Helmut, list
I'd agree with you - that it's not enough to analytically take apart
the triadic Sign into its Relations [that between the R and the O;
that between the R and the I; and that of the R in itself]. You have
to consider how this whole set functions. Otherwise - why does it
even exist? That is - what pragmatic effect is there from this
triadic interaction of information?
Edwina
On Wed 22/08/18 12:57 AM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:
Gary, List, Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object
and interpretant: "1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd
Draught of 3rd Lecture | MS [R] 462:74
…a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the
interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the
relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object." (From Commens
Dictionary "sign") "1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and
Multitude | MS [R] 31:2
A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to an
interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second
category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first category
concern." (same source)
I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate
and function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If
you see it as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a
function, which involves (functionally contains) the relation
(involvement as function).
That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more
too? It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement
define being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the
written form of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives.
Best,
Helmut 22. August 2018 um 00:40 Uhr
"Gary Richmond"
wrote: Jon, Helmut, List, Jon wrote: JAS: [T]he Sign itself
is not a triadic relation; it is one Correlate (or Subject) of a
triadic relation, along with the Object and the Interpretant. I
think it is very important to maintain this fundamental distinction.
I would strongly agree. One would think that in consideration of the
cenoscopic science of logic as semeiotics that "the Sign itself. . .
is one Correlate. . . of a triadic relation" would be seen as a
settled matter however differently it might (correctly or
incorrectly) be seen by some in, say, some idioscopic science. From
what I can tell from decades of reading the secondary literature on
this matter, with few exceptions amongst semioticians it is a settled
matter. In any event, Peirce is emphatic that "the Sign itself is not
a triadic relation." JAS: As I said earlier today in another
thread, a Y is adequate as a logical representation of any triadic
relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of
semiosis--from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant.
I agree. In fact, for the directionality of semiosis the triangle with
bent arrows works quite well. In trichotomic, semiosis follows
the directionality of the vector of determination, namely from the
Object, 2ns (at the bottom vertex of the triangle) through the Sign,
1ns (at its top), to the Interpretant, 3ns (at the vertex on the
right). Peirce uses both the turnstile, Y, and the triangle in
various triadic diagrams in his discussion of semeiotics--but for
different purposes. One is not 'right', the other 'wrong' as some
assert. The triangle is also handy when considering trichotomic
relations in Phenomenology and Metaphysics. For example (as it is
analyzed categorially in "A Neglected Argument": JAS:
"S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is
Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is
incorporated--"O determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in
reference to O, such that O determines I through the mediation of S"
(cf. EP 2:410; 1907). Mats Bergman even characterized this as "one
of Peirce's finest sign definitions." As I suggested above,
Mats Bergman is hardly alone in maintaining that the directionality
of semeiosis is essential in defining the Sign. JAS: "S
represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the
Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the
interpreter, just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the
utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907). Exactly. In other words: The
Object is 'utterer' of the Sign; it mediates between the Object and
the Interpretant (the Sign representing the Object to the
'interpreter'). O -> S -> I JAS:
However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S
represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding.
My understanding as well. Best, Gary Gary
Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690
On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 4:26 PM Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote: Helmut, List: No, the Sign itself is not a triadic
relation; it is one Correlate (or Subject) of a triadic relation,
along with the Object and the Interpretant. I think it is very
important to maintain this fundamental distinction. As I said
earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a logical
representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive
"directionality" of semiosis--from the Object through the Sign to the
Interpretant. "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general,
but it is Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is
incorporated--"O determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in
reference to O, such that O determines I through the mediation of S"
(cf. EP 2:410; 1907). Mats Bergman even characterized this as "one
of Peirce's finest sign definitions." "S represents O to I" is more
specific, but still correct with I as the Interpretant, since that is
the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter, just as the Object is
the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907).
However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S
represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding. Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:26 PM,
Helmut Raulien wrote: Jon, List, To your point 2.: I think, a
sign is a triadic relation, so a Y is ok, but it is a very special
kind of triadic relation. I think: -"S mediates between O and I" is
too general, because it does not show that there is a difference
between O and I. -"S represents O to I" is wrong, I think, because
in that case "I" would be the interpreter, not the interpretant. I
propose: -"S represents O as I". Best, Helmut
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