Jerry,

Peirce always insisted that the analysis of propositions or of their meanings 
should not be based on linguistic grammar, i.e. on the ‘parts of speech’ 
involved, because the linguistic structure of the sentences that represent 
propositions varies from language to language, and logic/semeiotic is aims for 
the deeper and more universal structural principles that he called “speculative 
grammar.” If you think he was mistaken in refusing to confuse linguistic or 
“sentential” meaning with semiotic meaning, perhaps you would prefer Victoria 
Welby’s “significs” to Peirce’s semiotics. The letter to Welby that I quoted in 
my message to Jon had another sentence at the end which I omitted before. This 
time I’ll include it:

[[ … My studies must extend over the whole of general Semeiotic. I think, dear 
Lady Welby, that you are in danger of falling into some error in consequence of 
limiting your studies so much to Language and among languages to one very 
peculiar language, as all Aryan Languages are; and within that language so much 
to words.  ] SS 118 ]

Gary f.

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]> 
Sent: 5-Jul-18 09:59
To: Peirce List <[email protected]>
Cc: Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

 

List:

On Jul 5, 2018, at 7:38 AM, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>  
wrote:

 

In your other post, you wrote, “A Rheme not only must have at least one blank 
empty, but also at least one blank filled; it must have either breadth or 
depth, just not both.” I don’t know where you get this idea … A rheme with no 
empty blanks is called by Peirce a medad rheme (CP 2.272). Also, breadth of a 
term or rheme is not the filling of a blank, but the potential of a blank to be 
filled; and the filled blank would represent the breadth of a proposition, 
which must have both breadth and depth in order to convey information, and 
therefore be relevant to logical critic.

 

CP 2.272 is indeed critical.

 

>From the perspective of “meaning”, CP 2.272 represents the relationships 
>between the concept the structure of a sentence and the logical content of it. 
> Thus, CSP is maladroitly separating the words of a sentence into what he 
>believes are more important terms from terms of ????  (lesser important?).  
>The listing of the terms, medad, monad, dyad, triad, etc, lacks sentential 
>meaning to this reader because CSP fails to relate the medad, monad, dyad,…  
>to either the subject or predicate or prepositions, or adjectives, or adverbs, 
>etc., of the statement. 

 

In short, the fancy terms, medad, monad, dyad, triad,…  simply say a sentence 
may contain 0,1,2,3, or more proper names.  

 

What I find interesting in CP 2.272 is that one meaningful use of this queer 
quasi- grammatical categorization is in the notion of parts of a whole which 
was later developed into an important part of mathematical logic (Lesniewski’s 
logic).

This is consistent with 3.420-421.

 

On the positive note, the rheme appears to extend the earlier usage of 
syncategorimata (sp?).

 

Perhaps JAS would like to relate CP 2.272 AND 3.420-1 to his views of 
meaningful information since any proper name could mean either breadth or 
depth. depending on the grammar and context of the organization of the 
proposition.

 

Cheers

 

Jerry

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