A few more comments on the terminology of Lowell 3.13:
Peirce says "I confine the word Representation to the operation of a sign or
its relation to the object for the interpreter of the representation." This
implies already that a sign is something that can operate (i.e. do
something, either physically or psychically) or be related to something
else. This "something" is, I take it, what he refers to as a "concrete
subject." This does not mean a physically existing thing, because that is
Peirce's definition of a sinsign ("an actual existent thing or event which
is a sign"), and in Peirce's classification, a sign can also be a qualisign
or a legisign. Both "concrete" and "subject" are being used here in their
traditional logical senses, which differ somewhat from their everyday usage
in our time. We've discussed Peirce's use of "subject" many times on the
list so I won't repeat that, but it's the sense in which a triadic relation
has three "subjects." He defines "concrete" in the Century Dictionary this
way: "In logic, considered as invested with the accidents of matter;
particular; individual: opposed to abstract."
"The concrete subject that represents I call a sign or a representamen." As
Peirce explains, the difference between the two terms is that the latter is
a technical, analytically defined word, while "sign" is in common usage, and
Peirce does not wish to violate that ordinary usage when he makes general
statements about signs.
Peirce was already using the term "representamen" in the 1860s. In his 1906
"Prolegomena," after defining the icon/index/symbol trichotomy, he added
this note: 'In the original publication of this division, in 1867, the term
"representamen" was employed in the sense of a sign in general, while "sign"
was taken as a synonym of Index, and an Icon was termed a "likeness."' So
Peirce in 1903 had a long history of using "representamen" as a technical
term. But apparently he came to regret this in 1905, as we can see in the
following excerpt from a draft letter to Lady Welby, dated July 1905:
[[ I use 'sign' in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful
case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense
of the scientific definition. . I formerly preferred the term representamen.
But there was no need of this horrid long word. . The truth is that I went
wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing
is inevitable in the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal
definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought. ] SS p.193 ]
Despite his regrets, Peirce continued using the term "representamen" into
1906 (usually in the phrase "sign or representamen"), perhaps feeling that
his usage of it was now well established and it was too late to change it.
Getting back to 1903 and the Lowell Lectures, Peirce tried to distinguish
between the meanings of the two terms as follows: "all signs convey notions
to human minds; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so. "
He made the same distinction at greater length in the Syllabus:
[[ A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there may
be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower, in turning
towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further
condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding
ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the
sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But thought is the chief,
if not the only, mode of representation. ] EP2:273 ]
I'll leave it up to the reader to decide whether this is exactly the same
distinction found in Lowell 3.13. (Whether it is or not, it's an example of
polyversity!)
Gary f.
From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 13-Jan-18 15:09
To: [email protected]
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.13
Continuing from Lowell 3.12,
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low
ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13937:
[540] The analysis which I have just used to give you some notion of Genuine
Thirdness and its two forms of degeneracy is the merest rough blackboard
sketch of the true state of things; and I must begin the examination of
representations by defining representation a little more accurately. In the
first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word Representation to the
operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the
representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a sign or a
representamen. I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently.
By a sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in
any way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I
start with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is
essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that
analysis applies to. If therefore I have committed an error in my analysis,
part of what I say about signs will be false. For in that case a sign may
not be a representamen. The analysis is certainly true of the representamen,
since that is all that word means. Even if my analysis is correct, something
may happen to be true of all signs, that is of everything that, antecedently
to any analysis, we should be willing to regard as conveying a notion of
anything, while there might be something which my analysis describes of
which the same thing is not true. In particular, all signs convey notions to
human minds; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so.
[541] My definition of a representamen is as follows:
A representamen is a subject of a triadic relation to a Second, called its
Object, for a Third, called its Interpretant, this triadic relation being
such that the Representamen determines its Interpretant to stand in the same
triadic relation to the same Object for some Interpretant.
http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903
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