Gary F, List, I haven't been reading ahead in the lecture material initially because I hadn't the time, but now as a kind of discipline, misguided as it may turn out to be.
I take from the present excerpt that whether in moral or in intellectual matters that one has a modicum of control in being able to construct a mental diagram which one can act on when at sometime in the future the opportunity arises to put that plan/resolution into effect. As Peirce writes: This resolution is of the nature of a plan; or, as one might almost say, a *diagram.* It is a mental formula always more or less general. This sort of thing in the moral/social sphere is more or less commonplace, I would think. Well, it certainly happens often enough to me. For example, I know a particular relative who, knowling my politics, will begin saying politically repugnant things just to get my goat it would seem. After a couple of times getting embroiled in such nonsense (which never goes anywhere of value) I finally determine that I will not allow myself to be engaged again in those kinds of fruitless discussion and I do not, remaining silent, or excusing myself from the room, etc. This is perhaps the simplest example I might offer, while there are many other rather more complex and subtle ones I could offer, say, from my years of teaching, and the advance plans I divised for dealing with certain recalcitrant or disruptive students. But divising such a general 'diagram' of a more intelletual nature can also be readily imagined. Peirce offers the case of his brother who, during a meal in the kitchen, saw the curtains go up in flames and went into rapid, decisive, and appropriate action, quickly putting out the flames. When asked how he pulled this off so adroitly, he told Charles that he had rehearsed such a plan in his head should a situation like that ever arise. I too have 'rehearsed' certain plans of action which I might take in some domestic exigency or another, the simplest (again) being my habit of always being aware of the nearest exit in theaters and halls I find myself in. The point of all this, as Peirce suggests, is that while we have little control over the present and none over the past, we do have a modicum of control of the future if we have such a general diagram in mind and act on it when the occasion arises. Best, Gary R <https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail&utm_term=icon> Virus-free. www.avast.com <https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail&utm_term=link> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 9:16 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Continuing from Lowell 1.2: > > > > Taking up, first, the argument about morals, let us confront it with the > facts of the case. The necessitarians tell us that when we act, we act > under a necessity that we cannot control. I am inclined to think that this > is substantially so. We certainly cannot control our *past* actions, and > I fancy it is too late to control what is happening at the very instant > present. You cannot prevent what already is. If this be true, it is true > that *when we act*, we do act under a necessity that we cannot control. > But our *future* actions we can determine in a great measure; can we not? > To deny *that* were mere gabble and word-twisting. No matter how bad the > argument may be that we can only control future actions by a present action > which is itself necessitated, still it would be idle to find fault with it, > since it is quite irrelevant. The point is that our future actions will be > controlled by present endeavors. That is sufficient. But let us describe > the all-familiar phenomena of self-control. > > > > In the first place, then, > > > > *[note: CP 1.591 begins here (EP2:245), and the CP edition differs > slightly in punctuation and paragraphing from the EP2 edition. EP2 sticks > more closely to Peirce's manuscript, but from this point on i'll post the > CP text, because it generally makes both reading and specific reference to > the text more convenient. The wording will not differ from EP2.] * > > > > 591. Every man has certain ideals of the general description of conduct > that befits a rational animal in his particular station in life, what most > accords with his total nature and relations. If you think this statement > too vague, I will say, more specifically, that there are three ways in > which these ideals usually recommend themselves and justly do so. In the > first place certain kinds of conduct, when the man contemplates them, have > an esthetic quality. He thinks that conduct fine; and though his notion may > be coarse or sentimental, yet if so, it will alter in time and must tend to > be brought into harmony with his nature. At any rate, his taste *is* his > taste for the time being; that is all. In the second place, the man > endeavors to shape his ideals into consistency with each other, for > inconsistency is odious to him. In the third place, he imagines what the > consequences of fully carrying out his ideals would be, and asks himself > what the esthetic quality of those consequences would be. > > > > 592. These ideals, however, have in the main been imbibed in childhood. > Still, they have gradually been shaped to his personal nature and to the > ideas of his circle of society rather by a continuous process of growth > than by any distinct acts of thought. Reflecting upon these ideals, he is > led to *intend* to make his own conduct conform at least to a part of > them— to that part in which he thoroughly believes. Next, he usually > formulates, however vaguely, certain *rules of conduct.* He can hardly > help doing so. Besides, such rules are convenient and serve to minimize the > effects of future inadvertence, and what are well named the wiles of the > devil within him. Reflection upon these rules, as well as upon the general > ideals behind them, has a certain effect upon his disposition, so that what > he naturally inclines to do becomes modified. Such being his condition, he > often foresees that a special occasion is going to arise; thereupon, a > certain gathering of his forces will begin to work and this working of his > being will cause him to consider how he will act, and in accordance with > his disposition, such as it now is, he is led to form a *resolution* as > to how he will act upon that occasion. This resolution is of the nature of > a plan; or, as one might almost say, a *diagram.* It is a mental formula > always more or less general. Being nothing more than an idea, this > resolution does not necessarily influence his conduct. But now he sits down > and goes through a process similar to that of impressing a lesson upon his > memory, the result of which is that the *resolution,* or mental formula, > is converted into a *determination,* by which I mean a really efficient > agency, such that if one knows what its special character is, one can > *forecast* the man's conduct on the special occasion. One cannot make > forecasts that will come true in the majority of trials of them by means of > any figment. It must be by means of something true and real. > > > > 593. We do not know by what machinery the conversion of a resolution into > a determination is brought about. Several hypotheses have been proposed; > but they do not much concern us just now. Suffice it to say that the > determination, or efficient agency, is something hidden in the depths of > our nature. A peculiar quality of feeling accompanies the first steps of > the process of forming this impression; but later we have no direct > consciousness of it. We may become aware of the disposition, especially if > it is pent up. In that case, we shall recognize it by a feeling of *need,* > of *desire.* I must notice that a man does not always have an opportunity > to form a definite resolution beforehand. But in such cases there are less > definite but still well-marked determinations of his nature growing out of > the general rules of conduct that he has formulated; or in case no such > appropriate rule has been formulated, his ideal of fitting conduct will > have produced some disposition. At length, the anticipated occasion > actually arises. > > > > 594. In order to fix our ideas, let us suppose a case. In the course of > my reflexions, I am led to think that it would be well for me to talk to a > certain person in a certain way. I resolve that I will do so when we meet. > But considering how, in the heat of conversation, I might be led to take a > different tone, I proceed to impress the resolution upon my soul; with the > result that when the interview takes place, although my thoughts are then > occupied with the matter of the talk, and may never revert to my > resolution, nevertheless the determination of my being does influence my > conduct. All action in accordance with a determination is accompanied by a > feeling that is pleasurable; but, whether the feeling at any instant is > felt as pleasurable in that very instant or whether the recognition of it > as pleasurable comes a little later is a question of fact difficult to make > sure about. > > > > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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