Peirce, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein had more than one thing in common -- a lot of unpublished fodder for endless speculation.
*Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. 4.551* amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 3:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a > clarification of Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it. > > My view of Peircean semiosis is its dynamic transformic nature; its > capacity to enable the world to operate as a complex adaptive system. This > capacity requires [1] a triadic semiosic relational systems and [2] > requires a modal nature of three types ; and [3] requires a constant > interactional and relational networking of Signs. I see nothing of this in > the mechanical outline of 'nodes' on a linear path that seems to be the > model now being discussed. > > In addition, I see the Quasi-Mind as a LOCAL articulation of Mind that > enables all three points above - and not as a Sign in itself. > > Yes, as Jerry points out - this linearity [as I call it] disconnects the > semiosic action from the relations with a larger network. > > Edwina > > > > > > On Thu 01/03/18 2:04 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent: > > Dear Jon, Garys, list, > > > > I am confused by your exact treatment. > > It appears to me that you have a clear and correct view but I don’t yet > see it. > > > > Since it is determined, at least by you and Gary R, that you have a grasp > of what Quasi-mind entails, please go a little bit further and say out loud > the answer to this: > > Is Quasi-mind the general standpoint of the spectator? > > > > That is, if quasi-minds are either of the quasi-utterer and > quasi-interpreter or somehow of both, then where, in accordance with your > view, is the spectator? > > > > I feel as though an understanding of this question and answer can help me > to be a better critical thinker; a better citizen of the world, even. > > > > Thanks and with best wishes, > Jerry R > > > On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary F., List: >> >> GF: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs >> in a Quasi-mind? >> >> >> Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an individual >> Sign that is also a complex of Signs," and (in his words) "something >> like the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication." There is nothing >> in EP 2:304 to indicate that "the ideal or perfect sign" is "an accretion >> of Signs," although EP 2:545n25 does refer to "a perfect sign" as "the >> aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries >> with it." I am not quite ready to say anything further about the latter >> passage just yet; I would prefer to cover a bit more semiotic and >> metaphysical ground first. >> >> JAS: The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object >> of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the >> entire >> effect that the Dynamic Object itself would have on the >> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). >> >> >> GF: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include) >> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate >> Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your concept of a woman >> includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you >> think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept? >> >> >> In the 1906 passage that I cited but did not quote, Peirce stated that a >> Sign "is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to >> enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly >> it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that >> quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had >> acted upon it." I have posited that this "respect" is precisely the >> Immediate Object, and stated that determination "must always occur with >> respect to a character or quality; i.e., a Form." Hence the Dynamic >> Object determines the Sign with respect to some, but not all, of its >> characters or qualities; and that partial combination of attributes is >> the Immediate Object, the Form that the Sign communicates. Only the Sign >> itself--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites >> Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant >> (determination). >> >> GF: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with >> another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a >> correlate of a triadic relation? >> >> >> Indeed, it would be better to substitute "Thing" for "Dynamic Object" >> when discussing dyadic reaction; I only wanted to emphasize the direct >> contrast with triadic Sign-action. In fact, I am drafting another post >> to discuss what I see as the key distinctions among Things, Quasi-minds, >> and Persons, continuing to utilize the Aristotelian terms for the >> Categories that Peirce employed in his 1904 writings--Form (1ns), Matter >> (2ns), and Entelechy (3ns). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSch midt >> <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 9:07 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >> >>> Gary, Jon S, >>> >>> I’ve inserted a few questions below … >>> >>> Gary f >>> >>> From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] >>> >>> Sent: 28-Feb-18 19:15 >>> >>> Jon, list, >>> >>> Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote: >>> >>> EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is identical , in such >>> identity as a Sign may have, with the unity of the very Matter denoted >>> by it and the very Form signified by it, such that its Interpretant is the >>> Truth. >>> >>> If this is so, then, since any given Sign or accretion of Signs in a >>> Quasi-mind (say on a sheet of assertion) can only signify specific aspects >>> or facets of the Object (ITS Object, mind you) as a certain, shall we say, >>> "selected assemblage" of characters (its Form), it would seem to me that a >>> perfect Sign remains an Ideal, that even the perfect Sign can only >>> asymptotically approach the Truth that it means to represent. >>> >>> Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs >>> in a Quasi-mind? >>> >>> So, in sum, the Object can never be completely represented even by a >>> perfect Sign, and even if, as Jon wrote: >>> >>> The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object of >>> the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the >>> entire effect that the Dynamic Object itself would have on the >>> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). >>> >>> Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include) >>> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate >>> Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your concept of a woman >>> includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you >>> think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept? >>> >>> It seems to me that "reproducing the entire effect that the Dynamic >>> Object itself would have on the Quasi-interpreter" is an impossibility. >>> >>> Yet, Jon, I'm not clear if this interpretation is consistent with this >>> part of your conclusion: >>> >>> Therefore, a perfect Sign in this sense is one that achieves Entelechy, >>> the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant. This is >>> the final cause of all triadic semiosis, Truth as "the conformity of a >>> representamen to its object--its object, ITS object, mind you" (CP 5.554, >>> EP 2:380; 1906). >>> >>> Of course I completely agree with your concluding sentence. >>> >>> By contrast, dyadic action occurs when there is no mediating Sign; just >>> two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally affecting each other (cf. EP >>> 2:411; 1907). >>> >>> Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with >>> another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a >>> correlate of a triadic relation? >>> >>> But here we are speaking of Science, while I believe that Art is--even >>> if rarely--able to perfectly represent its Object, one which however, it >>> retrospectively, so to speak, creates. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm>http://www.cspeirce.com/ >> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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