Gary R, list,
Yes, I agree that the usage of “sign” in reference to a “function” is a significant departure from Peircean semiotics. Peirce does define a function in Lowell 3 (specifically CP 1.540), but he calls it “Representation,” which is “the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the representation.” The word “Representation” is a hypostatic abstraction which nominalizes the function, which is also regarded by Peirce as a “relation.” The triadic relation which must “consist in a power of the representamen to determine some interpretant to being a representamen of the same object” (CP 1.542, emphasis Peirce’s). That determining power can only be exercised by what Peirce calls a “concrete subject,” a “sign” or a “representamen.” Peirce says that “representation is precisely genuine Thirdness” (CP 1.532). Representation is not a sign but the operation of a sign. Logic is “the Philosophy of Representation” (CP 1.539). Using the word “sign” as a synonym for the function of “representation,” or for the triadic relation instead of the one subject which determines another subject to represent a third subject, is not only unnecessary but misleading, for anyone trying to understand Peirce’s semiotic. It virtually robs the sign of its life, its power to determine. Gary f. From: Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 20-Jan-18 23:39 To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12 Gary f, Helmut, Edwina, Gary f wrote: [Peirce] used [Sign] as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. The sign, like the representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents” (CP 1.540). In this respect the two words are synonymous; there is no need to make up “a way of seeing "sign" as as synonym with "representamen".” Gary, I fully concur, as you can imagine, with your emphasizing "Sign" as a "correlate" of a genuine triadic relation and not to mean a function (as I also suggested in an earlier post) “consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” This idea of "consisting" leads astray, in my opinion. Best, Gary R <https://d22r54gnmuhwmk.cloudfront.net/photos/0/ia/il/nnIAIlpwAddaFAz-44x44-cropped.jpg> Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690 On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:19 PM, <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Helmut, Many have tried using the word “sign” that way, and some have even made a habit of it. But I prefer Peirce’s definition(s) of the word, and he did not use it to mean “a function,” or as “consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” He used it as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. The sign, like the representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents” (CP 1.540). In this respect the two words are synonymous; there is no need to make up “a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen".” I think the key challenge in understanding Peircean semiosis is reading exactly what Peirce wrote about it. The further we spin off from that, the more confused we become. Gary f. From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] Sent: 20-Jan-18 17:34 To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12 Gary, List, I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions), which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole interpretant, not only the immediate ones. 1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional composition. Best, Helmut 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr Von: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> John, you wrote, [[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and transcription of Peirce's MSS. He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology. But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]] What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief quotations”? The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave unexplained? Here it is again: [[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly preferred the term representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought. ] SS p.193 ] Gary f. -----Original Message----- From: John F Sowa [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01 To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12 Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F, Edwina > I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex > or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro > bacterium to the plant world to the animal world. Yes. I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted her career to studying bacteria: “The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance-forming bacteria” lie on a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our sensitivities and stimulations.” <https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html> https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html Gary R > Has there been any work (articles, dissertations, etc.) comparing the > thinking of the two? As I recall, John, some of your papers touch on > this. Following is the article I presented at a conference on "Pragmatic process philosophy" in 1999: <http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf Stephen > Here's > somethinghttp://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2010/05/12/between-whitehead-pei > <http://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2010/05/12/between-whitehead-pei> > rce/ Thanks for that reference. I googled "peirce whitehead" and found many other references. Among them was a paper by Jaime Nubiola from 2008: <http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html> http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html Jaime also spoke at the 1999 conference. But the 2008 paper is more detailed. In it, he quoted Whitehead's biographer, Victor Lowe: > Convictions common to Peirce and Whitehead have been deservedly > noticed by commentators, somewhat to the neglect of the first question > of > metaphysics: How shall metaphysics be pursued? — As a science among > the sciences, says Peirce. Not so, says Whitehead; it seeks truth, but > a more general truth than sciences seek (Lowe 1964, 440). But I'm not sure that they disagreed on that point. In his 1903 classification of the sciences, Peirce said that the "special sciences" depend on mathematics and metaphysics. Therefore, metaphysics would be more general than the special sciences. Gary F > Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of “sign” > which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell lectures > may represent his first clear move in that direction. This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and transcription of Peirce's MSS. He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology. But those brief quotations don't explain why. John ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. 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