Peirce, I thought said all thought is in signs. In CP signs appear many more times than thought or thinking. In between with over 700 mentions is consciousness which seems to me significant. I wonder if he believed consciousness was a condition of active thought and of signs as those vaguenesses and images that became words and thereby enabled reflection and representation. I know there are math things too but I have no sense of them.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 12:17 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > > > As I remarked in the other thread, this part of Lowell 3 illustrates > several significant points about definitions and terminological matters. > > > > As we all know, Peirce in his various writings provided dozens of > definitions of the word “sign,” and no two of them are exactly alike. Why > couldn’t he make do with one complete and exact definition, and simply > repeat it every time he needed to insert one? > > > > First of all, “sign” is a word in common use, which entails that it gets > used in a range of senses, some of them quite vague. For purposes of exact > logic or semiotics, Peirce needs to narrow that range. The same goes for > the term “representation”; and he gives rough-and-ready definitions of both > terms in Lowell 3.13, both of which achieve that purpose to some extent. > > > > Second, the contexts in which Peirce gives a definition of “sign” vary, > and I think this accounts for much of the variation in the definitions. > This variation gives us no reason to doubt that all Peirce’s definitions of > “sign” are consistent with one another, or that they all express exactly > the same *concept* (to the extent that a concept *can* be exact). > > > > But for his semiotic (i.e. scientific) purposes, Peirce also needs to make > an *analytical* definition of the concept, one that will identify its > *essential* elements. For that purpose he creates the technical term > “representamen,” which is *not* in common use — in fact there’s no entry > for it in most English dictionaries. That makes it much more suitable than > “sign” for analytic purposes, although its extension is supposed to match > that of “sign” as closely as possible. As a technical term, it can be > defined *exactly* by Peirce in the act of introducing it. Then, by > defining a “sign” as a representamen or a kind of representamen, he can > provide an exact definition of “sign” while also retaining the > ordinary-language signification of the word, which is more vague and more > familiar. > > > > There is a more detailed version of this double definition, with an > interesting example of the difference between “sign” and “representamen,” > in the “Speculative Grammar” section of the Syllabus, EP2:272-3. I devoted > some commentary to that passage in *Turning Signs*, > http://gnusystems.ca/TS/cls.htm#sunflow, which interested readers can > have a look at. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 13-Jan-18 15:09 > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.13 > > > > Continuing from Lowell 3.12, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce- > manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13937: > > > > [540] The analysis which I have just used to give you some notion of > Genuine Thirdness and its two forms of degeneracy is the merest rough > blackboard sketch of the true state of things; and I must begin the > examination of representations by defining representation a *little* more > accurately. In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word > *Representation* to the *operation* of a sign or its *relation to* the > object *for* the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject > that represents I call a *sign* or a *representamen.* I use these two > words, *sign* and *representamen,* differently. By a *sign* I mean > anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such > conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this > familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a > sign, and I define a *representamen* as being whatever that analysis > applies to. If therefore I have committed an error in my analysis, part of > what I say about *signs* will be false. For in that case a *sign* may not > be a *representamen.* The analysis is certainly true of the > representamen, since that is all that word means. Even if my analysis is > correct, something may happen to be true of all *signs,* that is of > everything that, antecedently to any analysis, we should be willing to > regard as conveying a notion of anything, while there might be something > which my analysis describes of which the same thing is not true. In > particular, all signs convey notions to *human minds;* but I know no > reason why every representamen should do so. > > > > [541] My definition of a representamen is as follows: > > A representamen is a subject of a triadic relation *to* a Second, called > its *Object*, *for* a Third, called its *Interpretant*, this triadic > relation being such that the Representamen determines its Interpretant to > stand in the same triadic relation to the same Object for some > Interpretant. > > > > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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