I wish to share this article, which I take to be topical given our incomplete understanding of Quasi-minds: *We worked in a group of three where one played the part of a scoundrel, the other one was a hero, and the third one kept a neutral position..* *He said he hated the work..* *The world in those comments was divided into black and white.. * *praised.. criticized.. That was the principle of the work..* *The posts and comments are made to form the opinion of Russian citizens regarding certain issues, and as we see it works for other countries, too..* *The most important principle of the work is to have an account like a real person..* *These technologies are unbelievably effective..* *She added that she learned how effective the troll farm's work was when she saw regular people sharing opinions and information that she knew were planted by trolls.* *"They believed it was their own thoughts, but I saw that those thoughts were formed by the propagandists," she said.* http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-russian-troll-factory-20180219-story.html *He begins in Letter 13 by affirming that “a third basic drive which could mediate the other two is an absolutely unthinkable concept”; * *Or, finally, there must exist a power which comes between mind and matter and unites the two… Is such a thing conceivable? Certainly not! * *~* "Aesthetic" for Schiller and Peirce: A Neglected Origin of Pragmatism Jeffrey Barnou, *Journal of the History of Ideas* Hth, Jerry R On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 2:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > List: > > I found three more potentially relevant quotes in an alternate draft of > "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (R 193, NEM 4:313-330; 1906). > It was a bit of a challenge to ascertain how much of the context I should > include in each case, so please let me know off-List if you would like to > see anything that comes right before or after any of these excerpts. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > > 8. Now let us see how the Diagram entrains its consequence. The Diagram > sufficiently partakes of the percussivity of a Percept to determine, as its > Dynamic, or Middle, Interpretant, a state [of] activity in the Interpreter, > mingled with curiosity. As usual, this mixture leads to Experimentation. It > is the normal Logical effect; that is to say, it not only happens in the > cortex of the human brain, but must plainly happen in every Quasi-mind in > which Signs of all kinds have a vitality of their own. (NEM 4:318). > > > 9. The System of Existential Graphs the development of which has only > been begun by a solitary student, furnishes already the best diagram of the > contents of the logical Quasi-mind that has ever yet been found and > promises much future perfectionment. Let us call the collective whole of > all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the > *Phaneron*. Then the substance of every Thought (and of much beside > Thought proper) will be a Consistituent of the Phaneron. The Phaneron being > itself far too elusive for direct observation, there can be no better > method of studying it than through the Diagram of it which the System of > Existential Graphs puts at our disposition. (NEM 4:320) > > > 10. Logic requires great subtlety of thought, throughout; and especially > in distinguishing those characters which belong to the diagram with which > one works, but which are not significant features of it considered as the > Diagram it is taken for, from those that testify as to the Form > represented. For not only may a Diagram have features that are not > significant at all, such as its being drawn upon ''laid'' or upon ''wove" > paper; not only may it have features that are significant but are not > diagrammatically so; but one and the same construction may be, when > regarded in two different ways, two altogether different diagrams; and that > to which it testifies in the one capacity, it must not be considered as > testifying to in the other capacity. For example, the Entire Existential > Graph of a Phemic Sheet, in any state of it, is a Diagram of the logical > Universe, as it is also a Diagram of a Quasi-mind; but it must not, on *that > *account, be considered as testifying to the identity of those two. It is > like a telescope eye piece which at one focus exhibits a star at which the > instrument is pointed, and at another exhibits all the faults of the > objective lens. (NEM 4:324) > > > On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 9:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> List: >> >> Following Gary R.'s example, before offering any further remarks of my >> own, I would like to add a few more Peirce quotes about Quasi-minds to the >> mix. The first three are from "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" >> (1906); #2 directly precedes Gary's first selection, and #3 comes shortly >> after it. The other four are from "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the >> Normative Sciences" (1906) and related manuscript drafts; #7 includes, and >> provides the context for, Gary's second selection. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> >> 1. I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, >> the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the >> Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a >> Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 4.536) >> >> >> 2. All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical, Metaphysical, >> and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less, partly because >> considerable logical acumen is required to distinguish some of them, and >> because of the lack of any machinery to support the thought in doing so, >> partly because they are so many, and partly because (owing to these >> causes), they are all called by one word, "Mind." In one of the narrowest >> and most concrete of its logical meanings, a Mind is that Seme of The >> Truth, whose determinations become Immediate Interpretants of all other >> Signs whose Dynamical Interpretants are dynamically connected. In our >> Diagram the same thing which represents The Truth must be regarded as in >> another way representing the Mind, and indeed, as being the Quasi-mind of >> all the Signs represented on the Diagram. For any set of Signs which are so >> connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be >> Determinations of one Sign which is a *Quasi-mind*. (CP 4.550) >> >> >> 3. The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which >> thereby becomes the *Quasi-mind* in which the Graphist and Interpreter >> are at one, being a Seme of *The Truth*, that is, of the widest Universe >> of Reality, and at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for >> granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their >> discussion, shall be a sheet, called the *Phemic Sheet*, upon which >> signs can be scribed and from which any that are already scribed in any >> manner (even though they be incised) *can *be erased. (CP 4.553) >> >> >> 4. Indeed, two minds in communication are, in so far, "at one," that is, >> are properly one mind in that part of them. That being understood, the >> answer to the question will go on to recognize that every sign,--or, at any >> rate, nearly every one,--is a determination of something of the general >> nature of a mind, which we may call the "quasi-mind." (EP 2:389) >> >> >> 5. A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the function >> of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium >> of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other respect >> than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the >> more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has >> upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object >> itself had acted upon it. Thus, after an ordinary conversation, a >> wonderfully perfect kind of sign-functioning, one knows what information or >> suggestion has been conveyed, but will be utterly unable to say in what >> words it was conveyed, and often will think it was conveyed in words, when >> in fact it was only conveyed in tones or in facial expressions. >> >> It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for if >> we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human >> mind, that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only >> after that consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the >> sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a >> determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding >> that determination as the sign. So, then, it is a determination that really >> acts upon that of which it is a determination, although *genuine* action >> is of one thing on another. This perplexes us, and an example of an >> analogous phenomenon will do good service here. Metaphysics has been said >> contemptuously to be a fabric of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but >> logical and phaneroscopical concepts need to be clothed in such garments. >> For a pure idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion >> without a peel. >> >> Let a community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of >> bottles which are in intricate connexion by tubes filled with the liquid. >> This liquid is of complex and somewhat unstable mixed chemical composition. >> It also has so strong a cohesion and consequent surface-tension that the >> contents of each bottle take on a self-determined form. Accident may cause >> one or another kind of decomposition to start at a point of one bottle >> producing a molecule of peculiar form, and this action may spread through a >> tube to another bottle. This new molecule will be a determination of the >> contents of the first bottle which will thus act upon the contents of the >> second bottle by continuity. The new molecule produced by decomposition may >> then act chemically upon the original contents or upon some molecule >> produced by some other kind of decomposition, and thus we shall have a >> determination of the contents that actively operates upon that of which it >> is a determination, including another determination of the same subject. >> (EP 2:391-392) >> >> >> 6. For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for >> the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that anything >> possessing consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common quality >> of all our feeling, should be concerned. But it is necessary that there >> should be two, if not three, *quasi-minds*, meaning things capable of >> varied determination as to forms of the kind communicated. >> >> As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its >> Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In >> its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to say, its >> correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, >> the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the >> Interpretant the Sign is *active*, determining the Interpretant without >> being itself thereby affected. >> >> But at this point certain distinctions are called for. That which is >> communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a >> Form. It is not a singular thing; for if a singular thing were first in the >> Object and afterward in the Interpretant outside the Object, it must >> thereby cease to be in the Object. The Form that is communicated does not >> necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different >> thing, because its being is a being of the predicate. The Being of a Form >> consists in the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given >> circumstances, something would be true. The Form is in the Object, >> entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or >> following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is >> literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may or may not be >> embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is, >> in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the >> Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under >> favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22) >> >> >> 7. Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which >> its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and >> we may call it a *perfect *sign, in the sense that it involves the >> present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of >> itself. Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as well >> suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a >> second, or any other long interval of time. The only signs which are >> tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a >> sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that active kind which we >> call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts changes ... >> >> Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of action >> upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, its >> outlines becoming more indefinite. >> >> On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by >> its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new >> signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already >> had, but which had lain dormant. >> >> In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the kind >> we rather drolly call *spontaneous*, that is, they happen *sua sponte* >> but not by its will. They are phenomena of growth. >> >> Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of >> Existential Graphs ... >> >> This quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be >> examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of >> susceptibility to determination. Moreover, the determinations come as >> events each one once for all and never again. Furthermore, it must have its >> rules or laws, the more special ones variable, others invariable. (EP >> 2:545n25) >> >> >> On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Edwina, Jon S., list, >>> >>> OK, I'll start the thread by offering the few quotes in *Commens* on >>> Quasi-mind. Again, I won't be able to join in the discussion until sometime >>> next week. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551 >>> >>> Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and >>> one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the >>> shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that >>> unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic >>> nominalism akin to Fichte’s. Not only is thought in the organic world, but >>> it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances >>> embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give >>> “Sign” a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within >>> our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it >>> may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs >>> require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a >>> *Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one >>> mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign >>> they are, so to say, *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of >>> human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of >>> thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I >>> admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It >>> might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part of this >>> fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would require a volume - >>> and an uninviting one; and in the second place, what I have been saying is >>> only to be applied to a slight determination of our system of >>> diagrammatization, which it will only slightly affect; so that, should it >>> be incorrect, the utmost *certain* effect will be a danger that our >>> system may not represent every variety of non-human thought. >>> 1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 283:118 [variant] >>> >>> … quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be >>> examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of >>> susceptibility to determination. >>> 1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 195 >>> >>> I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I >>> will try. A *thought* is not *per se* in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean >>> this in the same sense as I might say that Right and Truth would remain >>> what they are though they were not embodied, & though nothing were right or >>> true. But a thought, to gain any active mode of being must be embodied in a >>> Sign. A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a >>> sort of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better >>> considered self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every >>> thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must >>> be a determination of a quasi-mind. The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a >>> determinable sign. >>> >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >>> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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