Dear Gary, list,

*As a question of intellectual lineage, the link may be of minor
importance, but it becomes significant as soon as one recognizes the degree
to which certain crucial passages and themes in Schiller and in Peirce,
which have resisted comprehension, are mutually illuminating when seen
together.. *

For example,

*“**Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and
a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind)
in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct.  In the Sign they
are, so to say, welded.”*

*To articulate the problem of cosmology means to answer the question of
what philosophy is or what a philosopher is..*

*But even that stranger from Elea did not discuss explicitly what a
philosopher is.  *

*He discussed explicitly two kinds of men which are easily mistaken for the
philosopher, the sophist and the statesman.  *

*The divisions of the **Sophist and the Statesman are caricatures..*

*By understanding both sophistry (in its highest as well as in its lower
meanings) and statesmanship, one will understand what philosophy is.  *

*Philosophy strives for knowledge of the whole.  The whole is the totality
of the parts.  The whole eludes us, but we know parts:  we possess partial
knowledge of parts…*

Beyond this, I will stay silent, for I believe there is life in staying mum.

Jerry R

On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Gary Richmond <>

> Jerry, list,
> Would you please explain why you posted this to the list, especially in
> this thread. I cannot see what pertinence it has to the discussion of
> quasi-minds?
> Best,
> Gary R
> [image: Gary Richmond]
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
> On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 6:07 PM, Jerry Rhee <> wrote:
>> Dear list,
>> I wish to share this article, which I take to be topical given our
>> incomplete understanding of Quasi-minds:
>> *We worked in a group of three where one played the part of a scoundrel,
>> the other one was a hero, and the third one kept a neutral position..*
>> *He said he hated the work..*
>> *The world in those comments was divided into black and white.. *
>> *praised.. criticized..  That was the principle of the work..*
>> *The posts and comments are made to form the opinion of Russian citizens
>> regarding certain issues, and as we see it works for other countries, too..*
>> *The most important principle of the work is to have an account like a
>> real person..*
>> *These technologies are unbelievably effective..*
>> *She added that she learned how effective the troll farm's work was when
>> she saw regular people sharing opinions and information that she knew were
>> planted by trolls.*
>> *"They believed it was their own thoughts, but I saw that those thoughts
>> were formed by the propagandists," she said.*
>> factory-20180219-story.html
>> *He begins in Letter 13 by affirming that “a third basic drive which
>> could mediate the other two is an absolutely unthinkable concept”; *
>> *Or, finally, there must exist a power which comes between mind and
>> matter and unites the two… Is such a thing conceivable?  Certainly not!  *
>> *~* "Aesthetic" for Schiller and Peirce: A Neglected Origin of Pragmatism
>> Jeffrey Barnou,  *Journal of the History of Ideas*
>> Hth,
>> Jerry R
>> On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 2:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>> wrote:
>>> List:
>>> I found three more potentially relevant quotes in an alternate draft of
>>> "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (R 193, NEM 4:313-330; 1906).
>>> It was a bit of a challenge to ascertain how much of the context I should
>>> include in each case, so please let me know off-List if you would like to
>>> see anything that comes right before or after any of these excerpts.
>>> Regards,
>>> Jon S.
>>> 8.  Now let us see how the Diagram entrains its consequence. The Diagram
>>> sufficiently partakes of the percussivity of a Percept to determine, as its
>>> Dynamic, or Middle, Interpretant, a state [of] activity in the Interpreter,
>>> mingled with curiosity. As usual, this mixture leads to Experimentation. It
>>> is the normal Logical effect; that is to say, it not only happens in the
>>> cortex of the human brain, but must plainly happen in every Quasi-mind in
>>> which Signs of all kinds have a vitality of their own. (NEM 4:318).
>>> 9.  The System of Existential Graphs the development of which has only
>>> been begun by a solitary student, furnishes already the best diagram of the
>>> contents of the logical Quasi-mind that has ever yet been found and
>>> promises much future perfectionment. Let us call the collective whole of
>>> all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the
>>> *Phaneron*. Then the substance of every Thought (and of much beside
>>> Thought proper) will be a Consistituent of the Phaneron. The Phaneron being
>>> itself far too elusive for direct observation, there can be no better
>>> method of studying it than through the Diagram of it which the System of
>>> Existential Graphs puts at our disposition. (NEM 4:320)
>>> 10.  Logic requires great subtlety of thought, throughout; and
>>> especially in distinguishing those characters which belong to the diagram
>>> with which one works, but which are not significant features of it
>>> considered as the Diagram it is taken for, from those that testify as to
>>> the Form represented. For not only may a Diagram have features that are not
>>> significant at all, such as its being drawn upon ''laid'' or upon ''wove"
>>> paper; not only may it have features that are significant but are not
>>> diagrammatically so; but one and the same construction may be, when
>>> regarded in two different ways, two altogether different diagrams; and that
>>> to which it testifies in the one capacity, it must not be considered as
>>> testifying to in the other capacity. For example, the Entire Existential
>>> Graph of a Phemic Sheet, in any state of it, is a Diagram of the logical
>>> Universe, as it is also a Diagram of a Quasi-mind; but it must not, on *that
>>> *account, be considered as testifying to the identity of those two. It
>>> is like a telescope eye piece which at one focus exhibits a star at which
>>> the instrument is pointed, and at another exhibits all the faults of the
>>> objective lens. (NEM 4:324)
>>> On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 9:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>>> wrote:
>>>> List:
>>>> Following Gary R.'s example, before offering any further remarks of my
>>>> own, I would like to add a few more Peirce quotes about Quasi-minds to the
>>>> mix.  The first three are from "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism"
>>>> (1906); #2 directly precedes Gary's first selection, and #3 comes shortly
>>>> after it.  The other four are from "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the
>>>> Normative Sciences" (1906) and related manuscript drafts; #7 includes, and
>>>> provides the context for, Gary's second selection.
>>>> Regards,
>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>> <> -
>>>> idt
>>>> 1.  I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant,
>>>> the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the
>>>> Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a
>>>> Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 4.536)
>>>> 2.  All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical, Metaphysical,
>>>> and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less, partly because
>>>> considerable logical acumen is required to distinguish some of them, and
>>>> because of the lack of any machinery to support the thought in doing so,
>>>> partly because they are so many, and partly because (owing to these
>>>> causes), they are all called by one word, "Mind." In one of the narrowest
>>>> and most concrete of its logical meanings, a Mind is that Seme of The
>>>> Truth, whose determinations become Immediate Interpretants of all other
>>>> Signs whose Dynamical Interpretants are dynamically connected. In our
>>>> Diagram the same thing which represents The Truth must be regarded as in
>>>> another way representing the Mind, and indeed, as being the Quasi-mind of
>>>> all the Signs represented on the Diagram. For any set of Signs which are so
>>>> connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be
>>>> Determinations of one Sign which is a *Quasi-mind*. (CP 4.550)
>>>> 3.  The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which
>>>> thereby becomes the *Quasi-mind* in which the Graphist and Interpreter
>>>> are at one, being a Seme of *The Truth*, that is, of the widest
>>>> Universe of Reality, and at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly
>>>> taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of
>>>> their discussion, shall be a sheet, called the *Phemic Sheet*, upon
>>>> which signs can be scribed and from which any that are already scribed in
>>>> any manner (even though they be incised) *can *be erased. (CP 4.553)
>>>> 4.  Indeed, two minds in communication are, in so far, "at one," that
>>>> is, are properly one mind in that part of them. That being understood, the
>>>> answer to the question will go on to recognize that every sign,--or, at any
>>>> rate, nearly every one,--is a determination of something of the general
>>>> nature of a mind, which we may call the "quasi-mind." (EP 2:389)
>>>> 5.  A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the
>>>> function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of
>>>> a medium of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other
>>>> respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and
>>>> the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it
>>>> has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object
>>>> itself had acted upon it. Thus, after an ordinary conversation, a
>>>> wonderfully perfect kind of sign-functioning, one knows what information or
>>>> suggestion has been conveyed, but will be utterly unable to say in what
>>>> words it was conveyed, and often will think it was conveyed in words, when
>>>> in fact it was only conveyed in tones or in facial expressions.
>>>> It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for
>>>> if we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human
>>>> mind, that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only
>>>> after that consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the
>>>> sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a
>>>> determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding
>>>> that determination as the sign. So, then, it is a determination that really
>>>> acts upon that of which it is a determination, although *genuine*
>>>> action is of one thing on another. This perplexes us, and an example of an
>>>> analogous phenomenon will do good service here. Metaphysics has been said
>>>> contemptuously to be a fabric of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but
>>>> logical and phaneroscopical concepts need to be clothed in such garments.
>>>> For a pure idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion
>>>> without a peel.
>>>> Let a community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of
>>>> bottles which are in intricate connexion by tubes filled with the liquid.
>>>> This liquid is of complex and somewhat unstable mixed chemical composition.
>>>> It also has so strong a cohesion and consequent surface-tension that the
>>>> contents of each bottle take on a self-determined form. Accident may cause
>>>> one or another kind of decomposition to start at a point of one bottle
>>>> producing a molecule of peculiar form, and this action may spread through a
>>>> tube to another bottle. This new molecule will be a determination of the
>>>> contents of the first bottle which will thus act upon the contents of the
>>>> second bottle by continuity. The new molecule produced by decomposition may
>>>> then act chemically upon the original contents or upon some molecule
>>>> produced by some other kind of decomposition, and thus we shall have a
>>>> determination of the contents that actively operates upon that of which it
>>>> is a determination, including another determination of the same subject.
>>>> (EP 2:391-392)
>>>> 6.  For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium
>>>> for the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that
>>>> anything possessing consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common
>>>> quality of all our feeling, should be concerned. But it is necessary that
>>>> there should be two, if not three, *quasi-minds*, meaning things
>>>> capable of varied determination as to forms of the kind communicated.
>>>> As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its
>>>> Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In
>>>> its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to say, its
>>>> correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign,
>>>> the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the
>>>> Interpretant the Sign is *active*, determining the Interpretant
>>>> without being itself thereby affected.
>>>> But at this point certain distinctions are called for. That which is
>>>> communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a
>>>> Form. It is not a singular thing; for if a singular thing were first in the
>>>> Object and afterward in the Interpretant outside the Object, it must
>>>> thereby cease to be in the Object. The Form that is communicated does not
>>>> necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different
>>>> thing, because its being is a being of the predicate. The Being of a Form
>>>> consists in the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given
>>>> circumstances, something would be true. The Form is in the Object,
>>>> entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or
>>>> following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is
>>>> literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may or may not be
>>>> embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is,
>>>> in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the
>>>> Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under
>>>> favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22)
>>>> 7.  Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs
>>>> which its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign;
>>>> and we may call it a *perfect *sign, in the sense that it involves the
>>>> present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of
>>>> itself. Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as well
>>>> suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a
>>>> second, or any other long interval of time. The only signs which are
>>>> tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a
>>>> sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that active kind which we
>>>> call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts changes ...
>>>> Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of
>>>> action upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing
>>>> down, its outlines becoming more indefinite.
>>>> On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by
>>>> its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new
>>>> signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already
>>>> had, but which had lain dormant.
>>>> In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the
>>>> kind we rather drolly call *spontaneous*, that is, they happen *sua
>>>> sponte* but not by its will. They are phenomena of growth.
>>>> Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of
>>>> Existential Graphs ...
>>>> This quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be
>>>> examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of
>>>> susceptibility to determination. Moreover, the determinations come as
>>>> events each one once for all and never again. Furthermore, it must have its
>>>> rules or laws, the more special ones variable, others invariable. (EP
>>>> 2:545n25)
>>>> On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Gary Richmond <
>>>> > wrote:
>>>>> Edwina, Jon S., list,
>>>>> OK, I'll start the thread by offering the few quotes in *Commens* on
>>>>> Quasi-mind. Again, I won't be able to join in the discussion until 
>>>>> sometime
>>>>> next week.
>>>>> Best,
>>>>> Gary R
>>>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551
>>>>> Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
>>>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and
>>>>> one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the
>>>>> shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that
>>>>> unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic
>>>>> nominalism akin to Fichte’s. Not only is thought in the organic world, but
>>>>> it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances
>>>>> embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give
>>>>> “Sign” a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come 
>>>>> within
>>>>> our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it
>>>>> may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, 
>>>>> signs
>>>>> require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a
>>>>> *Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one
>>>>> mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign
>>>>> they are, so to say, *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact
>>>>> of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical 
>>>>> evolution
>>>>> of thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; 
>>>>> and
>>>>> I admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It
>>>>> might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part of this
>>>>> fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would require a volume -
>>>>> and an uninviting one; and in the second place, what I have been saying is
>>>>> only to be applied to a slight determination of our system of
>>>>> diagrammatization, which it will only slightly affect; so that, should it
>>>>> be incorrect, the utmost *certain* effect will be a danger that our
>>>>> system may not represent every variety of non-human thought.
>>>>> 1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 283:118 [variant]
>>>>> … quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be
>>>>> examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities 
>>>>> of
>>>>> susceptibility to determination.
>>>>> 1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 195
>>>>> I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I
>>>>> will try. A *thought* is not *per se* in any mind or quasi-mind. I
>>>>> mean this in the same sense as I might say that Right and Truth would
>>>>> remain what they are though they were not embodied, & though nothing were
>>>>> right or true. But a thought, to gain any active mode of being must be
>>>>> embodied in a Sign. A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking 
>>>>> is
>>>>> necessarily a sort of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the
>>>>> better considered self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as
>>>>> every thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all 
>>>>> minds
>>>>> must be a determination of a quasi-mind. The quasi-mind is itself a
>>>>> sign, a determinable sign.
>>>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>>>> *Communication Studies*
>>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>>>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
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