I'm not sure of the function of this extract.
What I get from it, is the reality that the actions of an
independent agent are due to multiple sources of 'information-input'
or multiple causes. There's the past form...one might call this the
material and formal causes. And there are multiple efficient causes
in 'the heat of the moment', coming from various sites. And, that
interesting 'final cause'.
That's as far as I've gotten with this extract.
Edwina
On Wed 27/09/17 9:16 AM , [email protected] sent:
Continuing from Lowell 1.2:
Taking up, first, the argument about morals, let us confront it with
the facts of the case. The necessitarians tell us that when we act, we
act under a necessity that we cannot control. I am inclined to think
that this is substantially so. We certainly cannot control our past
actions, and I fancy it is too late to control what is happening at
the very instant present. You cannot prevent what already is. If this
be true, it is true that when we act, we do act under a necessity that
we cannot control. But our future actions we can determine in a great
measure; can we not? To deny that were mere gabble and word-twisting.
No matter how bad the argument may be that we can only control future
actions by a present action which is itself necessitated, still it
would be idle to find fault with it, since it is quite irrelevant.
The point is that our future actions will be controlled by present
endeavors. That is sufficient. But let us describe the all-familiar
phenomena of self-control.
In the first place, then,
[note: CP 1.591 begins here (EP2:245), and the CP edition differs
slightly in punctuation and paragraphing from the EP2 edition. EP2
sticks more closely to Peirce's manuscript, but from this point on
i'll post the CP text, because it generally makes both reading and
specific reference to the text more convenient. The wording will not
differ from EP2.]
591. Every man has certain ideals of the general description of
conduct that befits a rational animal in his particular station in
life, what most accords with his total nature and relations. If you
think this statement too vague, I will say, more specifically, that
there are three ways in which these ideals usually recommend
themselves and justly do so. In the first place certain kinds of
conduct, when the man contemplates them, have an esthetic quality. He
thinks that conduct fine; and though his notion may be coarse or
sentimental, yet if so, it will alter in time and must tend to be
brought into harmony with his nature. At any rate, his taste is his
taste for the time being; that is all. In the second place, the man
endeavors to shape his ideals into consistency with each other, for
inconsistency is odious to him. In the third place, he imagines what
the consequences of fully carrying out his ideals would be, and asks
himself what the esthetic quality of those consequences would be.
592. These ideals, however, have in the main been imbibed in
childhood. Still, they have gradually been shaped to his personal
nature and to the ideas of his circle of society rather by a
continuous process of growth than by any distinct acts of thought.
Reflecting upon these ideals, he is led to intend to make his own
conduct conform at least to a part of them— to that part in which
he thoroughly believes. Next, he usually formulates, however vaguely,
certain rules of conduct. He can hardly help doing so. Besides, such
rules are convenient and serve to minimize the effects of future
inadvertence, and what are well named the wiles of the devil within
him. Reflection upon these rules, as well as upon the general ideals
behind them, has a certain effect upon his disposition, so that what
he naturally inclines to do becomes modified. Such being his
condition, he often foresees that a special occasion is going to
arise; thereupon, a certain gathering of his forces will begin to
work and this working of his being will cause him to consider how he
will act, and in accordance with his disposition, such as it now is,
he is led to form a resolution as to how he will act upon that
occasion. This resolution is of the nature of a plan; or, as one
might almost say, a diagram. It is a mental formula always more or
less general. Being nothing more than an idea, this resolution does
not necessarily influence his conduct. But now he sits down and goes
through a process similar to that of impressing a lesson upon his
memory, the result of which is that the resolution, or mental
formula, is converted into a determination, by which I mean a really
efficient agency, such that if one knows what its special character
is, one can forecast the man's conduct on the special occasion. One
cannot make forecasts that will come true in the majority of trials
of them by means of any figment. It must be by means of something
true and real.
593. We do not know by what machinery the conversion of a
resolution into a determination is brought about. Several hypotheses
have been proposed; but they do not much concern us just now. Suffice
it to say that the determination, or efficient agency, is something
hidden in the depths of our nature. A peculiar quality of feeling
accompanies the first steps of the process of forming this
impression; but later we have no direct consciousness of it. We may
become aware of the disposition, especially if it is pent up. In that
case, we shall recognize it by a feeling of need, of desire. I must
notice that a man does not always have an opportunity to form a
definite resolution beforehand. But in such cases there are less
definite but still well-marked determinations of his nature growing
out of the general rules of conduct that he has formulated; or in
case no such appropriate rule has been formulated, his ideal of
fitting conduct will have produced some disposition. At length, the
anticipated occasion actually arises.
594. In order to fix our ideas, let us suppose a case. In the course
of my reflexions, I am led to think that it would be well for me to
talk to a certain person in a certain way. I resolve that I will do
so when we meet. But considering how, in the heat of conversation, I
might be led to take a different tone, I proceed to impress the
resolution upon my soul; with the result that when the interview
takes place, although my thoughts are then occupied with the matter
of the talk, and may never revert to my resolution, nevertheless the
determination of my being does influence my conduct. All action in
accordance with a determination is accompanied by a feeling that is
pleasurable; but, whether the feeling at any instant is felt as
pleasurable in that very instant or whether the recognition of it as
pleasurable comes a little later is a question of fact difficult to
make sure about.
http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm [1] }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures
of 1903
Links:
------
[1] http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm
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