Clark, Stephen R, list, There a great deal I agree with in your post, Clark, but even more that I disagree with. But I'll have to respond more fully at a later date. For now just a few immediate reactions. I will have little to say on Heidegger as I haven't read his work in years, and I recall thinking while I was reading him that his emphasis on Being was, at least for me, the fixation on an empty concept, while his discussions of meaning were for me too vague to be of much value--at least to me. So, I'm hardly the person to engage on the thought of Heidegger, let alone the putative relation of his thought to Peirce's (which I don't see).
CG: Really quickly, how I took Kirsti (and please correct me if I’m reading wrong) was just that initially Peirce’s focus was on the structure of signs and later he was thinking through the structure in terms of meaningfulness that led to some of the innovations in structure in the early 20th century. (Such as those in his letters to Lady Welby) But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion of this classification recently discussed here was an important part of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural features, not to be glossed over in my opinion. Yet let me first clarify something regarding this discussion immediately. Off-list Stephen Rose wrote (in part; he said he was fine with my sharing this): SR: Is this forum an effort to establish scholarly precision about what Peirce said or meant or understood? Or is is an attempt to use his ideas as we understand them as relevant signposts to now? Maybe it is both. . . This has come up a number of times on this list, a few times by Stephen. I would say that certain members of this forum at times emphasize the importance of clarifying what Peirce's thought, while others at times emphasize using his ideas to further contemporary thought. But this appears to be mainly a matter of *emphasis*, and it seems to me that some of the strongest contributors to this forum see it as a both (that is certainly my position). Stephen continued: SR: ". . .this discussion seems to me to be related to the former which is my problem with the effort." I would say that this particular discussion is "both." But even if part of the discussion--or even if all of it--were emphasizing what Peirce* actually* wrote and thought and taught, what's wrong with that? First, as I see it, if we *are* to reliably and creatively use Peirce's ideas, we had best understand what he was trying to say. I don't know how much "precision" is necessarily involved in many discussion, and I* certainly* don't think that there is any "right" interpretation of Peirce, who himself syggested that all meaning *must* remain *vague*. while scientific meanings should aim at whatever precision is important so that there might be sufficient communication among researchers so as to move the inquiry forward as efficiently as possible (in an economy of research). The purpose of the pragmatic maxim would seem to be to help "settle opinion," which opinion can never be fully settled as the doctrine of fallibism makes clear enough. But while there may be many possible different 'good' interpretations of Peirce's thought, there are also some 'bad' interpretations which some on this list think that it is important to correct. There's much more to be said about this, but this will have to suffice for now. Mainly, this side discussion is once again to warn against blocking the way of inquiry. If one in not interested in a particular thread of inquiry here, ignore it, and possibly start another thread. But now continuing with Clark's recent comments: CG: . . Indeed if Peirce’s thought had an outsized influence, I think it safe to say it was his work on meaning not signs that was most influential. It’s worth noting that neither James nor Dewey really fully embrace his work on signs, only his work on meaning. I do not at all think that "it is safe to say" that Peirce's work on meaning has been more influential than his work in semiotics, especially in recent decades. While it is true that James and Dewey didn't fully (really, not all that mujch) embrace Peirce's work on signs. But this field of modern semeiotics which Peirce had pretty much invented (although drawing from Classical, Medieval, and other sources) was, naturally, both entirely new to them and quite difficult to fully grasp (as it is even in our day, although I see some considerable progress in this regard). As I see it, neither James nor Dewey had studied enough of the developments in the logic of Peirce's time to fully (much) understand his semiotic (this was especially so for James, while Peirce did not think very much of Dewey's work in logic). CG: Perhaps because it was his work on signs that quickly became so forgotten except in vague ways from some of his popular early works that continued to be reprinted. Certainly the key formulation from the end of his life seem largely unknown. But it is more and more *becoming* known, and I could, if I had the time, point to many centers of semiotic (and related, e.g. KR) research around the world which is developing his work. This is happening not only in Europe (e.g. in Denmark, Spain, France, and elsewhere), but also in South America (esp. Colombia and Brazil) and, more recently, in Asia (esp. China and Japan). But it takes a long time for such significant work as Peirce's1st to be "brought to light" and understood, 2nd to be promulgated, and 3rd to be further developed and applied. The occasional disparagement of Peirce's semeiotic on this list seems to me entirely wrong directed. CG: The second thing I’d add is that the place of the pragmatic maxim is crucial in all of this as a verification principle of meaning (not truth as others took it). While one obviously can’t fully separate the maxim from his work on signs, the place of meaningfulness as a key factor in his thought in some ways exceeds his work on signs. Again, while I agree with the important of, not only the pragmatic maxim, but all of his work in pragmaticism, your notion that "the place of meaningfulness . . . in some ways exceeds his work on signs" is your opinion, while many would disagree. I haven't time to discuss this at the moment except to say that I am of that camp which would *strongly* disagree. CG: Perhaps because it was his work on signs that quickly became so forgotten except in vague ways from some of his popular early works that continued to be reprinted. Certainly the key formulation from the end of his life seem largely unknown. The history of the growth of ideas is a peculiar one, and some of the most important work in scence and logic (and much else, including art and literature, for example, the great work of women in *all* these fields) was ignored until it was fully understood, for example, by an intellect like Peirce's. Let's hope that "the key formulations from the end of his life" will eventually become known and valued as much as some on this list value them--highly. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 7:22 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Jul 31, 2017, at 4:41 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > But I consider Kirsti's notion that "CSP was all his life after SIGNS. > That was earlier. Later he was after meanings" itself, if not 'gravely', at > least *completely* in wrong. Peirce was actively thinking about signs and > semiotics throughout his life and, as I see it, increasingly so. Indeed his > very idea of 'meaning' is near identical to a particular kind of sign, > namely, the interpretant. > > > I don’t disagree with that - I think what I was agreeing with her over was > the emphasis on meaning. Of course that’s not all that Peirce was focused > on. Sorry if I suggested deeper disagreement - I was writing quickly. I > don’t think Heidegger was only focused on meaning either, although that > clearly was one of his main emphasis. How to take him in that regard is > still a matter of debate in Heideggarian circles. (Thomas Sheehan has > caused a bit of a divide over how to take Heidegger - he emphasizes the > meaning aspect and thinks the focus of being misses the point - many > disagree with him both on the place of meaning in Heidegger but also the > importance of being) > > Really quickly, how I took Kirsti (and please correct me if I’m reading > wrong) was just that initially Peirce’s focus was on the structure of signs > and later he was thinking through the structure in terms of meaningfulness > that led to some of the innovations in structure in the early 20th century. > (Such as those in his letters to Lady Welby) But I always took the main > change as arising out of a deeper focus on meaning leading him to adopt > positions surprisingly similar to Hegel at times. So ironically his deeper > structural analysis of signs arises out of inquiry on meaning. That is > recognizing the differences within both the object and the interpretant and > how the former determines the latter. > > Since it’s precisely there that I think there’s common ground with the > Heideggarian stream of phenomenology (particularly the gap between object > and sign which a guess is required to bridge) this is quite important in my > view. Those elements, while often present in a primitive fashion in the > earlier Peirce really are explicated best in his later works. > > The second thing I’d add is that the place of the pragmatic maxim is > crucial in all of this as a verification principle of meaning (not truth as > others took it). While one obviously can’t fully separate the maxim from > his work on signs, the place of meaningfulness as a key factor in his > thought in some ways exceeds his work on signs. Indeed if Peirce’s thought > had an outsized influence, I think it safe to say it was his work on > meaning not signs that was most influential. It’s worth noting that neither > James nor Dewey really fully embrace his work on signs, only his work on > meaning. This is arguably true of most pragmatists. Even those later > figures who seem to be close to aspects of Peirce’s signs - say Grice’s > work on language - still end up missing the crucial insights. Perhaps > because it was his work on signs that quickly became so forgotten except in > vague ways from some of his popular early works that continued to be > reprinted. Certainly the key formulation from the end of his life seem > largely unknown. > > More later when I get some time. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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