) > > I wonder if other changes are involved that were required by this > broadening in the meaning of both of these terms? > > Given the fact that the classification of signs as terms, propositions > and arguments is based in 1903 on the relation between the sign and > the interpretant--and that he later grounded the distinction on the > relation between the sign and the _final_ interpretant in > particular--I tend to think that Peirce is reforming the early > explanations in a number of ways--but it isn't obvious to me what > might count as natural development or refinement of the earlier > position and what might count as a more dramatic shift in position. > > The distinction between different classes of final interpretants as > emotional, energetic or logical should give us some reason to > reconsider how the conceptions of "breadth" and "depth" work in the > context of the mature semiotic theory. > > --Jeff
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