Jerry, list,

Would you please explain why you posted this to the list, especially in
this thread. I cannot see what pertinence it has to the discussion of


Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 6:07 PM, Jerry Rhee <> wrote:

> Dear list,
> I wish to share this article, which I take to be topical given our
> incomplete understanding of Quasi-minds:
> *We worked in a group of three where one played the part of a scoundrel,
> the other one was a hero, and the third one kept a neutral position..*
> *He said he hated the work..*
> *The world in those comments was divided into black and white.. *
> *praised.. criticized..  That was the principle of the work..*
> *The posts and comments are made to form the opinion of Russian citizens
> regarding certain issues, and as we see it works for other countries, too..*
> *The most important principle of the work is to have an account like a
> real person..*
> *These technologies are unbelievably effective..*
> *She added that she learned how effective the troll farm's work was when
> she saw regular people sharing opinions and information that she knew were
> planted by trolls.*
> *"They believed it was their own thoughts, but I saw that those thoughts
> were formed by the propagandists," she said.*
> troll-factory-20180219-story.html
> *He begins in Letter 13 by affirming that “a third basic drive which could
> mediate the other two is an absolutely unthinkable concept”; *
> *Or, finally, there must exist a power which comes between mind and matter
> and unites the two… Is such a thing conceivable?  Certainly not!  *
> *~* "Aesthetic" for Schiller and Peirce: A Neglected Origin of Pragmatism
> Jeffrey Barnou,  *Journal of the History of Ideas*
> Hth,
> Jerry R
> On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 2:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> wrote:
>> List:
>> I found three more potentially relevant quotes in an alternate draft of
>> "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (R 193, NEM 4:313-330; 1906).
>> It was a bit of a challenge to ascertain how much of the context I should
>> include in each case, so please let me know off-List if you would like to
>> see anything that comes right before or after any of these excerpts.
>> Regards,
>> Jon S.
>> 8.  Now let us see how the Diagram entrains its consequence. The Diagram
>> sufficiently partakes of the percussivity of a Percept to determine, as its
>> Dynamic, or Middle, Interpretant, a state [of] activity in the Interpreter,
>> mingled with curiosity. As usual, this mixture leads to Experimentation. It
>> is the normal Logical effect; that is to say, it not only happens in the
>> cortex of the human brain, but must plainly happen in every Quasi-mind in
>> which Signs of all kinds have a vitality of their own. (NEM 4:318).
>> 9.  The System of Existential Graphs the development of which has only
>> been begun by a solitary student, furnishes already the best diagram of the
>> contents of the logical Quasi-mind that has ever yet been found and
>> promises much future perfectionment. Let us call the collective whole of
>> all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the
>> *Phaneron*. Then the substance of every Thought (and of much beside
>> Thought proper) will be a Consistituent of the Phaneron. The Phaneron being
>> itself far too elusive for direct observation, there can be no better
>> method of studying it than through the Diagram of it which the System of
>> Existential Graphs puts at our disposition. (NEM 4:320)
>> 10.  Logic requires great subtlety of thought, throughout; and especially
>> in distinguishing those characters which belong to the diagram with which
>> one works, but which are not significant features of it considered as the
>> Diagram it is taken for, from those that testify as to the Form
>> represented. For not only may a Diagram have features that are not
>> significant at all, such as its being drawn upon ''laid'' or upon ''wove"
>> paper; not only may it have features that are significant but are not
>> diagrammatically so; but one and the same construction may be, when
>> regarded in two different ways, two altogether different diagrams; and that
>> to which it testifies in the one capacity, it must not be considered as
>> testifying to in the other capacity. For example, the Entire Existential
>> Graph of a Phemic Sheet, in any state of it, is a Diagram of the logical
>> Universe, as it is also a Diagram of a Quasi-mind; but it must not, on *that
>> *account, be considered as testifying to the identity of those two. It
>> is like a telescope eye piece which at one focus exhibits a star at which
>> the instrument is pointed, and at another exhibits all the faults of the
>> objective lens. (NEM 4:324)
>> On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 9:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>> wrote:
>>> List:
>>> Following Gary R.'s example, before offering any further remarks of my
>>> own, I would like to add a few more Peirce quotes about Quasi-minds to the
>>> mix.  The first three are from "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism"
>>> (1906); #2 directly precedes Gary's first selection, and #3 comes shortly
>>> after it.  The other four are from "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the
>>> Normative Sciences" (1906) and related manuscript drafts; #7 includes, and
>>> provides the context for, Gary's second selection.
>>> Regards,
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> <> -
>>> 1.  I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant,
>>> the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the
>>> Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a
>>> Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 4.536)
>>> 2.  All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical, Metaphysical,
>>> and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less, partly because
>>> considerable logical acumen is required to distinguish some of them, and
>>> because of the lack of any machinery to support the thought in doing so,
>>> partly because they are so many, and partly because (owing to these
>>> causes), they are all called by one word, "Mind." In one of the narrowest
>>> and most concrete of its logical meanings, a Mind is that Seme of The
>>> Truth, whose determinations become Immediate Interpretants of all other
>>> Signs whose Dynamical Interpretants are dynamically connected. In our
>>> Diagram the same thing which represents The Truth must be regarded as in
>>> another way representing the Mind, and indeed, as being the Quasi-mind of
>>> all the Signs represented on the Diagram. For any set of Signs which are so
>>> connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be
>>> Determinations of one Sign which is a *Quasi-mind*. (CP 4.550)
>>> 3.  The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which
>>> thereby becomes the *Quasi-mind* in which the Graphist and Interpreter
>>> are at one, being a Seme of *The Truth*, that is, of the widest
>>> Universe of Reality, and at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly
>>> taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of
>>> their discussion, shall be a sheet, called the *Phemic Sheet*, upon
>>> which signs can be scribed and from which any that are already scribed in
>>> any manner (even though they be incised) *can *be erased. (CP 4.553)
>>> 4.  Indeed, two minds in communication are, in so far, "at one," that
>>> is, are properly one mind in that part of them. That being understood, the
>>> answer to the question will go on to recognize that every sign,--or, at any
>>> rate, nearly every one,--is a determination of something of the general
>>> nature of a mind, which we may call the "quasi-mind." (EP 2:389)
>>> 5.  A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the
>>> function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of
>>> a medium of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other
>>> respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and
>>> the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it
>>> has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object
>>> itself had acted upon it. Thus, after an ordinary conversation, a
>>> wonderfully perfect kind of sign-functioning, one knows what information or
>>> suggestion has been conveyed, but will be utterly unable to say in what
>>> words it was conveyed, and often will think it was conveyed in words, when
>>> in fact it was only conveyed in tones or in facial expressions.
>>> It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for
>>> if we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human
>>> mind, that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only
>>> after that consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the
>>> sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a
>>> determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding
>>> that determination as the sign. So, then, it is a determination that really
>>> acts upon that of which it is a determination, although *genuine*
>>> action is of one thing on another. This perplexes us, and an example of an
>>> analogous phenomenon will do good service here. Metaphysics has been said
>>> contemptuously to be a fabric of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but
>>> logical and phaneroscopical concepts need to be clothed in such garments.
>>> For a pure idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion
>>> without a peel.
>>> Let a community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of
>>> bottles which are in intricate connexion by tubes filled with the liquid.
>>> This liquid is of complex and somewhat unstable mixed chemical composition.
>>> It also has so strong a cohesion and consequent surface-tension that the
>>> contents of each bottle take on a self-determined form. Accident may cause
>>> one or another kind of decomposition to start at a point of one bottle
>>> producing a molecule of peculiar form, and this action may spread through a
>>> tube to another bottle. This new molecule will be a determination of the
>>> contents of the first bottle which will thus act upon the contents of the
>>> second bottle by continuity. The new molecule produced by decomposition may
>>> then act chemically upon the original contents or upon some molecule
>>> produced by some other kind of decomposition, and thus we shall have a
>>> determination of the contents that actively operates upon that of which it
>>> is a determination, including another determination of the same subject.
>>> (EP 2:391-392)
>>> 6.  For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium
>>> for the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that
>>> anything possessing consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common
>>> quality of all our feeling, should be concerned. But it is necessary that
>>> there should be two, if not three, *quasi-minds*, meaning things
>>> capable of varied determination as to forms of the kind communicated.
>>> As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its
>>> Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In
>>> its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to say, its
>>> correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign,
>>> the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the
>>> Interpretant the Sign is *active*, determining the Interpretant without
>>> being itself thereby affected.
>>> But at this point certain distinctions are called for. That which is
>>> communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a
>>> Form. It is not a singular thing; for if a singular thing were first in the
>>> Object and afterward in the Interpretant outside the Object, it must
>>> thereby cease to be in the Object. The Form that is communicated does not
>>> necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different
>>> thing, because its being is a being of the predicate. The Being of a Form
>>> consists in the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given
>>> circumstances, something would be true. The Form is in the Object,
>>> entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or
>>> following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is
>>> literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may or may not be
>>> embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is,
>>> in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the
>>> Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under
>>> favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22)
>>> 7.  Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which
>>> its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and
>>> we may call it a *perfect *sign, in the sense that it involves the
>>> present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of
>>> itself. Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as well
>>> suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a
>>> second, or any other long interval of time. The only signs which are
>>> tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a
>>> sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that active kind which we
>>> call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts changes ...
>>> Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of action
>>> upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, its
>>> outlines becoming more indefinite.
>>> On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by
>>> its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new
>>> signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already
>>> had, but which had lain dormant.
>>> In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the
>>> kind we rather drolly call *spontaneous*, that is, they happen *sua
>>> sponte* but not by its will. They are phenomena of growth.
>>> Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of
>>> Existential Graphs ...
>>> This quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be
>>> examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of
>>> susceptibility to determination. Moreover, the determinations come as
>>> events each one once for all and never again. Furthermore, it must have its
>>> rules or laws, the more special ones variable, others invariable. (EP
>>> 2:545n25)
>>> On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Gary Richmond <>
>>> wrote:
>>>> Edwina, Jon S., list,
>>>> OK, I'll start the thread by offering the few quotes in *Commens* on
>>>> Quasi-mind. Again, I won't be able to join in the discussion until sometime
>>>> next week.
>>>> Best,
>>>> Gary R
>>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551
>>>> Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
>>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and
>>>> one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the
>>>> shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that
>>>> unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic
>>>> nominalism akin to Fichte’s. Not only is thought in the organic world, but
>>>> it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances
>>>> embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give
>>>> “Sign” a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within
>>>> our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it
>>>> may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs
>>>> require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a
>>>> *Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one
>>>> mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign
>>>> they are, so to say, *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of
>>>> human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of
>>>> thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I
>>>> admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It
>>>> might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part of this
>>>> fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would require a volume -
>>>> and an uninviting one; and in the second place, what I have been saying is
>>>> only to be applied to a slight determination of our system of
>>>> diagrammatization, which it will only slightly affect; so that, should it
>>>> be incorrect, the utmost *certain* effect will be a danger that our
>>>> system may not represent every variety of non-human thought.
>>>> 1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 283:118 [variant]
>>>> … quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be
>>>> examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of
>>>> susceptibility to determination.
>>>> 1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 195
>>>> I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I
>>>> will try. A *thought* is not *per se* in any mind or quasi-mind. I
>>>> mean this in the same sense as I might say that Right and Truth would
>>>> remain what they are though they were not embodied, & though nothing were
>>>> right or true. But a thought, to gain any active mode of being must be
>>>> embodied in a Sign. A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is
>>>> necessarily a sort of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the
>>>> better considered self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as
>>>> every thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds
>>>> must be a determination of a quasi-mind. The quasi-mind is itself a
>>>> sign, a determinable sign.
>>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>>> *Communication Studies*
>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
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