Jon, Helmut, List, Jon wrote: "Only later [than the 1903 classification] did Peirce add trichotomies according to the *nature *of each Object and Interpretant--phaneroscopic (Immediate), ontological (Dynamic), or normative (Final)."
J ust so. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 9:35 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., Helmut, List: > > One clarification--in the 1903 taxonomy, the second and third trichotomies > are not divisions of the (Dynamic) Object and (Final) Interpretant > *themselves*, but of their *relations *to the Sign. For a Dicent > Indexical Sinsign, the S-FI *relation*, the S-DO *relation*, and the Sign > itself are in the Category of 2ns (Existents). Only later did Peirce add > trichotomies according to the *nature *of each Object and > Interpretant--phaneroscopic (Immediate), ontological (Dynamic), or > normative (Final). > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 1:04 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Helmut, List, >> >> Helmut wrote: "Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and >> interpretant." >> >> And so, in one very limited sense, it does. You gave this quote >> >> *CSP: A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to >> an interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second >> category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first category concern >> (*"1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and Multitude | MS [R] >> 31:2, emphasis added*). *[Btw: there is an apparent terminological >> problem in this quotation as Peirce writes that 'meaning' concerns 1ns; but >> since he has just stated that the sign's "reference to an interpretant" is >> a matter of 3ns (typcially associated by him with meaning), this apparent >> problem is, I think, easily overcome.] >> >> Continuing >> >> HR: I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and >> function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it >> as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a function, which involves >> (functionally contains) the relation (involvement as function). >> >> I think your comment represents a misunderstanding of 'involvement' in >> this context, one which most certainly does *not* 'functionally contain' >> a relation at all (see my comment below). >> >> HR: That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more >> too? It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement >> define being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the >> written form of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives. >> >> I agree that it is important to understand "to involve" in Peirce's >> semeiotic. In his classification of signs *involution* is *tricategorial >> involution* whereas the interpretant (3ns) involves the object (2ns) >> which involves the sign itself (1ns). >> >> Each of these (i.e., interpretant, object, sign itself) has its own >> tricategorial designation. So, for example, the object may be 'symbolic' >> (3ns), indexical (2ns), or iconic (1ns). An analogous tricategorial >> division applies to the interpretant and to the sign itself. >> >> But *this *notion of categorial involution is offered merely for the >> purpose of the abstract analysis of each of the 10 sign classes. It is >> taken up in theoretical grammar, the first of the three divisions of logic >> as semeiotic. And it only indirectly and *very* abstractly relates to >> semiosis itself. >> >> As you wrote: HR: "the written form of a sign class is that of a noun >> with two adjectives," or as I would phrase it: *In the order of >> involution a sign class is written with two adjective followed by a noun. >> *The >> first adjective refers to the interpretant, the second adjective refers to >> the object, and, finally, the noun is the sign itself (i.e., quali-, sin-, >> or legisign). >> >> So, for famous example, sign class 4 (e.g., a weather vane) is written >> dicentic indexical sinsign, the interpretant in category 2ns (adj., >> dicentic), the object also in category 2ns (adj., indexical), the sign >> itself also in category 2ns (noun, sinsign). >> That is all! There is no functionality whatsoever in categorial >> involution as it concerns the sign classes. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690* >> >> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 12:57 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Gary, List, >>> >>> Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and interpretant: >>> >>> "1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture | >>> MS [R] 462:74 >>> >>> …a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the >>> interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the >>> relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object." (From Commens >>> Dictionary "sign") >>> "1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and Multitude | MS [R] 31:2 >>> >>> A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to an >>> interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second >>> category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first >>> category concern." (same source) >>> >>> I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and >>> function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it >>> as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a function, which involves >>> (functionally contains) the relation (involvement as function). >>> >>> That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more too? >>> It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement define >>> being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the written form >>> of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Helmut >>> 22. August 2018 um 00:40 Uhr >>> "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> Jon, Helmut, List, >>> >>> Jon wrote: >>> >>> JAS: [T]he Sign *itself *is not a triadic relation; it is one >>> *Correlate *(or *Subject*) of a triadic relation, along with the Object >>> and the Interpretant. I think it is very important to maintain this >>> fundamental distinction. >>> >>> I would strongly agree. One would think that in consideration of the >>> cenoscopic science of *logic as semeiotics* that "the Sign itself. . . >>> is one Correlate. . . of a triadic relation" would be seen as a settled >>> matter however differently it might (correctly or incorrectly) be seen by >>> some in, say, some idioscopic science. From what I can tell from decades of >>> reading the secondary literature on this matter, with few exceptions >>> amongst semioticians it is a settled matter. In any event, Peirce is >>> emphatic that "the Sign *itself* is not a triadic relation." >>> >>> >>> JAS: As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a >>> *logical *representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the >>> distinctive "directionality" of semiosis--*from *the Object *through *the >>> Sign *to *the Interpretant. >>> >>> >>> I agree. In fact, for the directionality of semiosis the triangle with >>> bent arrows works quite well. >>> [image: image.png] >>> In trichotomic, semiosis follows the directionality of the vector of >>> determination, namely from the Object, 2ns (at the bottom vertex of the >>> triangle) through the Sign, 1ns (at its top), to the Interpretant, 3ns (at >>> the vertex on the right). >>> >>> Peirce uses both the turnstile, Y, and the triangle in various triadic >>> diagrams in his discussion of semeiotics--but* for different purposes*. >>> One is not 'right', the other 'wrong' as some assert. >>> >>> The triangle is also handy when considering trichotomic relations in >>> Phenomenology and Metaphysics. For example (as it is analyzed categorially >>> in "A Neglected Argument": >>> >>> [image: image.png] >>> >>> >>> JAS: "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is >>> Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O >>> determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such >>> that O determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907). Mats >>> Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign >>> definitions." >>> >>> >>> As I suggested above, Mats Bergman is hardly alone in maintaining that >>> the directionality of semeiosis is essential in defining the Sign. >>> >>> >>> JAS: "S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as >>> the Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the >>> interpreter, just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the >>> utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907). >>> >>> >>> Exactly. In other words: The Object is 'utterer' of the Sign; it >>> mediates between the Object and the Interpretant (the Sign representing the >>> Object to the 'interpreter'). O -> S -> I >>> >>> >>> JAS: >>> However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S >>> represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding. >>> >>> >>> My understanding as well. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *718 482-5690* >>> >>> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 4:26 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Helmut, List: >>>> >>>> No, the Sign *itself *is not a triadic relation; it is one *Correlate *(or >>>> *Subject*) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the >>>> Interpretant. I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental >>>> distinction. >>>> >>>> As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a *logical >>>> *representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive >>>> "directionality" of semiosis--*from *the Object *through *the Sign *to >>>> *the Interpretant. >>>> >>>> "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is >>>> Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O >>>> determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such >>>> that O determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907). Mats >>>> Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign >>>> definitions." >>>> >>>> "S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the >>>> Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter, >>>> just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP >>>> 2:404; 1907). >>>> >>>> However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S >>>> represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:26 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Jon, List, >>>>> >>>>> To your point 2.: I think, a sign is a triadic relation, so a Y is ok, >>>>> but it is a very special kind of triadic relation. I think: >>>>> >>>>> -"S mediates between O and I" is too general, because it does not show >>>>> that there is a difference between O and I. >>>>> >>>>> -"S represents O to I" is wrong, I think, because in that case "I" >>>>> would be the interpreter, not the interpretant. I propose: >>>>> >>>>> -"S represents O as I". >>>>> >>>>> Best, Helmut >>>>> >>>>
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