I have evolved a sense of things into a daily discipline which contains a meditative-prayer element and what I call a colloquy. I have described this in one or another of my writings. Essentially for me, it is important to raise the concerns of the Lord's Prayer daily and to submit whatever I want to deal with to Reality (developing a sign) Ethics (index of values) and Aesthetics (aiming toward truth and beauty in expression and action.) I mention this to suggest that an image is not essential to the process of arriving at concrete results from a triadic process. And this is proactive rather than having something in mind when an occasion arises. That is very important -- to be able to respond to occasions. But I believe a daily discipline may have taken place for Peirce in one form or another. His walks and musings and his clear emphasis on the centrality of memorial maxims suggest a practice of some sort. Best. S
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 4:04 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F, List, > > I haven't been reading ahead in the lecture material initially because I > hadn't the time, but now as a kind of discipline, misguided as it may turn > out to be. > > I take from the present excerpt that whether in moral or in intellectual > matters that one has a modicum of control in being able to construct a > mental diagram which one can act on when at sometime in the future the > opportunity arises to put that plan/resolution into effect. As Peirce > writes: > > This resolution is of the nature of a plan; or, as one might almost say, a > *diagram.* It is a mental formula always more or less general. > > > This sort of thing in the moral/social sphere is more or less commonplace, > I would think. Well, it certainly happens often enough to me. For example, > I know a particular relative who, knowling my politics, will begin saying > politically repugnant things just to get my goat it would seem. After a > couple of times getting embroiled in such nonsense (which never goes > anywhere of value) I finally determine that I will not allow myself to be > engaged again in those kinds of fruitless discussion and I do not, > remaining silent, or excusing myself from the room, etc. This is perhaps > the simplest example I might offer, while there are many other rather more > complex and subtle ones I could offer, say, from my years of teaching, and > the advance plans I divised for dealing with certain recalcitrant or > disruptive students. > > But divising such a general 'diagram' of a more intelletual nature can > also be readily imagined. Peirce offers the case of his brother who, during > a meal in the kitchen, saw the curtains go up in flames and went into > rapid, decisive, and appropriate action, quickly putting out the flames. > When asked how he pulled this off so adroitly, he told Charles that he had > rehearsed such a plan in his head should a situation like that ever arise. > I too have 'rehearsed' certain plans of action which I might take in some > domestic exigency or another, the simplest (again) being my habit of always > being aware of the nearest exit in theaters and halls I find myself in. > > The point of all this, as Peirce suggests, is that while we have little > control over the present and none over the past, we do have a modicum of > control of the future if we have such a general diagram in mind and act on > it when the occasion arises. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > <https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail&utm_term=icon> > Virus-free. > www.avast.com > <https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail&utm_term=link> > <#m_-1130672465717506295_DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 9:16 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Continuing from Lowell 1.2: >> >> >> >> Taking up, first, the argument about morals, let us confront it with the >> facts of the case. The necessitarians tell us that when we act, we act >> under a necessity that we cannot control. I am inclined to think that this >> is substantially so. We certainly cannot control our *past* actions, and >> I fancy it is too late to control what is happening at the very instant >> present. You cannot prevent what already is. If this be true, it is true >> that *when we act*, we do act under a necessity that we cannot control. >> But our *future* actions we can determine in a great measure; can we >> not? To deny *that* were mere gabble and word-twisting. No matter how >> bad the argument may be that we can only control future actions by a >> present action which is itself necessitated, still it would be idle to find >> fault with it, since it is quite irrelevant. The point is that our future >> actions will be controlled by present endeavors. That is sufficient. But >> let us describe the all-familiar phenomena of self-control. >> >> >> >> In the first place, then, >> >> >> >> *[note: CP 1.591 begins here (EP2:245), and the CP edition differs >> slightly in punctuation and paragraphing from the EP2 edition. EP2 sticks >> more closely to Peirce's manuscript, but from this point on i'll post the >> CP text, because it generally makes both reading and specific reference to >> the text more convenient. The wording will not differ from EP2.] * >> >> >> >> 591. Every man has certain ideals of the general description of conduct >> that befits a rational animal in his particular station in life, what most >> accords with his total nature and relations. If you think this statement >> too vague, I will say, more specifically, that there are three ways in >> which these ideals usually recommend themselves and justly do so. In the >> first place certain kinds of conduct, when the man contemplates them, have >> an esthetic quality. He thinks that conduct fine; and though his notion may >> be coarse or sentimental, yet if so, it will alter in time and must tend to >> be brought into harmony with his nature. At any rate, his taste *is* his >> taste for the time being; that is all. In the second place, the man >> endeavors to shape his ideals into consistency with each other, for >> inconsistency is odious to him. In the third place, he imagines what the >> consequences of fully carrying out his ideals would be, and asks himself >> what the esthetic quality of those consequences would be. >> >> >> >> 592. These ideals, however, have in the main been imbibed in childhood. >> Still, they have gradually been shaped to his personal nature and to the >> ideas of his circle of society rather by a continuous process of growth >> than by any distinct acts of thought. Reflecting upon these ideals, he is >> led to *intend* to make his own conduct conform at least to a part of >> them— to that part in which he thoroughly believes. Next, he usually >> formulates, however vaguely, certain *rules of conduct.* He can hardly >> help doing so. Besides, such rules are convenient and serve to minimize the >> effects of future inadvertence, and what are well named the wiles of the >> devil within him. Reflection upon these rules, as well as upon the general >> ideals behind them, has a certain effect upon his disposition, so that what >> he naturally inclines to do becomes modified. Such being his condition, he >> often foresees that a special occasion is going to arise; thereupon, a >> certain gathering of his forces will begin to work and this working of his >> being will cause him to consider how he will act, and in accordance with >> his disposition, such as it now is, he is led to form a *resolution* as >> to how he will act upon that occasion. This resolution is of the nature of >> a plan; or, as one might almost say, a *diagram.* It is a mental formula >> always more or less general. Being nothing more than an idea, this >> resolution does not necessarily influence his conduct. But now he sits down >> and goes through a process similar to that of impressing a lesson upon his >> memory, the result of which is that the *resolution,* or mental formula, >> is converted into a *determination,* by which I mean a really efficient >> agency, such that if one knows what its special character is, one can >> *forecast* the man's conduct on the special occasion. One cannot make >> forecasts that will come true in the majority of trials of them by means of >> any figment. It must be by means of something true and real. >> >> >> >> 593. We do not know by what machinery the conversion of a resolution >> into a determination is brought about. Several hypotheses have been >> proposed; but they do not much concern us just now. Suffice it to say that >> the determination, or efficient agency, is something hidden in the depths >> of our nature. A peculiar quality of feeling accompanies the first steps of >> the process of forming this impression; but later we have no direct >> consciousness of it. We may become aware of the disposition, especially if >> it is pent up. In that case, we shall recognize it by a feeling of >> *need,* of *desire.* I must notice that a man does not always have an >> opportunity to form a definite resolution beforehand. But in such cases >> there are less definite but still well-marked determinations of his nature >> growing out of the general rules of conduct that he has formulated; or in >> case no such appropriate rule has been formulated, his ideal of fitting >> conduct will have produced some disposition. At length, the anticipated >> occasion actually arises. >> >> >> >> 594. In order to fix our ideas, let us suppose a case. In the course of >> my reflexions, I am led to think that it would be well for me to talk to a >> certain person in a certain way. I resolve that I will do so when we meet. >> But considering how, in the heat of conversation, I might be led to take a >> different tone, I proceed to impress the resolution upon my soul; with the >> result that when the interview takes place, although my thoughts are then >> occupied with the matter of the talk, and may never revert to my >> resolution, nevertheless the determination of my being does influence my >> conduct. All action in accordance with a determination is accompanied by a >> feeling that is pleasurable; but, whether the feeling at any instant is >> felt as pleasurable in that very instant or whether the recognition of it >> as pleasurable comes a little later is a question of fact difficult to make >> sure about. >> >> >> >> >> >> http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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