Dear list,
Here is an interesting alternate translation; both from Jessica Moss: The desired and the wished for is either the good or the apparent good (*phainomenon agathon*). And this is why the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good; for some believe it is, and to some it appears [so] although they do not believe it so. For *phantasia* and belief do not reside in the same part of the soul. (EE VII.2 1235b26-29) ~ *Aristotle on the Apparent Good* The desired and the wished for is either the good or the apparent good (*phainomenon agathon*). And this is why the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good; for some believe it is, and to some it appears [good] although they do not believe it so. For *phantasia* [quasi-perceptual appearance] and *doxa* [rational belief] do not reside in the same part of the soul. (EE 1235b26–29) ~ *Aristotle’s Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View that Everyone Always Desires Things under the Guise of the Good* With best wishes, Jerry R On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:39 AM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear list, > > > > Helmut said: > > controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and again. > > I wonder what could we do about this. > > > > And Edwina said: > > our difficulties are based on our own knowledge bases and agendas. > > > > To which Peirce had said: > > > > *It appears, then, that* ~Commens > > > > ... the rule for attaining the third [the highest] grade of clearness is > as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical > bearings, we con- ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our > conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object > (5.402, 1878). > > ~ Haack, The Meaning of Pragmatism: The Ethics of Terminology and the > Language of Philosophy > > > > This maxim once accepted, – *intelligently accepted*, in the light of the > evidence of its truth, – speedily sweeps all metaphysical rubbish out of > one’s house. > > We must therefore attempt to decide about these matters and others akin to > them, taking as a starting point the following. > > The thing desired and wished is either the good or the apparent good. > Therefore also the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good, since > some people think it good, and to others it appears good even though they > do not think it so (as appearance and opinion are not in the same part of > the spirit). [Note] Yet it is clear that both the good and the pleasant > are dear. > > This being decided, we must make another assumption. Things good are some > of them absolutely good, others good for someone but not good absolutely; > and the same things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant. > > With best wishes, > Jerry R > > > On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:33 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Helmut, list >> >> I think it's very difficult, not at all due to Peirce, but to our >> own developed knowledge bases and our own agendas, to find agreement. >> >> For example, many view 'the Sign' as a conceptual re-presentation of an >> object, with the human agent as an interpreter of some object or word 'out >> there'. The focus is on 'the ultimate truth' of the image, in this >> interpreter's mind, of that 'out there' object/word. >> >> I, on the other hand, view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual construct >> but as a actual morphological unit, as an existential spatiotemporal unit >> of matter, formed by Mind, existent within constant relations with other >> Signs/morphological units. So, for me, this Sign is itself existential >> as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a plant, a word..and even, a >> society. Operating within the three categorical modes. Constantly >> interactive via the basic format of the Sign Process of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI.... >> >> Not many people are interested in such a perspective - and, I maintain, >> that it does not deny or contradict any Peircean theory. Most people are >> interested in the human conceptual domain - where a human interprets what >> someone said or did - and this re-presentation is deemed 'the Sign'. >> >> So- again, our difficulties, I maintain, have nothing to do with Peirce. >> His insights permit both views - our difficulties are based on our own >> knowledge bases and agendas. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue 10/04/18 12:04 PM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent: >> >> Edwina, Mike, list, >> I too don´t see a versus there. Maybe that is because I see sign, object, >> interpretant as examples for 1ns, 2ns, 3ns. But I guess that this is a >> subject both fundamental and controversial like some others (e.g whether >> sign is the same as representamen or not, whether the DO (same problem with >> the DI and the FI) is external to the sign, being the subject it is about, >> or the subject´s function in the sign, therefore internal, which >> controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and again. >> I wonder what could we do about this. >> Best, Helmut >> >> 10. April 2018 um 14:35 Uhr >> "Edwina Taborsky" >> >> >> Mike, list >> >> Nice post - I'll just comment briefly before specifically commenting on >> Gary R's post. >> >> I'm not in the camp of 'signs and semiosis' vs the three categories. I >> don't see how the one can function without the other. I self-define my >> perspective as a focus on morphology - on how energy, so to speak, >> transforms into matter or how the unformed becomes the formed. This matter >> can be within the physical-chemical realm, the biological, the conceptual, >> the societal. I'm NOT focused on re-presentation, which is, in my view, a >> purely cerebral focus on words; or words to images. I'm focused on >> morphology, and view this transformation as taking place within the >> semiosic triad and the three categories. >> >> So, a plethora of cells is transformed from one morphological primitive >> form into a more complex form via the habit formations [Thirdness]...But >> Thirdness is complex with three types [3-3, 3-2, 3-1] and this enables >> information exchange with the environment [via 3-2] rather than simple >> repetition of type [3-1]. So, Firstness is involved to enable adaptation, >> and Secondness is involved to enable direct contact with the local >> environmental realities. The result - is an adapted insect. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> On Mon 09/04/18 10:34 PM , Mike Bergman [email protected] sent: >> >> Hi Gary R, List, >> >> I thought this exchange was very worthwhile, esp. your current response. >> I have read your points multiple times and tried to think clearly about >> what you said. I find that I am in 'general agreement' with all that you >> have written in this response. As a result, I changed the subject line from >> 'Re: Order of Determination' to reflect my view. We have found at least one >> overlap in the Venn diagram. >> >> What I especially like is your basing your points on the universal >> categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation, generality, >> continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says and you quote, be a >> medium "between a Second and its First." In the sense I frequently use it, >> namely categorization of things for knowledge representation, this is the >> same as saying we find general types (Thirdness) of particulars >> (Secondness) by looking at their essences and shared qualities (Firstness). >> I frankly do not see why we need to use language such as >> "quasi-necessarily" as Edwina poses. I can not see where habit or any of >> the other senses of Thirdness may occur without Secondness and Firstness. >> >> I also like your pointing to the use of prescission to look at these >> questions. One observation I would make is that there is a community of >> Peirce researchers who see their investigations primarily through the lens >> of signs and semiosis. I believe Edwina would place herself in this group. >> That is well and good and in the sense of sign use and making and >> representation may indeed be the best perspective. But, for me, I see the >> universal categories as the governing primitives. (I believe Peirce did as >> well.) For example, in the pure sense of the phaneron, the reality of >> Firstness, I presently believe, is outside of the process of semiosis. Once >> we try to signify Firstness, a reification of sorts, we make it actual, >> which places it as a monadic idea in Secondness. (Not dissimilar from >> quantum effects.) We can talk about it and describe it, but it remains >> removed from the essence of Firstness. One can take these viewpoints based >> on Peirce's own statements about the categories and prescission. (CP 1.353) >> I guess put another way, for me, the universal categories are the >> adjudicators in how I try to think about Peirce, not semiosis, which is a >> process of representation. However, of course, from the vantage of >> representation, semiosis naturally holds sway. >> >> Thanks for trying to find common ground. From my perspective, you did an >> admirable job. >> >> Mike >> On 4/9/2018 6:10 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >> >> Edwina, list, >> >> Thanks for responding to my post, Edwina. I'm sorry that it's taken me a >> couple of days to reply, but this weekend happened to be especially busy. >> >> In the spirit of trying to see if it's possible to come to agreement on >> certain recent points of contention, I'd like to begin my response with a >> principle upon which we appear to be in agreement. You quoted me, then >> commented. >> >> >> 3] Gary R: Similarly Peirce uses the phrase "regulative hope" in >> consideration of just those habits of thought and action which, through >> hetero- and homo-correction (science as critical commonsense writ large) >> tend toward a belief wholly congruent with Reality, whatever you, I, Jon, >> or any given community of inquirers might think. >> EDWINA: Agree. >> >> >> Mike and John S suggested that it might be a valuable strategy to see if >> through dialogue here that there might be some significant ideas or >> principles of Peircean semeiotics and philosophy more generally with which >> we might come to at least some agreement. While I'm not looking for >> anything like "general agreement" on any point, I'd be interested to see if >> there's anyone in the forum who disagrees that this (stated perhaps too >> tersely above) is what Peirce means by the expression "regulative hope," >> that is, in referring it to the sense of how inquiry taken up in the >> scientific spirit brings us closer to a grasp of the Real? >> >> Now, on to the other points. >> >> 1] Gary R: Edwina, all the things that you question, disagree, or reject >> here will be found in Peirce. He himself, for example, says that 'the >> subject matter of normative science consists of the relations of phenomena >> to ends'. >> >> >> >> EDWINA: I'm not questioning their being 'found' in Peirce. One can cherry >> pick a zillion quotes from Peirce. I'm questioning their pragmatic use >> within an analysis. >> >> >> I agree in a general sense. But in this particular matter of the >> quotation, 'the subject matter of normative science consists of the >> relations of phenomena to ends,' I don't believe that there is any >> cherry picking going on whatsoever The subject matter of the other two >> branches of cenoscopic philosophy, phenomenology and metaphysics, are >> different from that of the normative sciences. One can agree or disagree >> with with what Peirce saw as the purpose of each of these three branches, >> but at least in a pragmatic analysis of his architectonic philosophy in >> consideration of scientific inquiry, it is important, I believe, to >> distinguish them. This is principally, I believe, because he develops >> his architectonic philosophy, outlined in his Classification of Sciences, >> as an aid to pragmatic inquiry, including what you referred to above as >> "their >> pragmatic use within an analysis." >> >> 2] Gary R: Similarly, the 'ideal end of semiosis is the development of >> habits that would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including, >> but not limited to, true beliefs' is a decidedly Peircean notion >> concerning an asymptotic tendency of scientific inquiry towards the Truth >> such that Truth == Reality. It is not Hegelian whatsoever in my view as >> Reality in Peirce's sense itself involves all three categories, not just >> 3ns. >> >> EDWINA: Here, I question the view that 'the development of habits that >> would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including but not >> limited to, true beliefs'. I'm not questioning this statement. I'm >> questioning the view that a 'final state' exists, where habits are no >> longer open to the realities of 1ns and 2ns. Let me explain. I can, for >> example, analyze the biological and chemical nature of a lion - such that I >> can determine the essentially true nature of it as a biological species. >> And - this analysis would not be 'confounded by subsequent experience' of >> the lion species. It's a 'scientific truth'. >> >> I agree that a final state does not, cannot exist in Peirce science >> exactly because it involves an evolutionary philosophy. That's why I >> suggested that the expression 'final state' refers to a regulative >> principle, and so I earlier used the term 'asymptotic' to suggest that >> while one can, perhaps, get closer and closer to the complete facts, >> principles, laws regarding the truth of any reality into which one might >> inquire, one can never definitively or fully arrive there (this is not >> to suggest that we can't grasp many specific 'truths', such as the real >> characteristics of an plant or animal species--see below). Peirce's term >> 'final' is misleading if one doesn't keep this in mind. So, in my view >> Peirce's notion is not Hegelian in the sense the 3ns is the be all and end >> all. For as long is there is evolutionary growth of any sort in the cosmos, >> all >> three categories will be in effect. >> >> In the case of the true (real) nature of the lion as a species, I fully >> agree that what we now know represents scientific truth even should that >> species evolve. Peirce suggests that there are no doubt many of these >> "scientific truths," but that we can't be certain that any one in >> particular will 'hold' in the future. But there's no reason to doubt what >> we've no reason to doubt as to what science has already discovered. >> >> ET: BUT - just because I have analyzed the scientifically valid nature of >> this species - does NOT mean that its habits are closed to adaptation and >> evolution. They could - and probably will - evolve and change. So, habit >> formation and truth are not the same thing. >> >> I agree that "habit formation and truth are not the same thing." What I >> suggested was that our human striving to understand the nature of reality >> together in a scientific way is the optimal way to arrive at whatever >> truths we may ever hope to achieve in whatever areas of inquiry we may take >> up. We could, of course, be wrong at any point in our inquiry, while the >> history of science will show that this has been the case any number of >> times. But, again, we clearly make scientific discoveries or we wouldn't >> see, for example, the development of the technologies we've witnessed even >> in our own lives--but our understandings remain fallible especially as we >> continue our inquiries. >> >> 4] Gary R: It is Peirce who says that the habit-taking tendency is the >> primordial law of mind, I believe first in the essay "The Law of Mind" >> (1892). Habits, 3ns, in the involutional sense I recently commented on as >> it appears in "The Logic of Mathematics," involve the other two categories >> quasi-necessarily. >> >> EDWINA: My view is that habit-taking is ONE of the primordial laws >> of Mind . Indeed, the formation of habits is vital. . . However, I don't >> see that habits 'involve' the other two categories quasi-necessarily. That >> is, Thirdness does not, in its own nature, require 1ns or 2ns. . . >> >> Here I will have to partially disagree. Although one can abstract >> (prescind) 1ns and 2ns from 3ns, it is of the very nature of the categories >> that in the phaneron and in reality that they are all present, that in >> particular that 3ns involves (cf 'involutional' as Peirce uses it) 2ns and >> 1ns. >> >> 1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture III | CP 5.66 >> >> Category the Third is the Idea of that which is such as it is as being a >> Third, or Medium, between a Second and its First. That is to say, it is >> Representation as an element of the Phenomenon. >> You agree that this is so apparently only for semiosis: ET (continuing >> from above): . . .but semiosis certainly, absolutely, does. . . >> >> I am beginning to see what you've been aiming at as regards habits in >> your writing, for example: >> >> ET (continuing): . . .a universe made up only of habits is obviously dead >> - in the sense that all life has ended, all individuation has ended, and >> the universe is one huge crystal [see 6.33]. Peirce himself saw this only >> as pure theoretical speculation in the infinite [i.e., never] future. >> >> And I see you as actually resolving the whole question in writing in the >> snippet above that for Peirce this virtual cessation of all life, >> growth, and evolution is but "speculation in the infinite [i.e., never] >> future" (which is why I just used the term 'virtual' and not 'actual'). >> >> ET: . . . [Semiosis] exists as Mind - which functions within all three >> primordial modes: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns - and I see all of them as equal and basic >> primordial forces. >> >> I wouldn't use 'exists' or 'forces' as you have here because I associate >> both those terms with 2ns, but I agree that semiosis involves all three of >> Peirce's categories and further agree that they are 'equal', 'basic' and >> 'priordial'. I don't, however, see them in reality as ever occurring apart >> from each other even while one may (at least seemingly) dominate in any >> given situation. >> >> ET: As for 'entelechy' - Peirce may have used the term, but what did he >> mean by it? >> >> I personally think that Peirce was clear enough by what he meant by >> entelechy in writing: >> >> >> 1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:304 >> >> . . . The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, >> will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the “Truth” of being. The >> “Truth,” the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate >> interpretant of every sign. >> >> I expect that you'll disagree with much of what I've written above. But I >> believe that besides that one clear point of agreement at the top of this >> post as well as some apparent partial agreement in a few other points, >> that, with further inquiry, we might arrive at others. >> >> Meanwhile, I very much look forward to your response to this message >> should you offer one. But, I think that for now I'll leave the last word to >> you. Thank you again for your very thoughtful response to my last post. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> >> >> >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> 718 482-5690 >> >> On Sat, Apr 7, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >>> >>> Gary R - see my responses below: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat 07/04/18 1:06 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: >>> >>> Edwina, Jon, list, >>> >>> 1] Gary R: Edwina, all the things that you question, disagree, or reject >>> here will be found in Peirce. He himself, for example, says that 'the >>> subject matter of normative science consists of the relations of phenomena >>> to ends'. >>> >>> EDWINA: I'm not questioning their being 'found' in Peirce. One can >>> cherry pick a zillion quotes from Peirce. I'm questioning their pragmatic >>> use within an analysis. >>> ----------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> 2] Gary R: Similarly, the 'ideal end of semiosis is the development of >>> habits that would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including, >>> but not limited to, true beliefs' is a decidedly Peircean notion >>> concerning an asymptotic tendency of scientific inquiry towards the Truth >>> such that Truth == Reality. It is not Hegelian whatsoever in my view as >>> Reality in Peirce's sense itself involves all three categories, not just >>> 3ns. >>> >>> EDWINA: Here, I question the view that 'the development of habits that >>> would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including but not >>> limited to, true beliefs'. I'm not questioning this statement. I'm >>> questioning the view that a 'final state' exists, where habits are no >>> longer open to the realities of 1ns and 2ns. Let me explain. I can, for >>> example, analyze the biological and chemical nature of a lion - such that I >>> can determine the essentially true nature of it as a biological species. >>> And - this analysis would not be 'confounded by subsequent experience' of >>> the lion species. It's a 'scientific truth'. >>> >>> BUT - just because I have analyzed the scientifically valid nature of >>> this species - does NOT mean that its habits are closed to adaptation and >>> evolution. They could - and probably will - evolve and change. So, habit >>> formation and truth are not the same thing. >>> >>> -------------------------------------------- >>> >>> 3] Gary R: Similarly Peirce uses the phrase "regulative hope" in >>> consideration of just those habits of thought and action which, through >>> hetero- and homo-correction (science as critical commonsense writ large) >>> tend toward a belief wholly congruent with Reality, whatever you, I, Jon, >>> or any given community of inquirers might think. >>> >>> EDWINA: Agree. >>> >>> ------------------------ >>> >>> 4] Gary R: It is Peirce who says that the habit-taking tendency is the >>> primordial law of mind, I believe first in the essay "The Law of Mind" >>> (1892). Habits, 3ns, in the involutional sense I recently commented on as >>> it appears in "The Logic of Mathematics," involve the other two categories >>> quasi-necessarily. >>> >>> EDWINA: My view is that habit-taking is ONE of the primordial laws >>> of Mind . Indeed, the formation of habits is vital. Peirce himself said >>> that without it - mass would at one instant weigh a pound and at the next >>> instant, weigh a ton' [memory quote]. However, I don't see that habits >>> 'involve' the other two categories quasi-necessarily. That is, Thirdness >>> does not, in its own nature, require 1ns or 2ns, but semiosis certainly, >>> absolutely, does - for a universe made up only of habits is obviously dead >>> - in the sense that all life has ended, all individuation has ended, and >>> the universe is one huge crystal [see 6.33]. Peirce himself saw this only >>> as pure theoretical speculation in the infinite [i.e., never] future. >>> >>> So, semiosis is, in my view, above all a dynamic process of >>> Mind-becoming-Matter. There is no need for the 'sop to Cerberus of bringing >>> in a human observer. Therefore, it is not a communication system, not an >>> 'interpretation system' but an actual pragmatic system of how matter >>> exists in our universe. It exists as Mind - which functions within all >>> three primordial modes: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns - and I see all of them as equal >>> and basic primordial forces. >>> >>> -------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> 4] Gary R: Finally, it is Peirce who calls the Sign an entelechy. >>> >>> EDWINA; Again, we have to each of us clarify what we mean by 'Sign'. I >>> mean, by Sign, the full irreducible triad of DO-[IO-R-II]. The reason I >>> insist on the relation of DO with this triad is because no Sign can exist >>> in isolation; it is always within some interaction. >>> >>> However, others mean by Sign - what I refer to only as the Repesentamen, >>> the node of mediation. >>> >>> So- I think one has to be very specific about this meaning. >>> >>> As for 'entelechy' - Peirce may have used the term, but what did he mean >>> by it? After all, his comparison of it with Thirdness does not mean that >>> there is an a priori agenda of Mind-forming-Matter. As he says, Thirdness, >>> as habits, providing predictive constraints, 'is essentially of a general >>> nature, and cannot ever be completely fulfilled' 1.26. Again, "this mode of >>> being which consists, mind my word, if you please, the mode of being which >>> consists in the fact that future facts of Secondness will take on a >>> determinate general character, I call a Thirdness" 1.26. >>> >>> Thirdness is general and not specific; it is not 'a priori' and with a >>> specific potential/purpose [which is what is suggested in some uses of the >>> term 'entelechy'] but, as general -its articulation within an individual >>> form of matter - is open to local stimuli. That is, with the reality >>> of both Secondness, which is the local individual 'articulation' of >>> Mind-as-Matter [and thus, susceptible to local stimuli] and the reality of >>> Firstness, which is the reality of chance deviations from the norm - then, >>> this general character of habits, is open to adaptation and change. >>> There is no predetermined future identity of the Universe or of how >>> Mind-as-Matter will function. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" >> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should >> go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" >> in the BODY of the message. 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