Dear list,
In *Man: Sign or Algorithm? A Rhetorical Analysis of Peirce's Semiotics*, Burks considers what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, he conceives the object of ‘man is a sign’ to have. “*Forty years ago I had the good fortune to begin a study of Peirce’s semiotics.. **His pragmatic analysis of a concept as a conscious habit of action; **and his associated pragmatic principle of meaning.* *There were also many obscure and murky, yet suggestive and intriguing, parts of Peirce’s semiotics. These I could not understand, and I puzzled over them. * *The most notable was Peirce’s “man is a sign.”* *This semiotic aphorism seemed central to much of Peirce’s metaphysics, including his later (1890’s) philosophy of evolutionary cosmology. * *But how could it fit with the clear parts of his semiotics?* *..I could not accept this split-thought hypothesis about Peirce.”* It ought to be obvious by now how ‘man is a sign’ is more than the whole of Burks’ conception of the object. If it isn’t, then there has been no movement, which is a change from positive into positive. Hth, Jerry R On Thu, Jan 18, 2018 at 2:01 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > A few more comments on the terminology of Lowell 3.13: > > > > Peirce says “I confine the word *Representation* to the *operation* of a > sign or its *relation to* the object *for* the interpreter of the > representation.” This implies already that a sign is something that can > *operate* (i.e. *do* something, either physically or psychically) or *be > related to* something else. This “something” is, I take it, what he > refers to as a “concrete subject.” This does not mean a physically existing > thing, because that is Peirce’s definition of a *sinsign* (“an actual > existent thing or event which is a sign”), and in Peirce’s classification, > a sign can also be a qualisign or a legisign. Both “concrete” and “subject” > are being used here in their traditional logical senses, which differ > somewhat from their everyday usage in our time. We’ve discussed Peirce’s > use of “subject” many times on the list so I won’t repeat that, but it’s > the sense in which a triadic relation has three “subjects.” He defines > “concrete” in the *Century Dictionary* this way: “*In logic*, considered > as invested with the accidents of matter; particular; individual: opposed > to *abstract*.” > > > > “The concrete subject that represents I call a *sign* or a > *representamen.*” As Peirce explains, the difference between the two > terms is that the latter is a technical, analytically defined word, while > “sign” is in common usage, and Peirce does not wish to violate that > ordinary usage when he makes general statements about signs. > > > > Peirce was already using the term “representamen” in the 1860s. In his > 1906 “Prolegomena,” after defining the icon/index/symbol trichotomy, he > added this note: ‘In the original publication of this division, in 1867, > the term “representamen” was employed in the sense of a sign in general, > while “sign” was taken as a synonym of Index, and an Icon was termed a > “likeness.”’ So Peirce in 1903 had a long history of using “representamen” > as a technical term. But apparently he came to regret this in 1905, as we > can see in the following excerpt from a draft letter to Lady Welby, dated > July 1905: > > [[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful > case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact > sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly preferred the term > *representamen*. But there was no need of this horrid long word. … The > truth is that I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn > up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong > logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will > only shackle thought. ] SS p.193 ] > > Despite his regrets, Peirce continued using the term “representamen” into > 1906 (usually in the phrase “sign or representamen”), perhaps feeling that > his usage of it was now well established and it was too late to change it. > > > > Getting back to 1903 and the Lowell Lectures, Peirce tried to distinguish > between the meanings of the two terms as follows: “all signs convey > notions to *human minds;* but I know no reason why every representamen > should do so. ” He made the same distinction at greater length in the > Syllabus: > > [[ A *Sign* is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there > may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower, in turning > towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further > condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely > corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same > reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. > But *thought* is the chief, if not the only, mode of representation. ] > EP2:273 ] > > I’ll leave it up to the reader to decide whether this is *exactly* the > same distinction found in Lowell 3.13. (Whether it is or not, it’s an > example of polyversity!) > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 13-Jan-18 15:09 > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.13 > > > > Continuing from Lowell 3.12, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce- > manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13937: > > > > [540] The analysis which I have just used to give you some notion of > Genuine Thirdness and its two forms of degeneracy is the merest rough > blackboard sketch of the true state of things; and I must begin the > examination of representations by defining representation a *little* more > accurately. In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word > *Representation* to the *operation* of a sign or its *relation to* the > object *for* the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject > that represents I call a *sign* or a *representamen.* I use these two > words, *sign* and *representamen,* differently. By a *sign* I mean > anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such > conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this > familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a > sign, and I define a *representamen* as being whatever that analysis > applies to. If therefore I have committed an error in my analysis, part of > what I say about *signs* will be false. For in that case a *sign* may not > be a *representamen.* The analysis is certainly true of the > representamen, since that is all that word means. Even if my analysis is > correct, something may happen to be true of all *signs,* that is of > everything that, antecedently to any analysis, we should be willing to > regard as conveying a notion of anything, while there might be something > which my analysis describes of which the same thing is not true. In > particular, all signs convey notions to *human minds;* but I know no > reason why every representamen should do so. > > > > [541] My definition of a representamen is as follows: > > A representamen is a subject of a triadic relation *to* a Second, called > its *Object*, *for* a Third, called its *Interpretant*, this triadic > relation being such that the Representamen determines its Interpretant to > stand in the same triadic relation to the same Object for some > Interpretant. > > > > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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