On 3/17/2018 3:59 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
what anything is, according to Peirce, accords with the final opinion.
So, the two statements make a paradox or not depending on whether
alterations of things are ultimately bounded by some overarching law or not.
Your suggestion led me to check the original CP 5.555, and I believe
that Margolis (and many others) misinterpreted what Peirce was trying
to say. JM thought that Peirce was asserting the following sentence:
"the act of knowing a real object alters it."
But in the complete paragraph, it occurs in a dependent clause,
which I believe Peirce was denying. Following are the first two
sentences:
CP 5.555
It appears that there are certain mummified pedants who have never
waked to the truth that the act of knowing a real object alters it.
They are curious specimens of humanity, and as I am one of them,
it may be amusing to see how I think.
My interpretation:
1. There are certain mummified pedants.
2. They have not waked to (become aware of) the so-called "truth"
that the the act of knowing a real object alters it.
3. I, CSP, am one of those mummified pedants.
4. I, CSP, am amusingly (ironically) stating the implications
of that so-called truth.
I started to type in the remainder of that paragraph from a paper copy
of Vol 5 & 6. But I did some googling and found a PDF. See below.
John
________________________________________________________________________
From page 3981 of
https://colorysemiotica.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-collectedpapers.pdf
555. It appears that there are certain mummified pedants who have never
waked to the truth that the act of knowing a real object alters it. They
are curious specimens of humanity, and as I am one of them, it may be
amusing to see how I think. It seems that our oblivion to this truth is
due to our not having made the acquaintance of a new analysis that the
True is simply that in cognition which is Satisfactory. As to this
doctrine, if it is meant that True and Satisfactory are synonyms, it
strikes me that it is not so much a doctrine of philosophy as it is
a new contribution to English lexicography.
556. But it seems plain that the formula does express a doctrine of
philosophy, although quite vaguely; so that the assertion does not
concern two words of our language but, attaching some other meaning
to the True, makes it to be coextensive with the Satisfactory in
cognition.
557. In that case, it is indispensable to say what is meant by the True:
until this is done the statement has no meaning. I suppose that by the
True is meant that at which inquiry aims.
558. It is equally indispensable to ascertain what is meant by
Satisfactory; but this is by no means so easy. Whatever be meant,
however, if the doctrine is true at all, it must be necessarily true.
For it is the very object, conceived in entertaining the purpose of
the inquiry, that is asserted to have the character of satisfactoriness.
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