A quick google search found plenty. Here some of the first few.
http://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2010/05/12/between-whitehead-peirce/
between Whitehead & Peirce
May 12, 2010 by Adrian J Ivakhiv
http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html
Peirce and Whitehead
http://koutroufinis.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/5a4393e048c409a9677b45899fdd7286.pdf
Uexküll, Whitehead, Peirce. Rethinking the Concept of ‘Umwelt’ from a
Process Philosophical Perspective.
On 2018/01/21 6:39 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Gary f, Helmut, Edwina,
Gary f wrote:
[Peirce] used [Sign] as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic relation.
The sign, like the representamen, is “the concrete subject that
represents” (CP 1.540). In this respect the two words *are
*synonymous; there is no need to make up “a way of seeing "sign" as as
synonym with "representamen".”
Gary, I fully concur, as you can imagine, with your emphasizing "Sign"
as a "correlate" of a genuine triadic relation and /not/ to mean a
function (as I also suggested in an earlier post) “consisting of sign,
object, interpretant.” This idea of "consisting" leads astray, in my
opinion.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond*
*
*
*
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*
On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:19 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca
<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
Helmut,
Many have tried using the word “sign” that way, and some have even
made a habit of it. But I prefer Peirce’s definition(s) of the
word, and he did not use it to mean “a function,” or as
“consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” He used it as one
“correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. The sign, like the
representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents” (CP
1.540). In this respect the two words *are* synonymous; there is
no need to make up “a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen".”
I think the key challenge in understanding Peircean semiosis is
reading exactly what Peirce wrote about it. The further we spin
off from that, the more confused we become.
Gary f.
*From:*Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de
<mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>]
*Sent:* 20-Jan-18 17:34
*To:* g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
*Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
*Subject:* Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
Gary, List,
I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant
is possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional
composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions),
which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of
domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is
possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too.
And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign
(functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and
the whole interpretant, not only the immediate ones.
1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns:
Functional composition.
Best, Helmut
20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
*Von:* g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
John, you wrote,
[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection
and transcription of Peirce's MSS. He was undoubtedly thinking
about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons
for changing his terminology. But those brief quotations don't
explain why. ]]
What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief
quotations”?
The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using
“representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2) using
them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term “representamen”
as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift that I quoted
was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s the “brief
quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave unexplained? Here
it is again:
[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a
wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in
almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly
preferred the term /representamen/. But there was no need of this
horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having
a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable
in the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal
definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought.]
SS p.193 ]
Gary f.
-----Original Message-----
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,
Edwina
> I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more
complex
> or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro
> bacterium to the plant world to the animal world.
Yes. I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted her
career to studying bacteria: “The growth, reproduction, and
communication of these moving, alliance-forming bacteria”
lie on a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our
sensitivities and stimulations.”
https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html
<https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html>
Gary R
> Has there been any work (articles, dissertations, etc.) comparing
the
> thinking of the two? As I recall, John, some of your papers touch on
> this.
Following is the article I presented at a conference on "Pragmatic
process philosophy" in 1999: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
<http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf>
Stephen
> Here's
> somethinghttp://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2010/05/12/between-whitehead-pei
<http://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2010/05/12/between-whitehead-pei>
> rce/
Thanks for that reference. I googled "peirce whitehead" and found
many other references. Among them was a paper by Jaime Nubiola
from 2008: http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html
<http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html>
Jaime also spoke at the 1999 conference. But the 2008 paper is
more detailed. In it, he quoted Whitehead's biographer, Victor Lowe:
> Convictions common to Peirce and Whitehead have been deservedly
> noticed by commentators, somewhat to the neglect of the first
question
> of
> metaphysics: How shall metaphysics be pursued? — As a science among
> the sciences, says Peirce. Not so, says Whitehead; it seeks
truth, but
> a more general truth than sciences seek (Lowe 1964, 440).
But I'm not sure that they disagreed on that point. In his 1903
classification of the sciences, Peirce said that the "special
sciences"
depend on mathematics and metaphysics. Therefore, metaphysics
would be more general than the special sciences.
Gary F
> Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of “sign”
> which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell lectures
> may represent his first clear move in that direction.
This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and
transcription of Peirce's MSS. He was undoubtedly thinking about
these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for
changing his terminology. But those brief quotations don't
explain why.
John
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