Very interesting and filled with implications. For example, if he makes normative sciences a hierarchy in which aesthetics at the top that is no different to me than having a triad which leads to action understood to be Aesthetics informed by Ethics and stimulated by Reality which is the sign. The reason I think Aesthetics trumps Ethics and deserves its place as the highest is drawn from my sense of Mao's massive failure. Good requires a diminution of violence. Mao did not see this. The cultural revolution died at birth. We now have a chance to have a replay of a global revolution which does indeed make us a bit more rational but not without the fallibility inherent in the philistine nature which I believe most of us share with Peirce.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Thu, Sep 28, 2017 at 10:09 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Following up on the comments by Gary R, Stephen, Jon, and (earlier) Tom > Gollier, > > > > What strikes me first about Peirce’s description of “the all-familiar > phenomena of self-control” is that his generic “man” seems to behave more > rationally than most people actually do. But we have to bear in mind that > this whole lecture, indeed this whole series, is primarily about > *reasoning*, and he is addressing this “argument about morals” because it > is *analogous* to the argument about logic which is his main target. The > quirks of ‘irrational man’ (however real) are not relevant to this argument. > > > > The words “*all-familiar phenomena*” are all-important here. Some people > have more self-control than others, but everyone has *some* acquaintance > with it, and Peirce is implicitly asking his audience to draw on that > experience. In Peirce’s terms at least, this is a *phenomenological* > inquiry, not a psychological one. Psychology is classified by Peirce as a > “special science,” meaning that its practitioners need special training > and/or equipment to establish the “facts” of the science, and have to use > assumptions and methods which they can only draw from metaphysics and > logic. What distinguishes philosophy (i.e. “cenoscopy”) from all special > sciences is that it requires no such special equipment: “It contents itself > with a more attentive scrutiny and comparison of the facts of everyday > life, such as present themselves to every adult and sane person, and for > the most part in every day and hour of his waking life” (EP2:146). This > goes double for phenomenology, which according to Peirce ought to be called > “first philosophy,” and thus first of the “positive sciences.” The “facts” > with which he asks us to “confront” the target argument are “facts of > everyday life.” > > > > This section also exemplifies Peirce’s classification of the normative > sciences: esthetics, ethics and logic, in that order, form a hierarchy in > the sense that each draws principles from the one before. The phenomena of > self-control typically include a “resolution,” a “mental formula” which is > very like a *diagram*. All reasoning is essentially diagrammatic, > according to Peirce, and I think Jon is right to point out that such > diagrams are not what we usually call “images” because they do *not* > represent anything in the universe of visual experience. They are, you > might say, a form of abstract art. This will be important to recall when we > get to the second Lowell lecture, in which Peirce introduces his > Existential Graphs. Those diagrams are iconic in the sense that the graphs > and the experiments we perform on them are visible, but they are also > symbolic signs whose *objects* are *not *visible. Moreover, in practice, > the kind of “diagram” Peirce is referring to in 1.592 may not be visualized > at all; it may be schematic in some other way. Personally, I think my own > “diagrams” are often more proprioceptive or “muscular” than visual. But > metaphors of vision are so pervasive in our language that they are pretty > much unavoidable in discussing mental matters. > > Anyway, Peirce observes that the “mental formula” which becomes a habit or > disposition must be “converted” into a “*determination,* by which I mean > a really efficient agency,” before it can issue forth in actual behavior. > In Peircean phenomenological terms, this is an example of Thirdness > “bringing about a Secondness,” as Peirce put it in the Syllabus (EP2:267). > In 1.593 Peirce explains how Firstness enters into the process, in the form > of “a peculiar quality of feeling” which “accompanies the first steps of > the process.” Already we can see how his description of “the all-familiar > phenomena of self-control” undermines the “defendant argument” he is > criticizing, by denying its implicit premisses. But Peirce will clarify > this in the next instalment, along with the “difficult question of fact” > concerning the *timing* of the process. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 27-Sep-17 09:16 > *To:* 'Peirce-L' <[email protected]> > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.3 > > > > Continuing from Lowell 1.2: > > > > Taking up, first, the argument about morals, let us confront it with the > facts of the case. The necessitarians tell us that when we act, we act > under a necessity that we cannot control. I am inclined to think that this > is substantially so. We certainly cannot control our *past* actions, and > I fancy it is too late to control what is happening at the very instant > present. You cannot prevent what already is. If this be true, it is true > that *when we act*, we do act under a necessity that we cannot control. > But our *future* actions we can determine in a great measure; can we not? > To deny *that* were mere gabble and word-twisting. No matter how bad the > argument may be that we can only control future actions by a present action > which is itself necessitated, still it would be idle to find fault with it, > since it is quite irrelevant. The point is that our future actions will be > controlled by present endeavors. That is sufficient. But let us describe > the all-familiar phenomena of self-control. > > > > In the first place, then, > > > > *[note: CP 1.591 begins here (EP2:245), and the CP edition differs > slightly in punctuation and paragraphing from the EP2 edition. EP2 sticks > more closely to Peirce's manuscript, but from this point on i'll post the > CP text, because it generally makes both reading and specific reference to > the text more convenient. The wording will not differ from EP2.] * > > > > 591. Every man has certain ideals of the general description of conduct > that befits a rational animal in his particular station in life, what most > accords with his total nature and relations. If you think this statement > too vague, I will say, more specifically, that there are three ways in > which these ideals usually recommend themselves and justly do so. In the > first place certain kinds of conduct, when the man contemplates them, have > an esthetic quality. He thinks that conduct fine; and though his notion may > be coarse or sentimental, yet if so, it will alter in time and must tend to > be brought into harmony with his nature. At any rate, his taste *is* his > taste for the time being; that is all. In the second place, the man > endeavors to shape his ideals into consistency with each other, for > inconsistency is odious to him. In the third place, he imagines what the > consequences of fully carrying out his ideals would be, and asks himself > what the esthetic quality of those consequences would be. > > > > 592. These ideals, however, have in the main been imbibed in childhood. > Still, they have gradually been shaped to his personal nature and to the > ideas of his circle of society rather by a continuous process of growth > than by any distinct acts of thought. Reflecting upon these ideals, he is > led to *intend* to make his own conduct conform at least to a part of > them— to that part in which he thoroughly believes. Next, he usually > formulates, however vaguely, certain *rules of conduct.* He can hardly > help doing so. Besides, such rules are convenient and serve to minimize the > effects of future inadvertence, and what are well named the wiles of the > devil within him. Reflection upon these rules, as well as upon the general > ideals behind them, has a certain effect upon his disposition, so that what > he naturally inclines to do becomes modified. Such being his condition, he > often foresees that a special occasion is going to arise; thereupon, a > certain gathering of his forces will begin to work and this working of his > being will cause him to consider how he will act, and in accordance with > his disposition, such as it now is, he is led to form a *resolution* as > to how he will act upon that occasion. This resolution is of the nature of > a plan; or, as one might almost say, a *diagram.* It is a mental formula > always more or less general. Being nothing more than an idea, this > resolution does not necessarily influence his conduct. But now he sits down > and goes through a process similar to that of impressing a lesson upon his > memory, the result of which is that the *resolution,* or mental formula, > is converted into a *determination,* by which I mean a really efficient > agency, such that if one knows what its special character is, one can > *forecast* the man's conduct on the special occasion. One cannot make > forecasts that will come true in the majority of trials of them by means of > any figment. It must be by means of something true and real. > > > > 593. We do not know by what machinery the conversion of a resolution into > a determination is brought about. Several hypotheses have been proposed; > but they do not much concern us just now. Suffice it to say that the > determination, or efficient agency, is something hidden in the depths of > our nature. A peculiar quality of feeling accompanies the first steps of > the process of forming this impression; but later we have no direct > consciousness of it. We may become aware of the disposition, especially if > it is pent up. In that case, we shall recognize it by a feeling of *need,* > of *desire.* I must notice that a man does not always have an opportunity > to form a definite resolution beforehand. But in such cases there are less > definite but still well-marked determinations of his nature growing out of > the general rules of conduct that he has formulated; or in case no such > appropriate rule has been formulated, his ideal of fitting conduct will > have produced some disposition. At length, the anticipated occasion > actually arises. > > > > 594. In order to fix our ideas, let us suppose a case. In the course of > my reflexions, I am led to think that it would be well for me to talk to a > certain person in a certain way. I resolve that I will do so when we meet. > But considering how, in the heat of conversation, I might be led to take a > different tone, I proceed to impress the resolution upon my soul; with the > result that when the interview takes place, although my thoughts are then > occupied with the matter of the talk, and may never revert to my > resolution, nevertheless the determination of my being does influence my > conduct. All action in accordance with a determination is accompanied by a > feeling that is pleasurable; but, whether the feeling at any instant is > felt as pleasurable in that very instant or whether the recognition of it > as pleasurable comes a little later is a question of fact difficult to make > sure about. > > > > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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