Gary R., Helmut, List: One clarification--in the 1903 taxonomy, the second and third trichotomies are not divisions of the (Dynamic) Object and (Final) Interpretant *themselves*, but of their *relations *to the Sign. For a Dicent Indexical Sinsign, the S-FI *relation*, the S-DO *relation*, and the Sign itself are in the Category of 2ns (Existents). Only later did Peirce add trichotomies according to the *nature *of each Object and Interpretant--phaneroscopic (Immediate), ontological (Dynamic), or normative (Final).
Regards, Jon S. On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 1:04 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut, List, > > Helmut wrote: "Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and > interpretant." > > And so, in one very limited sense, it does. You gave this quote > > *CSP: A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to an > interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second > category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first category concern > (*"1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and Multitude | MS [R] > 31:2, emphasis added*). *[Btw: there is an apparent terminological > problem in this quotation as Peirce writes that 'meaning' concerns 1ns; but > since he has just stated that the sign's "reference to an interpretant" is > a matter of 3ns (typcially associated by him with meaning), this apparent > problem is, I think, easily overcome.] > > Continuing > > HR: I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and > function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it > as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a function, which involves > (functionally contains) the relation (involvement as function). > > I think your comment represents a misunderstanding of 'involvement' in > this context, one which most certainly does *not* 'functionally contain' > a relation at all (see my comment below). > > HR: That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more > too? It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement > define being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the > written form of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives. > > I agree that it is important to understand "to involve" in Peirce's > semeiotic. In his classification of signs *involution* is *tricategorial > involution* whereas the interpretant (3ns) involves the object (2ns) > which involves the sign itself (1ns). > > Each of these (i.e., interpretant, object, sign itself) has its own > tricategorial designation. So, for example, the object may be 'symbolic' > (3ns), indexical (2ns), or iconic (1ns). An analogous tricategorial > division applies to the interpretant and to the sign itself. > > But *this *notion of categorial involution is offered merely for the > purpose of the abstract analysis of each of the 10 sign classes. It is > taken up in theoretical grammar, the first of the three divisions of logic > as semeiotic. And it only indirectly and *very* abstractly relates to > semiosis itself. > > As you wrote: HR: "the written form of a sign class is that of a noun with > two adjectives," or as I would phrase it: *In the order of involution a > sign class is written with two adjective followed by a noun. *The first > adjective refers to the interpretant, the second adjective refers to the > object, and, finally, the noun is the sign itself (i.e., quali-, sin-, or > legisign). > > So, for famous example, sign class 4 (e.g., a weather vane) is written > dicentic indexical sinsign, the interpretant in category 2ns (adj., > dicentic), the object also in category 2ns (adj., indexical), the sign > itself also in category 2ns (noun, sinsign). > That is all! There is no functionality whatsoever in categorial involution > as it concerns the sign classes. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690* > > On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 12:57 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary, List, >> >> Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and interpretant: >> >> "1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture | MS >> [R] 462:74 >> >> …a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the >> interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the >> relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object." (From Commens >> Dictionary "sign") >> "1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and Multitude | MS [R] 31:2 >> >> A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to an >> interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second >> category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first >> category concern." (same source) >> >> I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and >> function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it >> as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a function, which involves >> (functionally contains) the relation (involvement as function). >> >> That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more too? >> It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement define >> being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the written form >> of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives. >> >> Best, >> >> Helmut >> 22. August 2018 um 00:40 Uhr >> "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> Jon, Helmut, List, >> >> Jon wrote: >> >> JAS: [T]he Sign *itself *is not a triadic relation; it is one >> *Correlate *(or *Subject*) of a triadic relation, along with the Object >> and the Interpretant. I think it is very important to maintain this >> fundamental distinction. >> >> I would strongly agree. One would think that in consideration of the >> cenoscopic science of *logic as semeiotics* that "the Sign itself. . . >> is one Correlate. . . of a triadic relation" would be seen as a settled >> matter however differently it might (correctly or incorrectly) be seen by >> some in, say, some idioscopic science. From what I can tell from decades of >> reading the secondary literature on this matter, with few exceptions >> amongst semioticians it is a settled matter. In any event, Peirce is >> emphatic that "the Sign *itself* is not a triadic relation." >> >> >> JAS: As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a >> *logical *representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the >> distinctive "directionality" of semiosis--*from *the Object *through *the >> Sign *to *the Interpretant. >> >> >> I agree. In fact, for the directionality of semiosis the triangle with >> bent arrows works quite well. >> [image: image.png] >> In trichotomic, semiosis follows the directionality of the vector of >> determination, namely from the Object, 2ns (at the bottom vertex of the >> triangle) through the Sign, 1ns (at its top), to the Interpretant, 3ns (at >> the vertex on the right). >> >> Peirce uses both the turnstile, Y, and the triangle in various triadic >> diagrams in his discussion of semeiotics--but* for different purposes*. >> One is not 'right', the other 'wrong' as some assert. >> >> The triangle is also handy when considering trichotomic relations in >> Phenomenology and Metaphysics. For example (as it is analyzed categorially >> in "A Neglected Argument": >> >> [image: image.png] >> >> >> JAS: "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is >> Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O >> determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such >> that O determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907). Mats >> Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign >> definitions." >> >> >> As I suggested above, Mats Bergman is hardly alone in maintaining that >> the directionality of semeiosis is essential in defining the Sign. >> >> >> JAS: "S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as >> the Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the >> interpreter, just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the >> utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907). >> >> >> Exactly. In other words: The Object is 'utterer' of the Sign; it mediates >> between the Object and the Interpretant (the Sign representing the Object >> to the 'interpreter'). O -> S -> I >> >> >> JAS: >> However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S >> represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding. >> >> >> My understanding as well. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690* >> >> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 4:26 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Helmut, List: >>> >>> No, the Sign *itself *is not a triadic relation; it is one *Correlate *(or >>> *Subject*) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the >>> Interpretant. I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental >>> distinction. >>> >>> As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a *logical >>> *representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive >>> "directionality" of semiosis--*from *the Object *through *the Sign *to *the >>> Interpretant. >>> >>> "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is Peirce's >>> own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O determines S >>> relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such that O >>> determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907). Mats >>> Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign >>> definitions." >>> >>> "S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the >>> Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter, >>> just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP >>> 2:404; 1907). >>> >>> However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S >>> represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:26 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Jon, List, >>>> >>>> To your point 2.: I think, a sign is a triadic relation, so a Y is ok, >>>> but it is a very special kind of triadic relation. I think: >>>> >>>> -"S mediates between O and I" is too general, because it does not show >>>> that there is a difference between O and I. >>>> >>>> -"S represents O to I" is wrong, I think, because in that case "I" >>>> would be the interpreter, not the interpretant. I propose: >>>> >>>> -"S represents O as I". >>>> >>>> Best, Helmut >>>> >>>
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