Edwina, Jon S, Gary f, list, ET: I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a clarification of Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it.
I completely disagree. First, as you wrote, it is a "current focus." Other foci are possible and, no doubt, desirable. If one is not interested in a particular line of inquiry then one may leave the thread--don't even read the posts in it. But even better is to begin a thread on a 'focus' which *does* interest you. There have been *many* focuses over the years, some of them not even on semeiotics, but rather on other aspects of Peirce's thinking. I would encourage the development of threads on any and all facets of science, philosophy, art, literature, music, architecture, religion, etc. which are Peirce-related. In addition, and significantly, Peirce himself offers *many* "singular definitions of terms" in his discussion of the three branches of semiotics, typically relating them to other terms. I do not see why the "current focus" on the meaning of, especially, some very intriguing terms which Peirce uses in his late work in semeiotic, including "Quasi-mind" and "perfect Sign", "obscures" semeiotic inquiry; rather the contrary is the case in my view. I am finding the threads on Quasi-mind, etc. personally quite stimulating, drawn back into the discussion just when I was about to leave it in the direction of another 'focus'. Finally, I think the dismissal of a particular approach to semeiotic inquiry as 'obscuring it' tends to "block the way of inquiry." ET: In addition, I see the Quasi-Mind as a LOCAL articulation of Mind that enables all three points above - and not as a Sign in itself. Firstly, I thought you weren't interested in the "singular definitions of terms," but here you are participating in that "focus." In any event, I do not agree that a Quasi-mind can be reduced to "a LOCAL articulation of Mind" (see the many Peirce quotes Jon S offered which contradict that interpretation @ https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-02/msg00322 .html) As to your notion that the Quasi-mind is *not* a Sign, it is Peirce who writes that the Quasi-mind *is* a Sign. For example, here (emphasis added): 1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 195 I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I will try. A *thought* is not *per se* in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean this in the same sense as I might say that Right and Truth would remain what they are though they were not embodied, & though nothing were right or true. But a thought, to gain any active mode of being must be embodied in a Sign. A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a determination of a quasi-mind. *The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign.* ET: Yes, as Jerry points out - this linearity [as I call it] disconnects the semiosic action from the relations with a larger network I do not see the "linearity" that you speak of. Please show how the model which, for example, Jon S, Gary f, and I are employing (despite our many moments of sometimes significant disagreement on particulars) "disconnects the semiosic action from the relations with a larger network." Indeed, I would suggest that recent analyses around Quasi-mind do just the opposite, while it is your notion of "Quasi-Mind as a LOCAL articulation of Mind," for example, which seems to "disconnect." You will disagree, I'm certain, but I would say that as much as possible that we are basing our recent analyses at least on Peirce's own model of triadic semiosis (which is hardly linear), whereas I find a certain "linearity" in, for example, your own model of input-mediation-output, your notion of "dynamic transformic nature" in a semiotic context, whereas Peirce generally uses terms like dynamic for dyadic action. Best, Gary R ** *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 3:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a > clarification of Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it. > > My view of Peircean semiosis is its dynamic transformic nature; its > capacity to enable the world to operate as a complex adaptive system. This > capacity requires [1] a triadic semiosic relational systems and [2] > requires a modal nature of three types ; and [3] requires a constant > interactional and relational networking of Signs. I see nothing of this in > the mechanical outline of 'nodes' on a linear path that seems to be the > model now being discussed. > > In addition, I see the Quasi-Mind as a LOCAL articulation of Mind that > enables all three points above - and not as a Sign in itself. > > Yes, as Jerry points out - this linearity [as I call it] disconnects the > semiosic action from the relations with a larger network. > > Edwina > > > > > > On Thu 01/03/18 2:04 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent: > > Dear Jon, Garys, list, > > > > I am confused by your exact treatment. > > It appears to me that you have a clear and correct view but I don’t yet > see it. > > > > Since it is determined, at least by you and Gary R, that you have a grasp > of what Quasi-mind entails, please go a little bit further and say out loud > the answer to this: > > Is Quasi-mind the general standpoint of the spectator? > > > > That is, if quasi-minds are either of the quasi-utterer and > quasi-interpreter or somehow of both, then where, in accordance with your > view, is the spectator? > > > > I feel as though an understanding of this question and answer can help me > to be a better critical thinker; a better citizen of the world, even. > > > > Thanks and with best wishes, > Jerry R > > > On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary F., List: >> >> GF: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs >> in a Quasi-mind? >> >> >> Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an individual >> Sign that is also a complex of Signs," and (in his words) "something >> like the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication." There is nothing >> in EP 2:304 to indicate that "the ideal or perfect sign" is "an accretion >> of Signs," although EP 2:545n25 does refer to "a perfect sign" as "the >> aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries >> with it." I am not quite ready to say anything further about the latter >> passage just yet; I would prefer to cover a bit more semiotic and >> metaphysical ground first. >> >> JAS: The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object >> of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the >> entire >> effect that the Dynamic Object itself would have on the >> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). >> >> >> GF: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include) >> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate >> Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your concept of a woman >> includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you >> think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept? >> >> >> In the 1906 passage that I cited but did not quote, Peirce stated that a >> Sign "is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to >> enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly >> it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that >> quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had >> acted upon it." I have posited that this "respect" is precisely the >> Immediate Object, and stated that determination "must always occur with >> respect to a character or quality; i.e., a Form." Hence the Dynamic >> Object determines the Sign with respect to some, but not all, of its >> characters or qualities; and that partial combination of attributes is >> the Immediate Object, the Form that the Sign communicates. Only the Sign >> itself--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites >> Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant >> (determination). >> >> GF: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with >> another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a >> correlate of a triadic relation? >> >> >> Indeed, it would be better to substitute "Thing" for "Dynamic Object" >> when discussing dyadic reaction; I only wanted to emphasize the direct >> contrast with triadic Sign-action. In fact, I am drafting another post >> to discuss what I see as the key distinctions among Things, Quasi-minds, >> and Persons, continuing to utilize the Aristotelian terms for the >> Categories that Peirce employed in his 1904 writings--Form (1ns), Matter >> (2ns), and Entelechy (3ns). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSch midt >> <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 9:07 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >> >>> Gary, Jon S, >>> >>> I’ve inserted a few questions below … >>> >>> Gary f >>> >>> From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] >>> >>> Sent: 28-Feb-18 19:15 >>> >>> Jon, list, >>> >>> Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote: >>> >>> EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is identical , in such >>> identity as a Sign may have, with the unity of the very Matter denoted >>> by it and the very Form signified by it, such that its Interpretant is the >>> Truth. >>> >>> If this is so, then, since any given Sign or accretion of Signs in a >>> Quasi-mind (say on a sheet of assertion) can only signify specific aspects >>> or facets of the Object (ITS Object, mind you) as a certain, shall we say, >>> "selected assemblage" of characters (its Form), it would seem to me that a >>> perfect Sign remains an Ideal, that even the perfect Sign can only >>> asymptotically approach the Truth that it means to represent. >>> >>> Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs >>> in a Quasi-mind? >>> >>> So, in sum, the Object can never be completely represented even by a >>> perfect Sign, and even if, as Jon wrote: >>> >>> The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object of >>> the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the >>> entire effect that the Dynamic Object itself would have on the >>> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). >>> >>> Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include) >>> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate >>> Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your concept of a woman >>> includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you >>> think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept? >>> >>> It seems to me that "reproducing the entire effect that the Dynamic >>> Object itself would have on the Quasi-interpreter" is an impossibility. >>> >>> Yet, Jon, I'm not clear if this interpretation is consistent with this >>> part of your conclusion: >>> >>> Therefore, a perfect Sign in this sense is one that achieves Entelechy, >>> the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant. This is >>> the final cause of all triadic semiosis, Truth as "the conformity of a >>> representamen to its object--its object, ITS object, mind you" (CP 5.554, >>> EP 2:380; 1906). >>> >>> Of course I completely agree with your concluding sentence. >>> >>> By contrast, dyadic action occurs when there is no mediating Sign; just >>> two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally affecting each other (cf. EP >>> 2:411; 1907). >>> >>> Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with >>> another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a >>> correlate of a triadic relation? >>> >>> But here we are speaking of Science, while I believe that Art is--even >>> if rarely--able to perfectly represent its Object, one which however, it >>> retrospectively, so to speak, creates. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm>http://www.cspeirce.com/ >> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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