Eric (and list),
I don’t believe that Peirce is making an empirical claim here, i.e. he is not
claiming that his generalization is true because it is based on observation of
a large sample of individuals. He is making a cenoscopic claim, i.e. describing
his own experience and assuming that everyone else’s experience of self-control
(if they have any) is at least vaguely similar. He is asking you to reflect on
your own experience of self-control and decide for yourself whether it more or
less fits his description, and hoping that you will go along with him on that
basis.
You say that there are “some people who feel compelled to make their lives less
reasonable.” But if I understand Peirce’s concept of “reasonable” rightly, he
would find that a contradiction in terms. Any attempt to make your life have
any definite quality, whether you feel “compelled” to it or not, is an attempt
at self-control, because it entails judging how well your past conduct has
measured up to some standard and resolving to make your future conduct approach
that standard. Making your life less reasonable would be like making yourself
go to sleep — the harder you try, the further you get from your goal. In a
sense, self-control is reasonableness — reasoning is essentially the method of
self-control.
We should also bear in mind that, in Peirce’s words, “self-control of any kind
is purely inhibitory. It originates nothing” (EP2:233). We often think of
“self-control” as if it were opposed to spontaneity of action, but Peirce
thought of it as harnessing the core impulses that originate our activity and
guiding our instinctive motivations toward actualization of some admirable
ideal. That tends to transform a life into a continuous process, one that moves
in some direction instead of taking a random walk.
That would mean that if you are born to be wild, as Gene put it, reasonable
self-control would not domesticate you but inhibit the impulses toward
domestication that would otherwise tame you, and thus channel your wildness
more effectively!
Gary f.
} We must believe in free will – we have no choice. [Isaac Bashevis Singer] {
<http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Eric Charles [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 1-Oct-17 20:01
Coming in late, but....
I'm never quite sure what to think when Peirce starts making (seemingly)
flippant claims about the universal nature of men's psychological states. At
the end here, he says:
"That is, the man can, or if you please is compelled, to make his life more
reasonable. "
It seems to me that such a claim is either vacuous or a false generalization.
It is vacuous if, whatever someone does, we make it an a priori truism that the
action is directed at making his life more reasonable. And if we are not making
such an a priori move, then any concerted effort at empirical investigation
will reveal that there are people who do not feel so compelled, including some
people who feel compelled to make their lives less reasonable.
I'd really appreciate any help with this that others could offer. Is Peirce
trying to a make an empirical claim here, or not? If he is, with what evidence?
If he is not, then what is it he is trying to do?
Many thanks!
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