Jerry, List, Gary F's comments on the Lowell Lectures he's been transcribing seem to me to be just that: comments. Nothing definitive about them; they seem offered as Gary's understanding of the text and meant merely to spur, hopefully, substantive discussion (as he suggested early on). While I may not fully agree with him in a very few details, in general I think his comments, including these most recent ones, have been spot on.
Jerry wrote: Your responses to the distinctions between spot, dot and blot appear to avoid the basic logic of CSP and also appears to be remote from other interpreters of CSP writings. I have no idea where this peculiar comment (GF appearing "to avoid the basic logic of CSP" and his interpretations appearing "to be remote from other interpreters of CSP writings) might mean, nor where it is coming from. I see *none* of this and quite the contrary. Can you offer support for your comments Jerry? Just a few examples would do for us to mull over what you might have in mind. As for Kirsti's remarks, Gary F responded: Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in quotation marks. It’s because that is the term Peirce used for Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898. In the Lowell Lectures (and the Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in Lecture 3, for instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in terminology because I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly evident in Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on. This change in the terminology used to refer to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns from the 1898 Lectures to the Lowells and Syllabus of 1903 is Peirce's, *not* Gary F's. And while I will want to see where exactly he's going with this as we approach Lowell 3 (I'm not reading ahead as I previously noted), the phrase "*elements* of the phaneron" (emphasis added) immediately comes to mind for how Peirce can refer to the three categories in consideration of phenomenology. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 1:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > List, Gary, Kirsti: > > Your responses to the distinctions between spot, dot and blot appear to > avoid the basic logic of CSP and also appears to be remote from other > interpreters of CSP writings. > > By your usage, Roberts appears to use the term “spot” ambiguously. > (p.114-115) (CSP, 2003) > “Let a heavy dot or dash be used in place of a noun which has been erased > from a proposition” > “A blank form of proposition produced by such erasures as can be filled, > each with a proper name, to make a proposition again, is called a rhema, > or, relatively to the proposition of which it is conceived, the predicate > of that proposition.” > > I read this passage to mean that the term “spot” is used to represent > particular nouns (proper names) in the grammar of propositions! Within > this context, how can one image that, as logical terms, *spot*, *dot* and > *blot* can be substituted for one another? > > Gary, does CSP usage of the term “spot” in the context of this passage, > correspond with your assertions? > A “dot” may infer a point on a line. > A blot may infer a particular (irregular) geometric form. > Can you provide examples of how you would substitute the terms “element” > and “category” in this context? > > While I deeply appreciate your efforts to stimulate discussions here, I am > equally deeply concerned that your interpretations are flawed because of > the absence of associations to the structure of logical propositions. > > I find Kirsti’s comments to be well poised. Absolutely nothing is to be > gained by avoiding CSP’s writings as a whole. > > Can anyone provide resolutions to these conundrums? > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > On Nov 26, 2017, at 7:29 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > > Gary f., > > Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different > meaning. It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about terminonology. > They are not synonyms. > > But if anyone uses Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness as just names for > classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification. > > If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps not. > > Kirsti > > g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47: > > Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in > quotation marks. It’s because that is the term Peirce used for Firstness, > Secondness and Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898. > In the Lowell Lectures (and the Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the > term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in Lecture 3, for > instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in terminology because > I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly > evident in Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on. > As for SPOT, DOT and BLOT, if you’ve been following Lowell 2 it > should be clear enough how they are related; anyway, I don’t think I > can add anything to my last two posts that will clarify their usage in > the terminology of EGs. > Gary f. > -----Original Message----- > From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi > <kirst...@saunalahti.fi>] > Sent: 25-Nov-17 15:38 > To: g...@gnusystems.ca > Cc: 'Peirce List' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14 > Gary f., > I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his > "categories"??? Insted of... his categories??? > Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it > would have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is > all about relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too? > Not about just classification. > Kirsti > g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52: > > List, Mary, > > Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with > > either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth > > comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898 > > (RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before > > Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness, > > Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more > > specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained > > "by > > means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the > > unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll > > include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154: > > Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity > > attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion, > > I > > call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached > > to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs > > according > > to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads, > > triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete > > assertion, > > like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb, > > needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as > > --obeys mamma > > you obey-- > > A _dyad_, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete > > the assertion as > > —OBEYS— > > or —IS IDENTICAL WITH— > > A _triad_ needs just three subjects as > > --gives--to-- > > --obeys both--and-- > > The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology: > > what > > Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or > > "predicate" > > in the Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the > > semiotic > > trichotomy _rheme/dicisign/argument_ as given in the Syllabus, > > EP2:292 > > or CP 2.250.) The "subject blank" or "line of identity" here > > represents the individual "subject of force," as does the "heavy > > dot" > > in Lowell 2, where the sheet of assertion represents "the aggregate" > > of those "subjects of the complexus of experience-forces > > well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph, > > and > > the interpreter of it." > > The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT > > 155-6) relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to > > the Peircean "categories" -- and I think these relations also hold > > in > > the Lowell presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the _line of > > identity_ is classed among "verbs" here, although the _ends_ of the > > line (the "dots" of Lowell 2) represent "individual objects" which > > would be the "subjects" of the "verbs" in the graph. As a verb, > > though, all the line of identity can mean is "is identical with," > > its > > subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the "hooks" of > > the > > "spots." > > In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very > > different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety. > > Among these is the line signifying identity. But, second, the ends > > of > > the line of identity (and every verb ought to [be] conceived as > > having > > such loose ends) are signs of a totally different kind. They are > > demonstrative pronouns, indicating existing objects, not necessarily > > material things, for they may be _events_, or even _qualities_, but > > still objects, merely designated as _this_ or _that_. In the third > > place the writing of verbs side by side, and the ovals enclosing > > graphs not asserted but subjects of assertion, which last is > > continually used in mathematics and makes one of the great > > difficulties of mathematics, constitute a third, entirely different > > kind of sign. Signs of the first kind represent objects in their > > firstness, and give the significations of the terms. Signs of the > > second kind represent objects as existing,-- and therefore as > > reacting,-- and also in their reactions. They contribute the > > _assertive_ character to the graph. Signs of the third kind > > represent > > objects as representative, that is in their Thirdness, and upon them > > turn all the inferential processes. In point of fact, it was > > considerations about the categories which taught me how to construct > > the system of graphs. > > One last comment: the usage of the word "individual" in logic can be > > confusing, but Peirce's definition of the term in _Baldwin's > > Dictionary_ -- http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Individual [1] > > [1] > > --is helpful for understanding Peirce's usage. > > Gary f. > > SENT: 23-Nov-17 16:38 > > Continuing from Lowell 2.13, > > https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-19 > [2] > > 03-lowell-lecture-ii/display/13620 > > [2] > > You will ask me what use I propose to make of this sign that > > _something exists_, a fact that graphist and interpreter took for > > granted at the outset. I will show you that the sign will be useful > > as > > long as we agree that _although different points on the sheet may > > denote the same individual, yet different individuals cannot be > > denoted by the same point on the sheet_. > > If we take any proposition, say > > A SINNER KILLS A SAINT > > and if we erase portions of it, so as to leave it a _blank form_ of > > proposition, the _blanks_ being such that if every one of them is > > filled with a proper name, a proposition will result, such as > > ______ kills a saint > > A sinner kills ______ > > ______ kills ______ > > where _Cain_ and _Abel_ might for example fill the blanks, then such > > a > > blank form, as well as the complete proposition, is called a _rheme_ > > (provided it be neither [by] logical necessity true of everything > > nor > > true of nothing, but this limitation may be disregarded). If it has > > one blank it is called a _monad_ rheme, if two a _dyad_, if three a > > _triad_, if none a _medad_ (from μηδέν). > > Now such a _rheme_ being neither logically necessary nor logically > > impossible, as a [part of ?] a graph without being represented as a > > combination by any of the signs of the system, is called a _lexis_ > > and > > each replica of the lexis is called a _spot_. (_Lexis_ is the Greek > > for a single word and a lexis in this system corresponds to a single > > verb in speech. The plural of _lexis_ is preferably _lexeis_ rather > > than _lexises_.) > > Such a spot has a particular point on its periphery appropriated to > > each and every one of its blanks. Those points, which, you will > > observe, are mere places, and are not marked, are called the _hooks_ > > of the spot. But if a _marked point_, which we have agreed shall > > assert the existence of an individual, be put in that place which is > > a > > hook of a graph, it must assert that some thing is the corresponding > > individual whose name might fill the blank of the rheme. > > Thus > > • GIVES • TO • IN EXCHANGE FOR • > > will mean "something gives something to something in exchange for > > something." > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm [3] [3] }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures > > of > > 1903 > > https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-19 > [2] > > 03-lowell-lecture-ii > > [4] > > Links: > > ------ > > [1] http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Individual [1] > > [2] > > https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-19 > [2] > > 03-lowell-lecture-ii/display/13620 > > [3] http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm [3] > > [4] > > https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-19 > [2] > > 03-lowell-lecture-ii > > Links: > ------ > [1] http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Individual > [2] https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-19 > [3] http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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