Dear list,

I wish to share this article, which I take to be topical given our
incomplete understanding of Quasi-minds:

*We worked in a group of three where one played the part of a scoundrel,
the other one was a hero, and the third one kept a neutral position..*

*He said he hated the work..*

*The world in those comments was divided into black and white.. *

*praised.. criticized..  That was the principle of the work..*

*The posts and comments are made to form the opinion of Russian citizens
regarding certain issues, and as we see it works for other countries, too..*

*The most important principle of the work is to have an account like a real

*These technologies are unbelievably effective..*

*She added that she learned how effective the troll farm's work was when
she saw regular people sharing opinions and information that she knew were
planted by trolls.*

*"They believed it was their own thoughts, but I saw that those thoughts
were formed by the propagandists," she said.*

*He begins in Letter 13 by affirming that “a third basic drive which could
mediate the other two is an absolutely unthinkable concept”; *

*Or, finally, there must exist a power which comes between mind and matter
and unites the two… Is such a thing conceivable?  Certainly not!  *

*~* "Aesthetic" for Schiller and Peirce: A Neglected Origin of Pragmatism

Jeffrey Barnou,  *Journal of the History of Ideas*

Jerry R

On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 2:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <>

> List:
> I found three more potentially relevant quotes in an alternate draft of
> "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (R 193, NEM 4:313-330; 1906).
> It was a bit of a challenge to ascertain how much of the context I should
> include in each case, so please let me know off-List if you would like to
> see anything that comes right before or after any of these excerpts.
> Regards,
> Jon S.
> 8.  Now let us see how the Diagram entrains its consequence. The Diagram
> sufficiently partakes of the percussivity of a Percept to determine, as its
> Dynamic, or Middle, Interpretant, a state [of] activity in the Interpreter,
> mingled with curiosity. As usual, this mixture leads to Experimentation. It
> is the normal Logical effect; that is to say, it not only happens in the
> cortex of the human brain, but must plainly happen in every Quasi-mind in
> which Signs of all kinds have a vitality of their own. (NEM 4:318).
> 9.  The System of Existential Graphs the development of which has only
> been begun by a solitary student, furnishes already the best diagram of the
> contents of the logical Quasi-mind that has ever yet been found and
> promises much future perfectionment. Let us call the collective whole of
> all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the
> *Phaneron*. Then the substance of every Thought (and of much beside
> Thought proper) will be a Consistituent of the Phaneron. The Phaneron being
> itself far too elusive for direct observation, there can be no better
> method of studying it than through the Diagram of it which the System of
> Existential Graphs puts at our disposition. (NEM 4:320)
> 10.  Logic requires great subtlety of thought, throughout; and especially
> in distinguishing those characters which belong to the diagram with which
> one works, but which are not significant features of it considered as the
> Diagram it is taken for, from those that testify as to the Form
> represented. For not only may a Diagram have features that are not
> significant at all, such as its being drawn upon ''laid'' or upon ''wove"
> paper; not only may it have features that are significant but are not
> diagrammatically so; but one and the same construction may be, when
> regarded in two different ways, two altogether different diagrams; and that
> to which it testifies in the one capacity, it must not be considered as
> testifying to in the other capacity. For example, the Entire Existential
> Graph of a Phemic Sheet, in any state of it, is a Diagram of the logical
> Universe, as it is also a Diagram of a Quasi-mind; but it must not, on *that
> *account, be considered as testifying to the identity of those two. It is
> like a telescope eye piece which at one focus exhibits a star at which the
> instrument is pointed, and at another exhibits all the faults of the
> objective lens. (NEM 4:324)
> On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 9:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> wrote:
>> List:
>> Following Gary R.'s example, before offering any further remarks of my
>> own, I would like to add a few more Peirce quotes about Quasi-minds to the
>> mix.  The first three are from "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism"
>> (1906); #2 directly precedes Gary's first selection, and #3 comes shortly
>> after it.  The other four are from "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the
>> Normative Sciences" (1906) and related manuscript drafts; #7 includes, and
>> provides the context for, Gary's second selection.
>> Regards,
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> <> -
>> 1.  I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant,
>> the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the
>> Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a
>> Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 4.536)
>> 2.  All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical, Metaphysical,
>> and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less, partly because
>> considerable logical acumen is required to distinguish some of them, and
>> because of the lack of any machinery to support the thought in doing so,
>> partly because they are so many, and partly because (owing to these
>> causes), they are all called by one word, "Mind." In one of the narrowest
>> and most concrete of its logical meanings, a Mind is that Seme of The
>> Truth, whose determinations become Immediate Interpretants of all other
>> Signs whose Dynamical Interpretants are dynamically connected. In our
>> Diagram the same thing which represents The Truth must be regarded as in
>> another way representing the Mind, and indeed, as being the Quasi-mind of
>> all the Signs represented on the Diagram. For any set of Signs which are so
>> connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be
>> Determinations of one Sign which is a *Quasi-mind*. (CP 4.550)
>> 3.  The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which
>> thereby becomes the *Quasi-mind* in which the Graphist and Interpreter
>> are at one, being a Seme of *The Truth*, that is, of the widest Universe
>> of Reality, and at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for
>> granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their
>> discussion, shall be a sheet, called the *Phemic Sheet*, upon which
>> signs can be scribed and from which any that are already scribed in any
>> manner (even though they be incised) *can *be erased. (CP 4.553)
>> 4.  Indeed, two minds in communication are, in so far, "at one," that is,
>> are properly one mind in that part of them. That being understood, the
>> answer to the question will go on to recognize that every sign,--or, at any
>> rate, nearly every one,--is a determination of something of the general
>> nature of a mind, which we may call the "quasi-mind." (EP 2:389)
>> 5.  A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the function
>> of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium
>> of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other respect
>> than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the
>> more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has
>> upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object
>> itself had acted upon it. Thus, after an ordinary conversation, a
>> wonderfully perfect kind of sign-functioning, one knows what information or
>> suggestion has been conveyed, but will be utterly unable to say in what
>> words it was conveyed, and often will think it was conveyed in words, when
>> in fact it was only conveyed in tones or in facial expressions.
>> It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for if
>> we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human
>> mind, that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only
>> after that consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the
>> sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a
>> determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding
>> that determination as the sign. So, then, it is a determination that really
>> acts upon that of which it is a determination, although *genuine* action
>> is of one thing on another. This perplexes us, and an example of an
>> analogous phenomenon will do good service here. Metaphysics has been said
>> contemptuously to be a fabric of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but
>> logical and phaneroscopical concepts need to be clothed in such garments.
>> For a pure idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion
>> without a peel.
>> Let a community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of
>> bottles which are in intricate connexion by tubes filled with the liquid.
>> This liquid is of complex and somewhat unstable mixed chemical composition.
>> It also has so strong a cohesion and consequent surface-tension that the
>> contents of each bottle take on a self-determined form. Accident may cause
>> one or another kind of decomposition to start at a point of one bottle
>> producing a molecule of peculiar form, and this action may spread through a
>> tube to another bottle. This new molecule will be a determination of the
>> contents of the first bottle which will thus act upon the contents of the
>> second bottle by continuity. The new molecule produced by decomposition may
>> then act chemically upon the original contents or upon some molecule
>> produced by some other kind of decomposition, and thus we shall have a
>> determination of the contents that actively operates upon that of which it
>> is a determination, including another determination of the same subject.
>> (EP 2:391-392)
>> 6.  For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for
>> the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that anything
>> possessing consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common quality
>> of all our feeling, should be concerned. But it is necessary that there
>> should be two, if not three, *quasi-minds*, meaning things capable of
>> varied determination as to forms of the kind communicated.
>> As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its
>> Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In
>> its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to say, its
>> correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign,
>> the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the
>> Interpretant the Sign is *active*, determining the Interpretant without
>> being itself thereby affected.
>> But at this point certain distinctions are called for. That which is
>> communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a
>> Form. It is not a singular thing; for if a singular thing were first in the
>> Object and afterward in the Interpretant outside the Object, it must
>> thereby cease to be in the Object. The Form that is communicated does not
>> necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different
>> thing, because its being is a being of the predicate. The Being of a Form
>> consists in the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given
>> circumstances, something would be true. The Form is in the Object,
>> entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or
>> following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is
>> literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may or may not be
>> embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is,
>> in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the
>> Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under
>> favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22)
>> 7.  Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which
>> its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and
>> we may call it a *perfect *sign, in the sense that it involves the
>> present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of
>> itself. Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as well
>> suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a
>> second, or any other long interval of time. The only signs which are
>> tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a
>> sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that active kind which we
>> call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts changes ...
>> Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of action
>> upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, its
>> outlines becoming more indefinite.
>> On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by
>> its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new
>> signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already
>> had, but which had lain dormant.
>> In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the kind
>> we rather drolly call *spontaneous*, that is, they happen *sua sponte*
>> but not by its will. They are phenomena of growth.
>> Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of
>> Existential Graphs ...
>> This quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be
>> examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of
>> susceptibility to determination. Moreover, the determinations come as
>> events each one once for all and never again. Furthermore, it must have its
>> rules or laws, the more special ones variable, others invariable. (EP
>> 2:545n25)
>> On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Gary Richmond <>
>> wrote:
>>> Edwina, Jon S., list,
>>> OK, I'll start the thread by offering the few quotes in *Commens* on
>>> Quasi-mind. Again, I won't be able to join in the discussion until sometime
>>> next week.
>>> Best,
>>> Gary R
>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551
>>> Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and
>>> one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the
>>> shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that
>>> unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic
>>> nominalism akin to Fichte’s. Not only is thought in the organic world, but
>>> it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances
>>> embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give
>>> “Sign” a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within
>>> our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it
>>> may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs
>>> require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a
>>> *Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one
>>> mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign
>>> they are, so to say, *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of
>>> human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of
>>> thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I
>>> admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It
>>> might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part of this
>>> fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would require a volume -
>>> and an uninviting one; and in the second place, what I have been saying is
>>> only to be applied to a slight determination of our system of
>>> diagrammatization, which it will only slightly affect; so that, should it
>>> be incorrect, the utmost *certain* effect will be a danger that our
>>> system may not represent every variety of non-human thought.
>>> 1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 283:118 [variant]
>>> … quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be
>>> examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of
>>> susceptibility to determination.
>>> 1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 195
>>> I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I
>>> will try. A *thought* is not *per se* in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean
>>> this in the same sense as I might say that Right and Truth would remain
>>> what they are though they were not embodied, & though nothing were right or
>>> true. But a thought, to gain any active mode of being must be embodied in a
>>> Sign. A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a
>>> sort of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better
>>> considered self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every
>>> thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must
>>> be a determination of a quasi-mind. The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a
>>> determinable sign.
>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>> *Communication Studies*
>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
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