Jon, just one question here: What’s the change of mind that you are referring
to when you say “Peirce's initial parallelism here aligns the Object of a Sign
with its Breadth, and its Interpretant with its Depth; so he evidently had
changed his mind about the latter already by 1906”? Change from what?
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: 4-Jul-18 12:07
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs
Gary F., List:
As if my previous post were not long enough already, last night I read through
"Prolegomena" (1906) in its entirety and came across two other passages that
struck me as worth mentioning.
CSP: A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book
is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty thes on
a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word
"word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English language; and it is
impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any
voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does
not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely
significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once
and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing
which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing
being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this
or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I
will venture to call a Token. An indefinite significant character such as a
tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such
a Sign a Tone. In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a
Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type
signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the Type.
Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a page. (CP 4.537)
Peirce here gave his standard example of one word ("the") that only exists in
its multiple Replicas, calling the word in itself a Type and each of those
Replicas--or any other "Single thing or Single event" that is "significant only
as occurring just when and where it does"--a Token. Next he defined a Tone as
"an indefinite significant character," citing "a tone of voice" as an example.
Then he proposed to call a Token that embodies a Type an Instance, noting that
it has at least two Objects--the Type itself, and the Object of that Type.
My understanding of all this is that every Token is an Instance that embodies a
Type, and every Tone is a significant character that is embodied in a Token.
Another way of saying this is that every Tone is involved in a Token, and every
Token is involved in a Type. The upshot is what I have suggested
previously--every Sign in itself is a Type that "does not exist, it only
determines things that do exist"; i.e., in accordance with my interpretation of
"Sketch" (1904), it is an Entelechy that determines a Matter (each
Replica/Token/Instance) to a Form (the Immediate Object).
I would thus argue that even a "natural sign," such as a thermometer or a
symptom of disease, is always an Instance of a Type. The rising or falling of
the top of a confined column of fluid with changing temperature, or the
reaction of a human body to an infectious agent, is the dynamic effect of
processes that are governed by the "laws of nature." The reliability of such
an Index is due entirely to the inveterate habits of matter that generally
ensure consistent behavior and serve as its Object, along with the particular
circumstance that it indicates here and now. It is a Token of the Type that is
the combination of relevant "laws of nature."
CSP: No cognition and no Sign is absolutely precise, not even a Percept; and
indefiniteness is of two kinds, indefiniteness as to what is the Object of the
Sign, and indefiniteness as to its Interpretant, or indefiniteness in Breadth
and in Depth ... An ordinary Proposition ingeniously contrives to convey novel
information through Signs whose significance depends entirely on the
interpreter's familiarity with them; and this it does by means of a
"Predicate," i.e., a term explicitly indefinite in breadth, and defining its
breadth by means of "Subjects," or terms whose breadths are somewhat definite,
but whose informative depth (i.e., all the depth except an essential
superficies) is indefinite, while conversely the depth of the Subjects is in a
measure defined by the Predicate. (CP 4.543)
Peirce's initial parallelism here aligns the Object of a Sign with its Breadth,
and its Interpretant with its Depth; so he evidently had changed his mind about
the latter already by 1906. On the other hand, he went on to attribute breadth
to "Subjects" and depth to "Predicates." With that in mind, I still maintain
that it makes more sense to associate breadth with the (Dynamic) Object, the
Matter that the Sign denotes; depth with characters of that Object
(constituting the Immediate Object), the Form that the Sign signifies; and
information with the (Final) Interpretant, the Entelechy (unity of Matter and
Form) that the Sign intends.
As discussed previously, a Term/Rheme/Seme is not an informational Sign because
it only has (somewhat) definite breadth or depth, not both. Hence it is an
incomplete Sign, deficient as an Entelechy that unifies Matter and
(qualitative) Form, indefinite with respect to either its breadth or its depth
(or both)--corresponding to the blank(s) in the continuous predicate (copula)
that represents its logical form. That is presumably why such a Sign can only
be presented (Suggestive), not urged (Imperative) or submitted (Indicative);
and can only provide assurance of instinct (Abducent), not experience
(Inducent) or form (Deducent).
Regards,
Jon S.
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